Examining Iran-U.S. Frictions (Part Two)

Introduction – In the first part, we provided an overview of the actors in the Iran-U.S. confrontation. In this section, we will examine various scenarios and strategies from the perspective of game theory. We apologize for the length of the article and kindly ask readers to review the first part before reading this section. Part Two: Game Theory – As the first person to translate and publish a book on game theory (along with Alireza Tabib) into Persian twenty-three years ago, I must say that game theory is by no means empirical and does not tell us how actors actually behave. Some mathematicians even argue that our findings from game theory cannot be generalized, and we must also consider that even under equal conditions, the players in a game can act contrary to theoretical assumptions and calculations. This aspect can be better understood if we consider that the Trump administration is different from the Obama administration, or that President Hassan Rouhani's government in the twelfth term can be entirely different from the previous term during which the nuclear agreement was signed. However, since game theory is expressed in the language of mathematics, i.e., numbers and common mathematical symbols, this is an advantage that is not present in diplomatic games and negotiations in existing political processes. The negative aspect of game theory is that the language of mathematics has few listeners, and this makes the results obtained ambiguous for some listeners/readers. At the same time, the findings of this theory present an image that seems 'scientific.' Therefore, in this article, while utilizing the minimax principle in game theory, we refrain from presenting results and calculations in mathematical form, instead offering the findings in the form of comprehensible Persian literature. The principle of caution dictates that players should play strategies corresponding to high and low values, and thus the most cautious strategy is called the minimax [low-value game or maximin] and the maximin [high-value game or minimax]. Approach of the 'Minimax' Principle – In the Iran-U.S. game, both sides act cautiously because neither wants to be accused in the Joint Commission of the JCPOA in Vienna of taking the first step towards deviating from the commitments of the nuclear agreement. For example, in periodic reports on Iran's performance, it is seen that Iran has been warned that it cannot have more than a specified amount of heavy water as a minor violation. Heavy water is used in the process of weapon production. The first time this happens, Iran quickly sells the excess accumulated heavy water to a foreign country; the second time, the excess production of heavy water is transported to a foreign country and stored there until a buyer is found. This action at least proves that Iran does not have excess heavy water 'domestically' and is a formal solution to avoid accusations of non-compliance with commitments. The third time, to prevent such an occurrence, Iran shuts down the nuclear reactor under the pretext of repairs so that no additional heavy water is produced. All these actions have a precautionary aspect, which is characteristic of the minimax strategy because if Iran deviates from the minimax strategy, the opponent may punish Iran by implementing another strategy and reducing its score to a lower level. The United States government is also obligated, based on the commitments of the agreement approved by the Security Council, to provide a substantiated opinion every three months regarding Iran's compliance with the provisions of the agreement. At the end of the first quarter of the Trump administration, apart from the reports of the International Atomic Energy Agency, there was no other documentation available, and despite the President's promise during the elections to cancel the agreement, after the State Department's report, he was compelled, out of caution, to resort to the minimax strategy and confirmed Iran's compliance. The caution of the United States within the framework of the minimax strategy makes sense, and the same reasoning that led to Iran adopting this strategy causes the U.S. not to want to create more advantages for Iran by choosing another option. This is while the U.S. President still stands by his decision to cancel the agreement; however, the second 90-day period passes, and once again the IAEA report confirms that Iran has not deviated from the principles of the agreement. Again, the U.S. government's action is cautious because deviating from the minimax strategy could increase the opponent's (Iran's) score. The U.S. Congress immediately after the U.S. government's confirmation of Iran's practical compliance with the JCPOA moves to pass new sanctions. It is said that the sanctions are unrelated to the nuclear agreement, but Europe, Russia, and Iran do not share this belief or consider it an extraterritorial action that endangers the interests of individuals and groups outside the United States and thus contradicts international law. Simply expressing this dissatisfaction, although significant from a strategic standpoint, cannot be examined within the framework of game theory because it currently lacks the ability to influence the U.S. and change the minimax strategy, and the U.S. will not be willing to change its strategy due to this reaction, in other words, it is not quantifiable. At the same time, in the last meeting of the JCPOA commission members, Iranian representatives refrain from filing a lawsuit regarding the U.S. violation of the JCPOA text because they do not want to change the type of strategy and provoke the United States. Iran's action against the U.S. as a violation of the JCPOA automatically opens Pandora's box, as explained in the unlimited strategy section. However, one day after the sanctions were announced by the U.S. Congress, the U.S. Treasury Department, in response to Iran's satellite launch missile test, sanctions six companies under the Shahid Hemmat Industrial Group, which is affiliated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. We will examine this situation in the second part under the title of unlimited strategies. Chaos is one of the inevitable results of minimax strategies. In cases where both sides of the game change their minimax strategies, they create instability in the strategic environment. Changing strategy can be due to receiving new information that necessitates a change in strategy but can disturb the strategic environment. Of course, in theory, there are more stable minimax strategies, but they do not apply to Iran-U.S. relations. Similarly, in the minimax strategy matrix, there is a point referred to as the 'Zeno point.' Reaching this point means achieving an equal interest for