First Astana Meeting

On March 16, the bloody and destructive war in Syria will enter its seventh year. In recent weeks, several developments, including the holding of the Astana meeting, the drafting of a new constitution, the renewed discussion of creating a safe zone, and comments about the future of Bashar al-Assad, have created a turning point in the Syrian developments. In this week's views, we will discuss these developments with the participation of Ali Sadrzadeh, an analyst of Arab world issues, Ali Alizadeh, a political analyst in Iran, and Afshin Shahi, a professor of Middle Eastern studies at the University of Bradford, UK. Ali Sadrzadeh: It can be said that the Astana meeting was not very successful because the goals of the parties were different. Russia, Syria, and even Turkey wanted the negotiations to move towards a political direction and for negotiations to occur between different groups with Assad, probably for a transitional or future peace plan. However, the opposition claimed they were only participating in the Astana negotiations to solidify this fragile ceasefire. Ali Alizadeh: After seven years of a catastrophe that has been the most significant wound in the Middle East in the past fifty years, the presence of Iran, Russia, and Turkey was able to show a way out and a possibility for resolving the issue. It is clear that not all issues were resolved at the Astana conference. But compare it to 2013, 2014, and 2015 when there was no horizon. The conflicting groups are no longer concerned about Assad. They are shooting at each other. In the past few years, their conflicts have been much greater. Groups receiving Qatari funding were fighting against groups receiving Saudi funding, and they were engaged in clashes with groups funded by France, the UK, and the US. It is clear that gathering all of these under one roof is not a one-night or two-night job. However, the Astana meeting, after the previous trilateral meetings, showed that for the first time a roadmap seems to have been prepared. Afshin Shahi: In my opinion, this meeting was one of the most successful events we have witnessed in recent months. As Mr. Alizadeh pointed out, it at least created a basis for reaching a comprehensive peace. Perhaps no one reached an agreement on the details of the peace plan at Astana. But the prerequisite for a comprehensive peace plan is a ceasefire. The failures we faced, especially last year, whenever a negotiation was supposed to take place, the main thing threatening these negotiations was the breaking of ceasefires. The fact that the ceasefire has been maintained from December until today and the Astana meeting has practically created a mechanism that can at least theoretically maintain a relative ceasefire is, in my opinion, a very important and serious achievement. Iran's role in the Astana meeting: Ali Sadrzadeh: I think Iran did not have a decisive role in Astana because, in any case, if Iran were to influence various aspects of this conflict, it could only impact one aspect: the Assad government. And Bashar al-Assad is under enough pressure from Russia to participate there. More important than Iran's presence, in my opinion, was Turkey's presence. The main pillar of these negotiations or those who were the main guarantors of these negotiations were not Iran, but Turkey and Russia. Even if Iran initially opposed the participation of the US in these negotiations, it had to participate. If these negotiations make progress, Iran's differences with Turkey and Russia will become more apparent. Because in my opinion, Russia never considers Turkey and the US to be on the same level as Iran. In the matter of Syria's future, Turkey's and the US's interests differ from Iran's. Therefore, I do not think Iran's influence in the Astana negotiations was very significant. I think it played more of a symbolic role than an influential one. Ali Alizadeh: I completely disagree with this assessment. There is a perspective that whatever Iran does is wrong and it is a loser. All international analysts say that Iran has emerged from the catastrophe and predicament of Syria, both for the entire region and the deprived people of Syria and for its own national security, almost unscathed. It has emerged from this seven-year inferno. It is clear that Turkey had a more important role in Astana because Turkey accepted more commitments in the trilateral negotiations. Turkey agreed to be the spokesperson for the interests of the very groups that were partly nurtured by itself and partly by Qatar and Saudi Arabia. It is clear that it has more commitments and a larger role. For this reason, Iran can be said to have sat there more calmly. But Iran's interests are being fully secured. In my opinion, an important point that may later be mentioned is that the issue was resolved when the US lost hope. It was resolved when Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Turkey themselves, with Trump's arrival, were disappointed that the US would want to get more involved in Syria. Just remember and our dear friend should remember why Syria became so complicated because until two years ago, no one would accept anything less than the departure of Bashar al-Assad and the complete severance of Iran's interests and rights in the region. Now look where we are. For this reason, I believe the Astana negotiations were a step forward for the Syrian people towards achieving peace and stabilizing the interests of Syria's loyal partner over the years, namely Iran. Ali Sadrzadeh: I think Iran's role in Syria is a role for a long-term strategy. That is, Syria is a bridge for Iran through which it can maintain its influence in Lebanon, especially Hezbollah, and its presence in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Therefore, everything Iran does is to maintain this strategic relationship. What Mr. Khamenei called Iran's 'strategic depth.' The question is whether others have such a goal? It is clear that they do not. For Russia, it is not very important that Iran maintains its influence in Lebanon, and based on the trend that has occurred so far, I do not think Iran has been successful in Syria. The danger of ISIS, which Iran seems to have removed from itself by sending its forces there, is a danger that may be potential but does not currently exist. Because so far, the issue of ISIS attacking Iran has neither been raised nor has Iran gone there to attack ISIS. Iran has gone there to preserve Assad's regime. You see that in these seven years that have passed, neither Hezbollah forces nor Assad's forces, and to some extent Russian forces have attacked ISIS or the city of Raqqa, which is the center of ISIS in Syria. Their attacks have been more against non-ISIS groups that opposed Assad. Afshin Shahi: We need to see what the necessity of the Astana meeting was and why it came into being. The Astana meeting was created because Turkey made a very serious shift in its position. Last year around this time, no one could imagine that Ankara's foreign policy would be tied to Syrian interests and Iran's interests in Syria. The very fact that Turkish officials