Failure of the Simorgh Rocket: Technical Weakness or U.S. 'Deterrent Military Action'?

The significance of denying the possibility of foreign intervention in the failure of the Simorgh rocket launch and the failure to place the 'Payam' satellite in orbit is so critical that Iranian government officials (Jahromi, Minister of Communications) and news analysis sites close to the regime (Tabnak) have made extensive efforts to promote the acceptance of 'technical flaws' while rejecting it. Despite Mr. Jahromi's statements, the failure of the 'Simorgh' rocket to deliver the 'Payam' satellite to the designated orbit and the stopping of the 'third stage' propulsion 30 seconds before the scheduled time cannot simply be attributed to 'technical flaws' and 'a conventional failure of a space test' without sufficient evidence and documentation, nor can other possibilities, including the role of the American deterrent space capability known as 'Left of Launch', which has been cited in relation to the failures of North Korean missile experiments, be easily dismissed. The government's efforts to attribute the failure of the Simorgh rocket's satellite launch to technical flaws and to deny the possibility of foreign intervention, emphasizing the successful performance of the first and second stages of the rocket, may have been made to portray Iran's missile capabilities as effective and resilient against foreign deterrents. The Islamic Republic attempts to differentiate the names of its military missiles (Sajil, Zulfiqar, Zalzal...) from those used in satellite launch tests (Kavosh, Pajoohesh, Safir, and Simorgh...) to present a different nature of its missile tests, while European countries (France, Germany, and the UK), as well as Israel and the U.S., consider Iran's space activities as a cover for completing and producing intercontinental ballistic missiles capable of carrying weapons of mass destruction (nuclear bombs) and contrary to the provisions of UN Security Council Resolution 2231. Shortly after the news of the Simorgh rocket launch and the failure of the 'Payam' satellite project, Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu, during a ceremony introducing the new Chief of Staff of the Israeli Armed Forces, referred to the issue and called the leaders of the Islamic Republic 'liars,' stating that the purpose of the Simorgh launch was to develop ballistic missiles, and the next day, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo claimed that Iran is seeking 'threatening missile capabilities.' Iran has implemented an extensive program to develop missile capabilities since the end of the war with Iraq, coinciding with its entry into nuclear activities and uranium enrichment and efforts to produce processable plutonium. In the absence of an effective air force in Iran, the domestic production of Shahab-3 missiles, which was carried out with technical assistance from Russia, North Korea, and China, can be seen as the first stage of a long-term plan to achieve the necessary missile capabilities for creating offensive capabilities and defensive deterrent force. Achieving the technology for designing rocket structures and assembling engines and producing solid fuel to increase the range of ballistic missiles was the second stage of Iran's missile development program, led by Hassan Tehrani-Moghaddam after his transfer from the command of the artillery of the Revolutionary Guards to the command of the missile unit of the Guards. Hassan Tehrani-Moghaddam, known as the 'father of missiles,' aimed to achieve solid fuel, produce missiles equipped with solid fuel engines, and build long-range ballistic missiles (Emad missile). Ballistic missiles, whether military or used in space projects, share common capabilities. To achieve long-range, a ballistic missile (parabolic) must reach a minimum altitude of 160 to 200 kilometers above the ground. The commonality and similar capabilities of military and space ballistic missiles in reaching a minimum altitude from the ground, the capability to carry a warhead (satellite or bomb), and also the return of the missile's warhead (or bomb) to the Earth's atmosphere are significant. Iran has previously announced that it has conducted tests to place a warhead at the designated altitude and return it to the Earth's atmosphere, and comprehensive information on this topic has been part of negotiations with the International Atomic Energy Agency for a long time. If capable of delivering a ballistic missile to a vertical height of 200 kilometers, it can achieve intercontinental missile capabilities with long-range by changing the launch angle (higher angle; longer range). During the production of Shahab-3 missiles, Iran's missile threat was considered regional and limited, while for creating a deterrent capacity against