Finally, 'Awakening of Iranians' Against the Clerical Government

To understand the protests that began on December 28, 2017, across Iran and continued in the following days, several questions can be raised: Why at this moment? What are the demands? Are the protests against rising prices? To what extent do economic issues play a central role in these protests? Is there a common theme among all the protesters across the country? What reactions have political groups and factions shown, and why? While it is possible that the government's plan to increase the prices of goods and services in the 2018 budget, the banking crisis, and the delayed payment of pensions and wages for retirees and workers sparked some of the protests or were used to mobilize on social media channels, unlike the previous months, the December 2017 protests are no longer demand-oriented. The slogans indicate that the protesters are tired of the current situation and see no window for change in the government's policies. The government, which came to power using the public's mindset after the uniform rule of Ahmadinejad with the slogan of 'prudence and hope,' has almost disappointed everyone. This disappointment is particularly felt after the 2017 elections, as some believed that by voting more for Rouhani, he would be more determined to pursue their demands, which has not happened. Rouhani's complete shift towards the conservatives after the hollow reformist rhetoric during the elections has shown the public that this government, like other governments, is a logistics provider for the IRGC and the Leader's office and is not supposed to lift any burden off the people's shoulders. If the December 2017 protests achieve no political success, at least they have thrown the government's slogan of 'prudence and hope' into the trash. Furthermore, in recent months, the government celebrated its illusory victory over ISIS, claimed that no decision in the region would be made without the presence of the Islamic Republic, and a general involved in crimes was presented as a victorious commander, while the government was ready to strengthen the religious bureaucracy and funnel rents and privileges to the ruling class with the 2018 budget. In this context, those who were fed up with all this ambition and self-aggrandizement wanted to remind the government to stop its nonsense and come down from its divine pedestal. The December 2017 protests have severely questioned the idea of a 'stable island.' The demands and trends in the December 2017 protests included street protests on December 28 in cities like Mashhad, Yazd, Kashmar, Nishapur, and Shahroud, and on the day and night of December 29 in Kermanshah, Tehran, Quchan, Qazvin, Khorramabad, Isfahan, Ahvaz, Zahedan, Rasht, and Qom, and on December 30 in Tehran, which, unlike the recent livelihood-oriented protests, were not demand-oriented but targeted high-ranking officials and the regime itself ('Death to the Dictator,' 'Death to Rouhani'); indicating a combination of reformist tendencies ('Political prisoners must be freed,' 'Neither Gaza nor Lebanon, my life is for Iran,' 'Don't be afraid, don't be afraid, we are all together'), royalist supporters ('Long live Reza Shah,' 'We are the children of Cyrus, we are the center of rebellion'), and justice-seeking ('What a mistake I made by revolting,' 'The nation is begging, the cleric is ruling,' 'Police, go catch the thief,' 'Plunder and inflation, time for overthrow'). However, reformist slogans are marginal, and in some protests, not only are they absent, but there is also a hostile atmosphere against them: 'Reformists and conservatives, the story is over.' The protests were not center-oriented so that officials would think the problem is limited to central residents and the middle class and educated people. The protests are nationwide; part of the regime's usual base also participates in these protests, making suppression more difficult. In fact, due to the presence of different social classes, the slogans are not politically healthy, and some are explicitly dissolutionist. The December 2017 protests can be seen as a cry of despair. The slogans show that there is a spectrum of various reformist, conservative, royalist, and even traditionalist tendencies among the demonstrators, but what unites them is the opposition to the government's insistence on preserving the status quo, which means waste, privileges, rents, and abuses that all stem from the rule of the clerical regime. The reactions of the government factions: Reformists view these protests as a conspiracy (Mohammad Khatami) and planned by their opposing faction (Es'hagh Jahangiri) to weaken the government. This view was quickly invalidated by the slogans against the government and the clergy, which targeted the entire system. Conservatives or supporters of Raisi in Mashhad and Qom do not chant for the return of the monarchy. Conservatives consider these protests to be of the same nature as the livelihood protests of the 1990s (A 8 Dey 1396). They attribute the economic policies of Rouhani's government to these protests, just as they considered Hashemi's adjustment policies to be the cause of the protests in the 1990s in Mashhad, Islamshahr, Arak, and Qazvin. Both reactions indicate that the factions within the government project the cause of these protests onto their opposing faction and ignore the protests against the essence