Examining Iran-U.S. Frictions (Part One)

Introduction – These days, more than any other topic, discussions revolve around the hostile atmosphere of Iran-U.S. relations and the nuclear agreement between Iran and the West. There is a possibility that the agreement signed about two years ago between Iran and the countries known as the 1+5, which became famous as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), may be heading towards a downfall. Although this multinational agreement has been approved by the United Nations, inappropriate actions by one of the signatory countries could suspend it and lead to a deadlock. It does not seem that China, Russia, Germany, or the High Representative of the European Union have any interest in disrupting this agreement. The current tension is only between Iran and the United States; however, it is unclear how the configuration of actors will change in the event of an explosive situation. Considering the ambiguity in the configuration and the uncertainty of the outcomes, this first part of the article will examine the actors and current conditions in both Iran and the United States, and then in the second part, we will evaluate various strategies within the framework of game theory. Part One: Actors – Iran – Unlike the United States, all key members of the nuclear negotiation team in Iran remain in power. Ayatollah Khamenei, the leader of Iran, was one of the first to endorse the principle of negotiation. Other key figures, including President Hassan Rouhani, Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif, Deputy Foreign Minister Abbas Araqchi, and Head of the Atomic Energy Organization Ali Akbar Salehi, have retained their responsibilities in the government. Any changes that have occurred have primarily been at lower levels, which have not affected the decision-making process. Although a rightward shift is observed in the leadership's positioning, this shift seems more aimed at maintaining support and ensuring the satisfaction of the Revolutionary Guards and extreme rightists, as well as influencing the selection of members of Rouhani's new cabinet, and does not (at least until today) involve a decision to exit the JCPOA. It appears that behind the scenes, Rouhani has only been allowed to advance negotiations to the extent that it does not lead to establishing relations with the United States. However, this boundary has likely been drawn by the Revolutionary Guards commanders and set as overarching negotiation lines through the leader, although the leader has been aware of the minutiae of the agreement. Meanwhile, when it came to drafting the agreement and the agreement was formulated in legal-political language, the process went out of control, and ultimately, the expertise of the Foreign Ministry's negotiation team in the final drafting and interpretation of the text played a crucial role for the higher authorities of the regime. For instance, the commanders of the Revolutionary Guards have provided necessary consultations on issues such as arms restrictions, but in practice, the Foreign Ministry team managed to utilize the fragile closeness that emerged between U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry and Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif to ambiguously incorporate missile and arms restrictions into Resolution 2231, making it difficult to vote on today. After the signing and officialization of the nuclear agreement, hardliners and sanctions profiteers, who could not change the text of the agreement, attempted to change Zarif and members of the negotiation team. The interventions of this group were significantly effective, blocking Zarif's communication line with Kerry and effectively making Araqchi the main liaison for the JCPOA commission. After one or two regional trips and scattered speeches, especially after he pointed out Iran's military weakness against U.S. power in a student gathering, Zarif came under significant pressure from hardliners and preferred to remain silent. The unsuccessful attempts to turn Rouhani into another Banisadr indicate that Rouhani, due to his role, information, and history in the Security Council and the thirty-eight-year history of the Islamic Republic, cannot be easily sidelined. The difference between Rouhani and President Trump is that Trump often expresses his views based on his personal knowledge of the subject, leading to errors or discrepancies between his statements and those of his ministers. Rouhani acts or coordinates shrewdly, remaining silent when necessary and speaking a layer of reality for daily objectives without revealing everything. If you were to collect his statements about Palestine and Israel during his four-year presidency, it would be difficult to extract any significant statement or slogan, whereas ten years before becoming president, he had fiery sentiments regarding Palestine. As the twelfth government in Iran is about to begin, major changes in President Hassan Rouhani's cabinet are expected. Although it seems unlikely that there will be a change at the level of the Foreign Minister in the new cabinet, even if the Foreign Minister is replaced, the likelihood of changes in Iran's regional policies in the next four years will be minimal. Regarding the United States and the JCPOA, the Foreign Minister is merely an executor of higher directives, and his tactical ability is the only effective factor. Therefore, the appearance suggests that Iran's desire is to remain within the framework of the nuclear agreement. This assumption will be further discussed in the second part regarding Iran's strategies from the perspective of game theory. The United States – During the election campaign for the forty-fifth presidential term in the United States, neither of the two candidates showed particular interest in Iran, and it was clear that the new president, whoever he may be, had no intention of improving relations with Iran. Mrs. Clinton's statements about Iran were concerning for the