extra-regional threats (or creating a balance of power against larger threats), the Islamic Republic saw itself in need of developing missile range with the capability to carry heavy warheads and the technology to return it to the ground (impacting a designated point). The Islamic Republic's space programs have been discussed since the early 2000s, and after a few years of pause, they were seriously pursued from the early 2010s. The goal of the Islamic Republic's space programs was declared to place satellites in orbit, and the two-stage ballistic missile Safir was the first significant attempt in this regard. The two-stage Simorgh missile, using four liquid fuel engines from the Shahab-3 missile (clustered and placed in the first part of the rocket), is an evolutionary continuation of the Safir missile production and a step towards increasing payload capacity (heavier satellite weight or increased missile range) that has so far failed to achieve its designated goal. The final stage of Iran's 'space' missile production is the construction of the 'Emad' missile (three or four stages using liquid fuel engines in two stages and solid fuel in one or two other stages) with the capability to place a 100-kilogram satellite at an altitude of 1000 kilometers above the Earth's surface. Countries opposing Iran's missile-space activities consider targeting satellites at altitudes of 500 or 1000 kilometers as an actual attempt to build intercontinental missiles capable of carrying weapons of mass destruction, similar to North Korea's missile capabilities. In countering the U.S., former President Ronald Reagan announced a plan on March 23, 1983, to create a capacity to counter the intercontinental ballistic missiles of the former Soviet Union, which later became known as 'Star Wars.' Since 1985, according to existing calculations, the U.S. government has spent over $200 billion on creating and developing capabilities to counter missile threats, in addition to specific internal costs of its defense organizations. In March 2015, in a short joint note, the then U.S. Secretary of Defense, General Ray Odierno, Chief of Staff of the Army, and Admiral Jonathan Greenert, Commander of U.S. Naval Operations, referred to conducting 'new studies' to create 'different anti-missile capabilities' to defeat missile threats against the U.S. and its allies. In the same year, a new anti-missile capability known as 'Left of Launch' was reported in the U.S., designed based on non-contact-physical technologies such as light guidance, wave, magnetic field creation, and heat to disable missile space targets. In April 2017, a North Korean missile equipped with a liquid fuel engine of the Scud type (the father of Iran's Shahab-3 missiles, which was first designed and produced in the former Soviet Union based on Germany's V-2 missiles) failed to continue its flight about 9 minutes after launch and crashed near the city of Sinpo in eastern Korea into the Sea of Japan. Many experts have since written numerous articles in specialized and public sources about the role of the new U.S. anti-missile capability in deterring North Korean missiles from moving during flight. North Korea, which had previously undergone six unsuccessful missile tests, including an attempt to launch a missile from a submarine over three years, agreed in 2018 to negotiate with the U.S. to limit its missile capabilities and nuclear disarmament. In 2010, the existence of a computer worm known as Stuxnet was reported, which was said to have been produced in 2005 with the cooperation of the U.S. and Israel and carried out destructive attacks against Iran's nuclear facilities, including the Natanz enrichment center and the Bushehr nuclear reactor. The Islamic Republic, which has never admitted to a cyber attack on its nuclear facilities, agreed two years later to engage in nuclear negotiations with the U.S., and the negotiations two years and more later led to the signing of the July 2015 nuclear agreement with the 5+1 group. Current U.S. President Donald Trump, on Tuesday, August 1, at a gathering in Florida, referred to the officials of the Islamic Republic, saying: 'I think they will talk to us soon - maybe not. And that's okay!' It seems that in the current situation where the U.S. and Israel describe the Islamic Republic's missile activities as a threat to their security, if there is a technical capability similar to 'Left of Launch' and a strategy similar to the decision to use the Stuxnet computer worm against Iranian facilities, the possibility of foreign deterrent intervention to slow down or stop its missile programs is not a small probability that the officials of the Islamic Republic can simply dismiss by resorting to 'technical flaws.' The opinions expressed in this note do not necessarily reflect the views of Radio Farda.