now indicate that there is no longer a political deadlock regarding Bashar al-Assad's future in Syrian politics is, in my opinion, one of Iran's greatest achievements. If this shift had not occurred, which was solely due to the military successes of Russia, Iran, and its allies in Syria, we might not have witnessed this meeting today. Did the Astana meeting change Iran's position in Syria? Ali Alizadeh: Let me add a sentence to Mr. Shahi's remarks. For Iran, the issue was not about preserving or removing Assad. For Iran, it was about preserving the integrity of Syria and preventing its fragmentation. Because it knew that the fragmentation of Syria, like what happened in Iraq, would be detrimental to the entire region. It knew that in order for that country not to disintegrate, Assad had to remain in power until the end of the determination of the terrorist groups and the civil war. Secondly, Iran's interests have been defensive. In my opinion, it was not about reaching Hezbollah in Lebanon. You look at the time when the entirety of this region, from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait and Gulf countries to Egypt and Morocco, was against Iran. One country in this region stood by Iran during the entire eight years of war that was unjustly imposed on Iran. For this reason, having an alliance with this country, in my opinion, is a very old alliance that is part of Iran's national security doctrine... Afshin Shahi: I do not agree with Mr. Alizadeh's view. Because these two issues are intertwined. In the view of Iranian policymakers, preserving Syria's integrity was not the only criterion. Perhaps if Syria remained intact but was led by a party whose interests were very close to those of Saudi Arabia and the rivals of the Islamic Republic, Tehran would seriously oppose it. In my opinion, it is reductionist to say that Iran only intervened to prevent Syria from fragmenting. Ali Sadrzadeh: For Iran, Assad is the only one who can secure Iran's interests. I think and still insist on my previous opinion that if there is a government in Damascus that preserves Iran's strategic interests in relation to Hezbollah and maintains Iran's influence and presence in the Arab-Israeli conflict, Iran is not so dependent on Assad. And let us not forget that Assad is also a very big problem. Imagine a leader of a country who has killed six hundred thousand people by dropping barrel bombs and bombs, half of the population has become displaced; imposing such a person during a transitional period on the people, I think, is a difficult task. I have always given an example and said, look, in the years 68 in Iran, with the order given by Mr. Khomeini, some were killed in Iranian prisons. Even now, this wound has not healed among us Iranians, and we still talk about the crimes of those years. Imagine someone will be able to cover the depth of the catastrophe that has occurred in Syria. Ali Alizadeh: I have a fundamental disagreement with Mr. Sadrzadeh's view. In my opinion, it was not just about Hezbollah in Lebanon. If Syria had collapsed, the next stage would have been to apply pressure on Iran itself and bring the issue to Iran's borders. Now it may start with ISIS and Takfiri forces, but then the West would also reach Iran's borders, and rest assured that there would be no such thing as the JCPOA. The second point regarding Turkey is that I said that Turkey's shift was due to something deeper. Turkey had failed. The heavy investment of Turkey and its old allies, Saudi Arabia and Qatar, had failed, and this failure was dangerous. It had also spread inside Turkey's borders. That is, Turkey was playing with fire, with ethnic fabric that became a mirror and symmetrical within its own borders. There were Salafis, Sunnis, Alawites, and Kurds there, and it could disrupt security within Turkey as well. The West was also scared. When the issue of the migration of millions of Syrians arose, the West realized that this issue could reach its own borders. My answer to Mr. Sadrzadeh is that national reconciliation is never easy anywhere, especially where the West and its regional allies have rampaged for five years. But Astana showed that with this new alliance, there is a will to move in a different direction. Otherwise, it is clear that a couple that fights cannot sit together. With the catastrophe that has occurred there, how can we achieve national reconciliation? It is clear that it is a very difficult path, but it seems possible and feasible. The specific reason for this is Trump's arrival and Trump's isolationist policies and his closeness to Putin allowed those who intended to burn Syria to build the Middle East to become disappointed. For the first time, we have a way out. Afshin Shahi: I think one of the most important issues that can turn this horizon that Mr. Alizadeh outlines into a serious matter is that for the first time in the past four years, there is a force that has the upper hand. As long as there is an equality and a military symmetry between the conflicting groups, reaching a political destiny is very difficult. Since the military situation has changed significantly in the last six or seven months, and today we can seriously and undeniably say that Assad and his allies have a military upper hand. This is a context that can make a political solution and process possible. If you look at the internal war in Lebanon, it was exactly like this. For this reason, it took almost 15 years. One of the important reasons was that the balance of power did not change significantly in the field, and this war became more and more protracted. Of course, we must also keep in mind that the Syrian war is a very complex war that has very different dimensions, including local, regional, and trans-regional dimensions. In our political analyses, we generally look at regional and trans-regional dimensions. We look at the roles of Russia, Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar. But local dimensions are also very important in this war. One issue that unfortunately the media has not paid attention to is the role of new groups, these new economic mafias that have emerged in the past five years and are practically one of the winners of this war. They have benefited from the economy of this war. The benefit of these groups, which are active in various parts of Syria, is that the war continues in some form. Ali Sadrzadeh: I will start with Mr. Shahi's last point, that we have talked more about the role of foreigners in this region. The reality is that there is also an issue happening in Syria itself. If you remember, from 2011 when the protests of the Syrian people against Bashar al-Assad began, there was no news of armed struggle for two years. In these two years, what did Assad's army do to these people? It was that it brought society to this situation that foreign forces began to covet this country and entered. Then, with the policy it adopted, it caused the entry of more foreign forces. That is, before we consider foreign factors as decisive in Syria, we should see what has happened in Syria itself and what role Mr. Assad has played.