both sides. Every game has at least one solution point, and that is under conditions where by employing one of the optimal strategies, they reach an outcome equal to the opponent and end the game with equal value. Currently, such an ending is not observed in the relations between the two countries. In my opinion, this point can only be achieved if both Iran and the U.S. can symmetrically make similar moves and so-called 'open face.' Gradually establishing bilateral relations that start from lower levels and rise to higher levels with mutual trust can certainly help mitigate conflicts between the two countries. However, there is doubt as to whether either side has the will to reach such a point. Approach of Unlimited Games – The unlimited game is another method of game theory where at least one of the players has an unlimited set of strategies while the other side has limitations on the strategies it can choose. The Iran-U.S. game can also be examined within this framework. The U.S. has the ability to adopt unlimited strategies, although the likelihood of winning in all those strategies is not equal. For example, in the Persian Gulf, an American warship fires a warning shot at an Iranian speedboat that has come too close. The U.S. can engage in limited and point confrontations in the Persian Gulf and after firing a warning shot, effectively target Iranian speedboats. Iran's response is caution, distancing, and avoiding being within the firing range of American ships. Iran can also ambush American boats with the intention of hostage-taking, but after the experience two years ago of detaining and then releasing American marines, repeating that scenario has little chance. Another action by Iran could be to fire back or approach with explosives, which, given America's technological capabilities, would resemble suicide. The U.S. can attack Iranian troop concentrations in Syria and kill some. Israel can also do this instead of the U.S. under the pretext of threatening those forces to Israel's security at border points. However, in both cases, the possibility of Iran's military threats being realized increases, and the likelihood of friction rises exponentially. Iran, as it has done so far, can detain dual nationals, tourists, university professors, or American students or permanent residents traveling to Iran on charges of 'espionage' and try them in closed rooms, sentencing them to long imprisonments. Currently, at least four American citizens and two permanent residents are imprisoned in Iran. Conversely, the U.S. can arrest and convict Iranians who have been involved in circumventing sanctions and illegal economic operations. The issue is that in the U.S., trials cannot occur without following legal procedures, whereas Iran conducts such detentions without informing the consular representatives of the protecting power, and trials in Iran occur without the presence of lawyers in closed rooms. The U.S. considers such actions equivalent to hostage-taking and accuses Iran of violating the international convention against hostage-taking. The U.S. threat that if Iran does not release American citizens, it will face serious and new consequences could lead to escalation in this regard, resulting in unpredictable outcomes. Iran does not have a specific strategy to counter such a situation. The IRGC threatens that if Congress's sanctions against the IRGC are implemented, it can target U.S. security interests within a radius of one thousand kilometers. This figure seems to have a direct relationship with the effective range of Iran's ballistic missiles, which, coincidentally, are the reason for the sanctions. Implementing this threat would bring matters into a military phase; however, if Iran takes action against U.S. bases in the region beyond verbal threats, it would undoubtedly ignite another war in the region. This further illustrates Iran's limited choices against some of the U.S. strategies. The U.S. can create problems for Iran by influencing regional developments. For example, supporting the Kurds and Syrian opposition to Bashar al-Assad, who naturally see Iran as an ally of Syria and their enemy, is something that has been done to some extent so far. Conversely, Iran can also secretly support groups like the Taliban against U.S. forces or disrupt the peace of Israel and U.S.-backed forces through Hezbollah in Lebanon. The proposal for sanctions against Iran alongside Russia and North Korea has been signed by the President and has become law. The difference of this law from previous sanctions is its continuity and persistence. Three months after signing, the list of individuals and institutions is completed, and thereafter, the lists change annually based on Iran's performance in three areas: weapons (especially missile), human rights, and regional destabilization. As a complement to this law, the U.S., Britain, France, and Germany have requested the Security Council to address Iran's satellite launch, considering it a violation of Resolution 2231. Whatever the outcome of this action, it shows that Iran's strategy of using the European Union as leverage against the U.S. is not working, and Iran must think about engaging with the West and lacks the ability to create divisions within the components of what is called the West. The U.S. can exert pressure on Iran by supporting and selling weapons to regional allies like Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries. As we have seen in the past couple of years, this has created many problems for Iran, but in the long run, it could disrupt the arms balance in the region or accelerate Iran's rapprochement with Russia. Therefore, while economically beneficial for the U.S., its long-term effectiveness is questionable. Iran's response to this strategy, due to limited choices, is inadequate and non-deterrent. Iran is not at an appropriate military level to counter changes in the regional strategic environment, and entering this dangerous game could jeopardize Iran's territorial integrity. This is another limitation of the game at the level of unlimited strategy for Iran, while also causing losses for the U.S. for reasons unrelated to Iran. Another solution for Iran to counter militarily is to return to the pre-nuclear agreement environment and produce the necessary materials for building a nuclear bomb underground or openly. For this, Iran could benefit from North Korean assistance and follow the North Korean model in hostility towards the U.S. This is precisely what the Trump administration would likely prefer Iran to do and exit the nuclear agreement. Certainly, this is not considered an optimal strategy for Iran as it would violate the commitments accepted in the JCPOA and, if done intentionally or even out of urgency, would lead to significant consequences.