Iranian-American community, even in the presence of a group of Iranians, and Donald Trump's statements left no hope. Moreover, his successive threats to cancel the nuclear agreement did not pave a clear path for parts of the American industrial-commercial community that were expecting to enter the Iranian market. Of course, these threats were very pleasing in Iran and for sanctions profiteers, whose interests require that the West remain a permanent enemy of Iran. Since January 20, 2017, with the beginning of President Trump's presidency, it was time to implement the promises of the new president. Among the members of Trump's cabinet and advisors, at least two high-ranking generals are opposed to Iran and any rapprochement with Iran. These two generals, along with the president, form three focal points of policymaking regarding Iran. – General Mattis, the Secretary of Defense in Trump's cabinet, is one of these two generals, who is said to have had several of his forces killed in missile attacks by Iran-backed militants during the years of war in Iraq. At that time, President Obama, who had promised to end the war in Iraq, did not agree with General Mattis's proposal for a response through missile strikes on Iran. Obama did not want to expand the war operations towards Iran and initiate a new war; consequently, a military response to Iran's movements was not directed into Iran. Although eventually, General Mattis was granted permission to target Iran-backed militia leaders inside Iraq, this action prevented missile strikes. When General Mattis was appointed as Secretary of Defense, the Washington Post wrote in an article on January 8, 2017: "Now, Mattis, as the new commander-in-chief and as President Trump's appointee in a new role as the head of the U.S. Department of Defense (Pentagon), will oversee the work of about one million three hundred thousand military personnel present in over 150 countries worldwide." General Mattis emphasizes the "use of power and force instead of diplomacy" and believes that in the application of raw military power resources, "unpredictability" has an advantage over action based on precise calculations. At the same time, the newspaper predicted at that time that Mattis would exhibit a milder behavior as Secretary of Defense and would avoid extremism. An examination of the events in the first six months of Trump's presidency shows that although the slogans of General Mattis as one of the "doves" in Trump's cabinet regarding Iran have remained intact, in practice, at least until today, he has shown no inclination towards acute military action. – The selection of General McMaster as National Security Advisor to President Trump led to various interpretations. Initial assessments suggested that McMaster, alongside Mattis, the Secretary of Defense, and Rex Tillerson, the Secretary of State, could prevent President Trump's extremism in the harsh "America First" policy. However, overall, as noted in an article in Slate magazine, McMaster also falls into the category of "doves" in the president's power circle. McMaster is a high-ranking general in the U.S. Army and considers the professional ethics of an army officer in his writings. At the same time, he has called for severe actions in U.S. foreign policy concerning countries like Russia, China, and Iran. According to Slate magazine, Mattis, like other "doves," has a reputation for extremism regarding "Iran and Middle Eastern countries" and, unlike General Mattis, places more importance on "pre-planned war." – However, policymaking in foreign policy also requires another actor. Rex Tillerson, with a wealth of experience in the oil economy, entered President Trump's cabinet. With Tillerson's appointment as Secretary of State, we have witnessed some theoretical differences between the president and his secretary of state. Perhaps the influence of this individual in decision-making led to the fact that in the first 180 days of President Trump's political life, the attack on the nuclear agreement did not go beyond rhetoric. However, simultaneously with the second report from the U.S. government confirming Iran's practical compliance with the nuclear agreement, congressional sanctions actions intensified, and it eventually became clear that the U.S. intended to test a new approach. Currently, none of the members of the U.S. negotiation team who participated in lengthy negotiations with Iran are in power, and President Trump's administration not only seeks to disrupt the nuclear agreement but also aims to prove that: – The previous president, President Obama, paid unnecessary and excessive costs to reach this agreement and that concessions were made to Iran that were undeserved, thus Iran emerged as the winner of this agreement without meeting the expectations of the West. – The nuclear agreement is a bad agreement and is not beneficial for the United States. – Iran's regional behavior disrupts regional stability, and Iran is the largest state sponsor of terrorism in the world. – Iran has not even adhered to this bad agreement and has, in some cases, exceeded its commitments and violated the agreement. – Ultimately, Iran could become a threat to the United States like North Korea. He is expected to present reasons for Iran's non-compliance within three months and thereby prepare the grounds for the cancellation of the agreement. Apparently, this will be done through the review of certain military sites in Iran. Such an action has its own complexities within the framework of JCPOA commitments and is not easily feasible, but it could be highly provocative. Thus, in the strategic battleground we intend to evaluate, there are two actors whose gain for one equals the loss for the other. Various strategies can be employed within the framework of game theory. In the second part of this article, we will examine two methods based on the "minimax principle" and the "unlimited game" method to assess Iran-U.S. relations and potential scenarios according to these criteria.