Experts and Oversight of Armed Forces' Performance; Khamenei: Don't Even Mention It

The controversy over oversight of the performance of the institutions under Ali Khamenei has resurfaced in Iran with the publication of a letter by Mehdi Karroubi, the commencement of the fifth Assembly of Experts, and Ahmad Jannati's defense of the leader's performance. Karroubi sharply criticized Khamenei's performance and the leadership's subordinates in a letter, declaring the current state of the country as a result of the lack of oversight over their actions. On Tuesday, September 4, the fifth Assembly of Experts began its work in the absence of Hassan Rouhani, and Ahmad Jannati, as the head of this assembly, reacted to the contents of Karroubi's letter. Jannati stated that "the evil plan of the enemies is to attribute the inefficiency of the institutions to the leadership; they promote it as if the leadership is involved in all executive matters of the country." The issue of oversight over the performance of institutions under Khamenei has long been a political controversy in Iran, and no oversight body, including the Assembly of Experts, is allowed to examine the performance of these institutions. The Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB), the judiciary, the Foundation of the Oppressed, the Astan Quds Razavi, and the armed forces are the main institutions under Khamenei that have been exempt from oversight and inspection for years. The root of these immunities is Khamenei's explicit opposition to a request from a group of Assembly of Experts members to examine and oversee his subordinates, especially the armed forces. Throughout his leadership, he has told those members of the Assembly of Experts who intended to scrutinize his subordinates' performance that he would not allow such actions. This issue was first publicly raised by Abbas Nabavi, head of the "Civilization and Islamic Development" Institute, in 2011 in a meeting with a group of members of the Ansar Hezbollah. Nabavi stated that Khamenei had told the Assembly of Experts representatives in their last meeting that he would not allow them to interfere in his affairs. He added that the Supreme Leader told the Assembly members, "I do not accept that you get into the details regarding minor issues [oversight of the performance of the institutions under the leadership]." According to Nabavi, Khamenei further stated, "If you say we want to discuss why this person was appointed to this position and why you allowed this person, I do not accept that you want to get involved." The issue of the Assembly of Experts' oversight over the performance of the Supreme Leader's subordinates has been raised since the assembly's formation, and figures such as Ahmad Jannati, Mohammad-Reza Mahdavi-Kani, and Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani have pursued it. In a less-seen interview with issue 41 of the "Islamic Government" magazine in 2006, Jannati elaborated on this issue and Khamenei's opposition to it. Jannati recalled that he, along with Hashemi Rafsanjani and Mahdavi-Kani, supported the establishment of various bodies in the Assembly of Experts to oversee the performance of the leader's subordinates. As the current head of the Assembly of Experts stated, this assembly did not allow itself to "enter this matter" while Ruhollah Khomeini was alive, as "his status was too exalted for us to discuss these matters with him." According to Jannati, after the death of the founder of the Islamic Republic and the election of Ali Khamenei as the new leader, the Assembly of Experts convened again to discuss this issue. As explained by the head of the Guardian Council, the majority of the Assembly of Experts members supported the issue of oversight over the performance of the institutions under the Supreme Leader, which was raised with Khamenei but met with his opposition. He added that regarding this issue, the Assembly of Experts members discussed and debated with Khamenei in several sessions but were unable to achieve their goals. Jannati recounted that Khamenei told the Assembly members in these sessions, "Our performance is different from the performance of this organization [the leader's subordinates]." According to Jannati, the Supreme Leader added that the Assembly of Experts should first examine the leader's appointments, and if they were "against wisdom and management," then they could take action. In other words, Khamenei's red line for oversight over his subordinates is limited to examining the appointments of his subordinates, and this assembly has not been allowed to enter and intervene further for oversight. He specifically referred to the judiciary and its performance in these sessions, stating that the judiciary has "many judges, an organization, and employees who operate throughout the country; if someone commits an offense in a part, the responsibility is not with the leadership." In another part of these sessions, Khamenei opposed the Assembly of Experts' entry for oversight over the performance of the armed forces and told the Assembly members, "Don't even mention it." He reminded them, "The armed forces are not a place for such discussions. Can someone enter among the armed forces and raise doubts about issues? In that case, the commander cannot operate." Jannati explained that Khamenei also told some Assembly members who insisted that "if there is a need for examination, questioning, or action, contact my office and ask them what I have done regarding this organization." Khamenei stated in these sessions that he would instruct his office members to provide any information the Assembly of Experts members wanted. As Jannati mentioned, the Supreme Leader explicitly stated in these sessions that the performance of his subordinates "has nothing to do with him." However, Khamenei added that if a violation occurs in his subordinates and he remains "silent" or takes "no action," then their performance is related to the leader. With these arguments, Khamenei managed to keep the Assembly of Experts members away from his institutions and denied them entry into his managerial domains. He succeeded in this while Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, the former head of the Expediency Discernment Council, announced in 2009 that the issue of oversight over the performance of the leader's subordinates had been approved and turned into "law" in the Assembly of Experts. Rafsanjani stated that after the approval of this law, the Assembly of Experts began inviting managers of the leader's subordinates to provide explanations, but after a while, "the leader's office prevented their attendance in the Assembly." Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani was one of Khamenei's most important supporters in the Assembly of Experts, who, after the death of Ruhollah Khomeini, helped him ascend to the leadership and later played a role in the permanent establishment of Khamenei's leadership. He supported the permanence of Khamenei's leadership by stating, "I see the stability of the essence of the Islamic system in the leadership. In the Assembly of Experts, there was also a discussion about approving the leadership term for ten years. We said there is no need to bring the game of democracy here." (Book "Unfiltered with Hashemi Rafsanjani," p. 147) After the events of 2009, Rafsanjani, like Mehdi Karroubi and Mir-Hossein Mousavi, fell out with Khamenei and was gradually sidelined, continuing to criticize the performance of the leader's subordinates until his death. However, despite being under house arrest, Mehdi Karroubi has published several open letters criticizing the leader's performance and his subordinates, holding the leader responsible for the current situation in Iran. In this context, the Assembly of Experts meeting was convened to "follow up on the demands" of the Islamic Republic's leader.