of the Islamic Republic and the clergy. The nature of these protests: despair over reform. If we set aside the conspiracy theory (the new enemy plot from the mouths of Friday prayer leaders) and factional rivalries, which play little role in these events, three theories can be proposed regarding the nature of the protests: 1) General protest against corruption and inefficiency; 2) Protest against the miserable economic situation; and 3) Protest against religious despotism. Among the slogans given, all three types are evident, but the third type is more prominent. Both those who have come to the streets and chant and those who do not speak out of fear of the regime's brutality have lost hope for reforming the regime in terms of efficiency, rule of law, and attention to public demands. The December 2017 protests can be seen as a cry of despair. The slogans show that there is a spectrum of various reformist, conservative, royalist, and even traditionalist tendencies among the demonstrators, but what unites them is the opposition to the government's insistence on preserving the status quo, which means waste, privileges, rents, and abuses that all stem from the rule of the clerical regime. To better understand these protests, they can be compared to the protests of the early 1990s and the Green Movement. The early 1990s protests were uprisings of low-income classes against privileges and discrimination. People who had endured a decade of war expected a transformation in their lives, but nothing happened. In the protests of 1999 and the Green Movement in 2009, the more educated class raised their freedom-seeking and democracy-demanding demands. The December 2017 protests occur after a few years of opportunity for reform following the JCPOA. The government, according to various statistics, spent between 100 to 150 billion dollars deposited after the JCPOA on expanding regional ambitions and more corruption and rent-seeking, with no improvement in employment and people's lives. The December 2017 movement displays a spark of awakening among the Iranian people regarding the dangers posed by the clergy institution to the country and Iranian society. Ordinary people may not be able to analytically express these dangers, but they deeply feel the risk of the continuation of clerical rule over the country. Rouhani's government has been very successful in making promises and ignoring them in both the 2013 and 2017 terms. This neglect is evident in various political, economic, and social demands in the protests. A prominent aspect of the 2017 protests, which was very muted in the 1990s and 2000s, is targeting the clergy. It seems that some segments of the Iranian people have come to realize that many of the economic and social toxins stem from the beliefs, lifestyle, and policies derived from this class. Besides the slogans denying the clergy, even slogans in favor of monarchy and kingship are more about negating the entire regime under the title of 'clerical government.' Anti-clerical slogans are heard in most of these protests. Particularly, the mention of Reza Shah is significant in that he felt the danger posed by the clergy for a modern Iran more than his son. The clergy and not the Islamist regime. Given the undisputed power of the Shia clergy and the pervasive corruption of this institution and its guardians, it was expected that one day the protesters would target this institution. It seems that the Iranian people, after four decades of giving the clergy a chance to wake up from their dinosaur sleep (hostility to science and human reason) and fill their pockets, see the present time as a good opportunity to hold the Shia clergy accountable in its general sense. In the final months of 2017, no security threat is felt for Iran, so the protesters do not have to consider such a concern and remain silent. Today, the clergy and its government are so intertwined that no one in Iran can separate them, and any slogan against one will also be against the other. Khamenei has left no independent clergy. Today, the vital veins of the Shia clergy all pass through the pipes of oil, gas, mines, and exports and imports. Since February 11, 1979, some opponents of the Pahlavi government realized that the clergy could not have an efficient government. However, a significant portion of the people had to feel this issue with their eyes, ears, and skin. Today, even the most loyal Islamists do not consider the existing government, which has implemented the ideas of the Shia clergy, to be efficient, let alone the ordinary people. In none of the protests from the 1980s to the 2000s was the clergy directly targeted. The Mojahedin Khalq in the early 1980s introduced themselves as opponents of Khomeini's government and not anti-clerical. Reformists in the 1990s and 2000s sought to reform jurisprudence and jurists, not to eliminate them. Urban uprisings also targeted political officials and not the clergy organization. At no point has the clergy been so dependent on the government and its ideas, which dominate the current affairs of the country. The December 2017 movement displays a spark of awakening among the Iranian people regarding the dangers posed by the clergy institution to the country and Iranian society. Ordinary people may not be able to analytically express these dangers, but they deeply feel the risk of the continuation of clerical rule over the country.