Exclusive | Bradesky: Biden is 'Not Very Scary' for the Islamic Republic; Slavine: The Iranian Government Realized America's 'Red Line'

After the U.S. military began retaliatory airstrikes in Iraq and Syria against targets linked to Iranian government proxy groups in response to the killing of three of its soldiers, various experts assessed this action and its different aspects. Voice of America spoke with Jason Bradesky, Policy Director of the 'United Against a Nuclear Iran' organization, and Barbara Slavine, a researcher at the Stimson Institute, to gather their evaluations on this matter. Interview with Jason Bradesky Question: What is your reaction to the retaliatory strike carried out by the United States in Iraq and Syria? Bradesky: In my opinion, the U.S. targeted more objectives in its attack compared to previous attacks against the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and its affiliated proxies and militias. The power used was higher with the deployment of B-1 bombers, but at the same time, we attacked targets in Iraq and Syria that do not hold specific strategic importance for the regime. Although the number of targets has increased, the quality has remained almost the same, and my concern is that this does not send a decisive message for deterrence to the Islamic Republic. We have left the country that should be targeted - namely the Islamic Republic and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps - and instead are targeting objectives in Syria and Iraq that hold no value for the rulers in Tehran. Question: After the attack, the White House and the Pentagon repeated several messages multiple times. First, we do not want war with Iran; second, we want any attacks on U.S. forces or interests to stop; and third, this is the first phase of retaliatory attacks, and more attacks are on the way. If you put these three messages together, do you think it sends a message of deterrence? Or de-escalation? Because the goal was to create deterrence against the Islamic Republic. Bradesky: My concern is that the U.S. seems to be more afraid of the Islamic Republic than the Islamic Republic is of the U.S. The reason is that the U.S. President, in the view of Iranian officials, is an adversary who is not very scary, and from my perspective, this is very dangerous for U.S. interests regarding the Islamic Republic. Because this makes the Islamic Republic bolder and continues to test the limits of U.S. tolerance. Also, U.S. officials are sending a message to the leaders of the Islamic Republic that they have no interest in conflict, and this is a message that Tehran and the ruling officials there have received. As a result, repeating that the United States is not seeking war or conflict is exaggerated and now, instead of helping U.S. interests, it has harmed them. Because the Islamic Republic has reached a point where there is nothing to fear from Washington and in response, no target of strategic importance to the Islamic Republic has been hit. As long as the U.S. does not instill more fear in the hearts of the rulers of the Islamic Republic, there is nothing for them to deter them. Question: What is your prediction for the situation in the Middle East? What movements will the Islamic Republic's proxy groups and the U.S. witness? Bradesky: I believe missile and drone attacks will continue. Some may wait a little and rebuild after the costs incurred by the U.S. attacks, but I do not think there will be a fundamental change in the strategy or doctrine of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps to pressure the U.S. to leave the Middle East. This is a goal that the leaders of the Islamic Republic have pursued since 1979. This is what I think will happen unless the U.S. adopts more aggressive reactions. Interview with Barbara Slavine Question: What is your reaction to the military attacks that the U.S. carried out in Iraq and Syria? Slavine: The U.S. reaction was not surprising. With the killing of three American forces and many injuries, nearly over 40 people in an attack that occurred about a week ago, the U.S. was in a position where it had to respond, but I think it was not limited to just a response and was carried out with the aim of deterrence to prevent such attacks from happening again. The U.S. military is always planning, and I am sure they had a long list of potential targets, and this was an opportunity to target these facilities. My sense is that they promoted this in advance and warned for several days. As a result, I think all the official members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps were evacuated, and many individuals had either left these facilities or were in shelters. It seems that the most that was lost in the attacks were just facilities or munitions or launch sites. Things they need to continue attacking American forces in such remote areas in Iraq, Syria, and Jordan. There is still no news of precise information and potential casualties, but undoubtedly, it was a heavy and extensive retaliatory attack. Several other interesting points included that bombers were dispatched from the U.S. and no deployment was made from Iraq. Iraq denies this, but the U.S. says it had warned Iraq in advance so they would not be surprised. All of this was precisely coordinated and planned to inflict deep damage on these militias that attack American forces, but at the same time, it does not ignite a broader war with Iran. Question: You mentioned that it was carried out for deterrence. Do you think this deterrence has been achieved with these attacks? Slavine: It depends on how much real capability the Islamic Republic has to control each of these proxy groups. In fact, I am currently working on a piece about this. I think Iran's control over these groups in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen varies. The Islamic Republic was unaware that Hamas was going to attack Israel on October 7. I think the Islamic Republic has good influence over Kata'ib Hezbollah, which incidentally, after the attack, when the news of the killing of American forces was published, said it would no longer attack American forces, and the head of the Quds Force went to Baghdad and met with the leaders of Kata'ib Hezbollah. But there is another group called al-Nujaba that seems to have less obedience to the demands of the Islamic Republic. There are many militia groups in Iraq, and one of the ironies of the matter is that by killing Qassem Soleimani in 2020, the U.S. weakened the Islamic Republic's control over these groups. After all, it was Qassem Soleimani who was the founder of the so-called resistance movement, and all were trained, gathered, and educated by Iran. His successor, Ismail Qaani, is neither as effective, nor as popular, nor as influential. The Islamic Republic does not have extensive influence, and each of these groups has its own agenda. Some just want the U.S. to leave Iraq. Some want to be more powerful or influential than other groups. We are facing a problem that is difficult to control, and something else that needs to happen, of course, is a ceasefire. These attacks that the U.S. carried out may have an effect, but a ceasefire in Gaza will have a very serious impact and especially on the Houthis and to some extent in Iraq as well. Question: How long do you think this deterrence, if achieved, can last? Slavine: Deterrence may last one day and disappear the next. It is a very sensitive situation, and anything could nullify it. We do not know if Israel kills more people. The usual pattern is that Israel kills, then groups of the Islamic Republic or those supported by the Islamic Republic retaliate against American forces in the Middle East. Because hitting American forces is easier than hitting Israel directly. There are many variables, but I feel that there is certainly no desire in Washington or Tehran to escalate to something more. The Islamic Republic also knows that when the militias take the lives of American forces, they have crossed a red line that should provoke a reaction from the U.S. Joe Biden has been under heavy pressure, especially from Republicans, to act more and even directly attack Iran, which fortunately it seems he currently has no intention of doing.