Five Concepts of Political Practice in Today's Iran; Dominance of Coercive Politics

Conflicts among officials of the executive and judicial branches and some members of parliament over the Babak Zanjani case, the judicial branch's accounts in the name of its head, the funding sources for the 2013 presidential election (dirty money), the misuse of power by the president's brother, security equipment of the presidency, and issues related to the JCPOA are not ideological disputes or legal claims but rather political quarrels. These confrontations have less of a factional, discursive flavor and more of an internal war within the powerful institutions of the Islamic Republic. What are the contexts of these disputes and under what frameworks do they occur? Political practice in the Islamic Republic lacks defined and clear foundations and frameworks based on national interests or long-standing political traditions, so politicians cannot present their calculated and refined programs to the people for selection, nor can political actions and reactions emerge. Politicians in the Islamic Republic do calculate costs and benefits, but not for the nation and the country, rather for themselves, their families, and their close associates. Political practice in Iran has other foundations and frameworks, such as factionalism, family, profession, and group of friends, and of course, coercion and the power of arms. If we look at the map of political practice in today's Iran, we see coercive politics reflected in the interactions of the three branches of government and appointed and seemingly elected institutions, and identity politics in the confrontation of social forces and the dominant power. The end of value-oriented politics began in the late 1980s and was completed in the mid-1990s. Insults to the West and advocates of secularism and liberalism in Iran are no longer the core of political practice but merely tools for approaching power and declaring loyalty to the regime. Such behaviors are not even taken seriously by supporters of the regime because they are like currency printed daily without backing. Just look at the recent presidential and parliamentary elections. In these democratic displays, the only topics that are not discussed are the values of the parties; the quarrel is over who should be elected and which interests should take precedence. In political disputes over domestic and foreign policies and access to resources, the focus is not on values like justice, freedom, development, individual rights, public good, and peace and coexistence, but rather politicians resort to other titles and topics to persuade audiences and gather votes or attack their opposing groups. Today, political quarrels center around the amount of power within the core institutions of the Islamic Republic, namely security, judicial, military, and law enforcement institutions. The decline of factional politics was prevalent in the 1980s among certain social strata, but with the intolerance of totalitarian groups of clerics and military personnel and the Supreme Leader siding with one of the factions, factional politics has become costly and unproductive. Therefore, this type of political practice has been in decline over the past two decades. Factional politics in Iran has never gained a national character. Active members of factions today are few in some provincial centers and can only survive through connections with parts of the central government. Today, neither leftism nor rightism has a clear meaning in Iran. The left supports capitalism and the market, while the right (apparently) opposes it. Groups operating under the name of the left even strive more than rightist groups to prove their loyalty to the leader, the IRGC, and Shiite clergy. The end of discourse-oriented politics saw reform and change versus preserving the status quo (principlism) as the two dominant discourses in the country during the 1990s and 2000s. These terms are still used in the political space, but they no longer carry their previous meanings. Today, neither those who identify as reformists nor principlists are genuinely reformist or principlist. Reformists are not seeking reform; principlists are also not seeking a permanent change towards greater totalitarianism and imposing their lifestyle on more segments. Kinship-based politics has always been present in Iran. Only during regime change years is there a slight and temporary disruption in this type of political practice, but regimes immediately revert to it after establishment because they want to benefit their kin and tribes and also be able to trust their collaborators. It was said that the Pahlavi regime was a regime of a thousand families; by this measure, the Islamic Republic is a regime of ten thousand families because tens of thousands of clerical, IRGC, and technocrat families are connected through kinship ties and assist each other in gaining power, wealth, and status. In terms of the continuity and prevalence of this type of political practice, it cannot be considered a hallmark of a specific group, movement, or period. Factional and discourse-oriented politics have been in decline in the interactions among political forces, especially during Rouhani's government, while kinship-based politics is evident on all sides. Among these three, kinship-based politics has provided a more suitable ground for growth and expansion. Identity politics, which emerged in the 1950s and 1960s, did not become a prevalent method of political practice due to the focus on armed struggle by active ethnic groups (mostly left-leaning) and the brutality of the central government. However, with the decline of factional and discourse-oriented politics in the 1980s and 1990s, this type of political practice has become established in the political space with a non-violent approach. Women and ethnic and religious minorities focus on sexual, regional, and religious identities, while the clergy focuses on its professional identity. Professional and occupational groups such as workers, teachers, students, lawyers, engineers, and doctors have played a key role in political practice in criticizing the government in recent years, and the government has also created groups in the name of these professions to counter them. The formation of the Turkish-speaking faction in the tenth parliament and the behaviors of supporters of the Tractor Sazi Tabriz team (using the Turkish flag in the stadium and slogans denying the name Persian Gulf) are clear signs of the rise of this type of political practice in Iran's political space. Identity politics among women and ethnic and religious minorities has only been marginalized through repression. This type of political practice has been on the rise. Coercive politics, ongoing among power institutions, saw the clergy holding the upper hand in Iranian politics in the 1950s and 1960s. However, when Khamenei came to power, due to the lack of religious authority and legitimacy, he gradually relied more and more on the military, which gained increasing power in sensitive and key centers such as parliament, the cabinet, governorships, boards of trustees of state companies, and foundations. The military's power was such that Khamenei could not prevent the establishment of a bank by the IRGC (Khamenei's opposition to the establishment of a bank by the IRGC, quoted by Rouhani, Tabnak, January 5, 2017). This expansion of the IRGC's economic empire today is comparable to the economic empire under Khamenei's supervision and the empire of state companies. Military politics is based on the amount of coercion they possess and does not generally resort to any specific ideology, discourse, or identity. Where they encounter obstacles, they use the language of force and threats with weapons, prison, and torture. For this reason, the role of the Basij as the paramilitary arm of the IRGC and security institutions in Iranian politics has increased. Basijis are not only election monitors but also most of the operators of the election headquarters of the authoritarian faction. In addition to the Ministry of Intelligence, military and law enforcement agencies have several security institutions. The political media of the country (news agencies, newspapers, news websites, and state radio and television) are mainly run by security personnel, IRGC members, and Basijis, and these media shape the news and propaganda landscape of the country. Even media that are ostensibly not military employ several Basijis to protect themselves from their attacks (bombings, assaults, threats). Coercive politics has become so entrenched in Iran's political landscape that parts of society do not even question the legitimacy of this coercion in acquiring the country's resources. If we look at the map of political practice in today's Iran, we see coercive politics reflected in the interactions of the three branches of government and appointed and seemingly elected institutions, and identity politics in the confrontation of social forces and the dominant power. The exchange of statements between Hassan Rouhani and Sadegh Larijani is mainly about who has more resources and greater access to power. Factional and discourse-oriented politics have been in decline in the interactions among political forces, especially during Rouhani's government, while kinship-based politics is evident on all sides. Among these three, kinship-based politics has provided a more suitable ground for growth and expansion. Coercive politics belongs to totalitarian regimes (such as fascist, communist, and Islamist regimes) and authoritarian regimes (such as military regimes); kinship-based politics is dominant in Eastern authoritarian regimes; however, in democratic systems, factional, discourse-oriented, and identity politics are prevalent, while the other two are absent or very faint. By these criteria, the Islamic Republic has become increasingly similar to authoritarian and totalitarian fascist and communist regimes over its four decades of existence. For this reason, those who were concerned about the spread of fascism and communism in the 20th century are now worried about the spread of Islamism.