Final Arrangement of the Presidential Election and Possible Scenarios

The Guardian Council has granted permission to six out of 80 candidates whose documents were accepted by the Ministry of Interior to enter the 1403 presidential election race. The qualifications of 66 candidates were rejected, among them Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Ali Larijani, Abbas Akhoundi, Eshaq Jahangiri, Mehrdad Bazrpash, Mohammad Shariatmadari, Abdolnaser Hemmati, and Mohammad-Mehdi Esmaeili. Nearly eight others also withdrew, which can be seen as a form of respectful disqualification. The only unexpected phenomena of this election were the approval of Masoud Pezeshkian and the disqualification of Mehrdad Bazrpash and Esmaeili, both ministers in Raisi's government. Masoud Pezeshkian, whose qualifications were not confirmed in 1392 and 1400, passed the Guardian Council's filter without any change in his apparent positions and actions. The key to understanding this event lies in Pezeshkian's initial positioning when announcing his candidacy for the early presidential election. He stated his motivations for registering as 'increasing electoral participation through the presence of various political tastes, nullifying the claim of people's discontent with the ballot boxes of the Islamic Republic in global and domestic views, and showing solidarity with the death of Ebrahim Raisi to prevent the loss of votes resulting from not holding simultaneous council elections.' Pezeshkian did not mention any program or plan for the people, nor did he raise concerns about 'Iran,' but after his sudden qualification, he claimed candidacy 'for Iran.' Examining Pezeshkian's previous positions and the fact that he has always been approved by the hard core of power and the intelligence institutions of the Islamic Republic raises questions about the validity of his claims. Therefore, he might be considered a candidate 'for the system,' which aligns more with his personality and political status. Pezeshkian also has a clear superiority in terms of character, integrity, and non-rent-seeking growth over other approved candidates, and at least he is not accused of economic corruption or committing crimes. However, another significant feature of this election cycle is the disqualification and forced withdrawal of four ministers and deputies of Ebrahim Raisi. Ghazi-Zadeh Hashemi, although Raisi's deputy, participated in the election in which Raisi became president. This event, along with the likelihood of Saeed Jalili receiving fewer votes than Ghalibaf and Pezeshkian, sends signals that the fourteenth government may not be Raisi's government but could represent a break from it. The inability of the third generation of the Islamic Republic's officials to participate in the 1403 election race is also an important point, showing that senior government positions remain monopolized by the first and second generations, and the blockage in power circulation and political gerontocracy among the regime's own officials continues. Overall, the early presidential election for the fourteenth government has unfolded differently from the initial expectations of the current flow. This election is neither in the form of the 1400 model nor similar to the third presidential election after the assassinations of Mohammad Ali Rajai and Mohammad Javad Bahonar, where the head of the executive branch was completely determined before the voting. It can be said that the election has returned to a competitive state, albeit controlled and limited. However, although the competition has approached the model of the 92 elections, it is not at that level. In this cycle, Pezeshkian and Pour-Mohammadi have replaced Hassan Rouhani and Mohammad-Reza Aref as seemingly anti-dominant current candidates and representatives of the status quo. The electoral atmosphere has not yet formed, and the final political arrangement of voters at the ballot boxes is not yet clear. Numerous variables determine the fate of the votes cast, the most important of which are: the final actions of the Guardian Council, Khamenei's intervention or non-intervention, the activation or deactivation of the government's voting machine, the unity or divergence within the ranks of conservatives, the ability of the reformist front to persuade its entire base to participate in the elections, the activity level and performance of those calling for a boycott or non-participation in the elections, the type of activities of Masoud Pezeshkian and his ability to polarize the atmosphere, the electoral debates and the possibility of drawing meaningful distinctions between candidates. For now, what is clear is the complex game of the Supreme Leader in this election cycle and his retreat from electoral models since 1398. However, it seems that his retreat is primarily a result of the failure of the electoral staging in Esfand 1402 to encourage public participation and a sense of danger from the expansion of existential threats to the regime, although it may not have a strategic and sustainable nature and is essentially a tactical operation based on deception. At the same time, it is unclear what Khamenei's final action will be. Will his ceiling of intervention be the exertion of influence to engineer the electoral atmosphere and design the desired playing field with the final arrangement of the Guardian Council? Or will he continue to intervene and act in favor of his preferred option? In this regard, several possible scenarios can be considered, although none of them are certain based on existing observations. Intervention in favor of Ghalibaf; in this case, messages will be issued, and conservative candidates will withdraw at the request of organizations claiming to organize the 'Front of Revolutionary Forces' in favor of Ghalibaf. The political atmosphere will not change. It is even possible that, similar to 1388, manipulations will occur, and by any means, Ghalibaf will emerge from the ballot box. The appointment of Ali Nikzad, the current Deputy Speaker of the Islamic Consultative Assembly, as the head of Ghalibaf's campaign is enlightening in this regard. He was the head of Ebrahim Raisi's campaign in the previous term. Another scenario is Khamenei's non-intervention in the competition phase, allowing the output of the ballot boxes, regardless of participation levels, to determine the next government leader. In this scenario, Khamenei has his preferred option, but in the competition, he does not intervene beyond making vague statements in speeches and social media in his favor. Additionally, the political atmosphere during the election days will somewhat open up. In this case, given the fragmentation of conservative candidates and the so-called 'revolutionary' current, Pezeshkian's chances of success may increase. Since it is expected that Khamenei is generally aware of the consequences of his non-intervention, it can be concluded that in this scenario, within the framework of 'the superiority of participation over the selection of the best,' his preferred option will ultimately be Pezeshkian (the acceptable candidate over the unacceptable best), someone who, in his view, believes in 'the principles of the revolution,' even though he does not outwardly belong to the 'revolutionaries.' It should especially not be forgotten that Pezeshkian has not created problems for the Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist and does not have significant political weight. Another scenario of Khamenei's non-intervention stems from a miscalculation regarding Pezeshkian's failure to win votes, similar to the years 76 and 88. In this case, Khamenei, assuming that Pezeshkian cannot mobilize protesters and fluid votes, did not oppose his qualification and hopes that his presence will lead to coalition and cohesion among conservatives and unity. As the final days of the election competition approach, it will become clear which of these scenarios have a chance of realization. For now, it can be predicted that the level of participation will likely exceed that of the twelfth parliamentary elections, and if conservative candidates remain until the end, the likelihood of a two-round election will also increase. Additionally, although Ghalibaf and Pezeshkian may have the highest chances of victory, there is close competition between Jalili and Ghalibaf within the social base of conservatives, and if the actual participation rate is below 40 percent, the possibility of Jalili reaching the second round and other unexpected events cannot be ruled out.