Experts and Yazdi; Analyzing a Selection

With about 65% of the votes from the representatives of the Assembly of Experts - twice the votes of Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani - Mohammad Yazdi became the head of the Assembly that must oversee the work of the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic and choose his successor. The presidency of a hardliner like Yazdi over the Assembly of Experts, especially at a time when rumors about the illness of the first person in the political system are increasing, is not a trivial or insignificant event. The head of the Society of Teachers of Qom Seminary, who is known for his extremist positions against reformists and any form of opening in the political and cultural space, has become the new president of the Assembly of Leadership while he once hinted that he would go to hell behind the Supreme Leader but would not even go to heaven with Hashemi. Analyzing the election of the new president of the Assembly of Leadership from various angles brings meaningful and contemplative results. It is hard to accept that the election of a hardline cleric occurred without the positive attention and support of the first person in the system and the core of power in the Islamic Republic. The authoritarian and hardline elements in the government have once again shown that they have no intention or decision to change their positions or relinquish their political stances. The election of Hassan Rouhani as president in 2013 created some optimism in certain social layers; hope for gradual change and the expansion and deepening of rationality and management in the political power structure. However, Yazdi's election by 47 representatives of the Assembly of Leadership showed that many processes in Iran have changed since the 2009 presidential elections. The central power core has no qualms about being strict and confronting any disruption in its desired projects. Although moderates and some reformists have taken over the executive branch, the upper hand in the core of power belongs to the hardliners and the far-right. The output of the existing and established Islamic Republic, and its manifestation in the Assembly of Leadership, is Yazdi, not Rafsanjani; the preferred option of the leadership of the system and the security-military circles around him is also Yazdi, not Rafsanjani. Therefore, the presence of a cleric who opposes democracy and cultural and social freedoms at the head of the Assembly of Leadership is not surprising. The competition between Yazdi, Hashemi Rafsanjani, and Momen in the Assembly of Leadership coincided with the withdrawal of Hashemi Shahroudi from candidacy. Someone who could have played a mediating role among the established political factions in the Assembly: the far-right, traditional right, and pragmatic conservatives and moderates. However, the hardliners paid no attention to him or, for whatever reason, deemed him unqualified to sit in the presidency. Thus, Hashemi Shahroudi could not emerge as a bridge among the three main currents present in the Assembly of Leadership. When signs of a lack of consensus around Shahroudi became apparent, Rafsanjani, who had previously stated that he would run if the 'unfit' were nominated, entered the competition against his long-time and outspoken critic (Yazdi). The far-right's 'no' to Hashemi Shahroudi may be as significant as Yazdi's presidency over the Assembly of Leadership. It is a clear message of the firm resolve of the far-right and authoritarians to continue their projects and pursue their desired goals, despite the differing opinions of the majority of society. This insistence relies on the hard power tools: weapons and repression. The far-right is not even willing to align or take joint action with the moderate and traditional right. Thus, they do not tolerate Hashemi Shahroudi either. This exposes the depth of the hardliners' totalitarianism. The rules of the game in the political power structure and in the hard power sector (government institutions) are not the same as those in civil society and in the soft power sector. Although a very significant majority of society may not sympathize with Mohammad Yazdi, it is this majority of the Assembly of Leadership representatives who choose. Representatives who, of course, have emerged from the vetting filter of the Guardian Council, and most of them define themselves as part of the first person in the system and the central power core. Hard power (government) imposes its totalitarian will on society through violence and repression; and if at some point (like the 2009 elections and Rouhani's emergence and victory) an informal reconciliation or alignment of interests between society and the core of power occurs, the causes and reasons for it must be independently analyzed. The necessity of forming a government that can alleviate the sanctions and somewhat repair the economic crisis is not a small factor. The mass disqualification of candidates for the seventh Assembly and the severe and unrestrained implementation of the Guardian Council's oversight after the sixth Assembly have marked a new era in the Islamic Republic that has not changed except with the positive and negative presence of a defined and manifested society. The proactive reaction and tangible protest after the significant fraud and theft in the 2009 elections, or the significant boycott and silent protest with messages in the ninth Assembly elections in March 2012, are two important witnesses. These two events encouraged the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic to speak of 'the rights of the people' in the 2013 elections. The election of the system's leadership is the most important output and function of the Assembly of Leadership; because this Assembly has essentially shown that it lacks any oversight and critical tools to evaluate and critique the leader's performance. The Assembly of Leadership, as its most well-known figures have repeatedly emphasized, is an opportunity to strengthen the regime based on the absolute rule of the jurist. Thus, this Assembly only becomes significant when it wants to determine and introduce the successor to the leader after his absence. However, neither Yazdi is supposed to choose the successor to the current Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic, nor was such a role assigned to Hashemi Rafsanjani if he were to sit at the head of the Assembly of Leadership. The issue of leadership is much more important and vital than to be entrusted to a group of clerics. It is the main and dominant current in the Islamic Republic that, in the struggle with other influential currents, will ultimately define and determine which option has the maximum benefit for their desired system. The far-right and authoritarians rooted in the leadership's household and the security sector of the Revolutionary Guard and the revolutionary court will play a decisive role in such a process because they dominate the hard power tools (weapons, repression, and national media). This game will only undergo transformation or face serious challenges in one scenario: when moderates or reformists, relying on social force, create a tangible and manifested power behind their will. This is what occurred from another angle in the civil protests following the 2009 elections and the interaction of Mousavi and Karroubi with the change-seeking citizens. But does such a perspective and determination (relying on social force) exist in this segment of political forces (pragmatic conservatives and moderate reformists)? A positive answer does not correlate much with the realities and signs. The 2016 Assembly of Leadership elections Yazdi's election as the head of the Assembly of Leadership and Hashemi's defeat may be an important message and shock to the dissatisfied society with the authoritarians and conservatives to become active as much as possible to change the composition of this Assembly. Although the vetting filter of the Guardian Council and the prior management of the elections by the subordinates of the Supreme Leader will itself be a significant barrier to realizing the will of the majority of citizens dissatisfied with the established Assembly of Leadership. The public demand for change is one issue, and reaching the desired outcome is another. Can the moderates and reformists leverage lobbying in the government and also the social potential to compel the Guardian Council to hold semi-free and semi-competitive elections? There are no promising signs indicating this approach; especially since Rouhani's government has taken a very faint and inactive stance towards political development in the past year and a half. Nevertheless, premature judgment about the political-social situation in Iran in the coming year does not seem logical; especially since the social-political changes resulting from the breaking or continuation of sanctions are themselves a significant factor in the political processes in Iran.