Five Questions About the 'Show Trial' of the Attackers on the Saudi Embassy

Among 194 countries in the world, the Islamic Republic holds the record for attacks on embassies and diplomatic missions, which are protected under the Vienna Convention of 1961. Attacks on the embassies of Egypt, Morocco, the United States, Denmark, the United Kingdom, and Saudi Arabia are among these cases. In almost all instances, the police force has never taken effective action to arrest the attackers. This is clear evidence that the will of the government was behind the attackers, who are sometimes referred to as rogue forces to leave no trace of the government's will in this unethical action that violates international law. Although attacks on embassies have been costly for the country in each case, the author believes that the attack on the Saudi embassy has incurred costs for the Islamic Republic that have compelled it to establish a 'show trial.' For example, Riyadh, by recalling its diplomats and expelling Iranian diplomats, not only severed its diplomatic relations with Tehran but also effectively closed the way for sending tens of thousands of pilgrims for Hajj, thereby putting the Islamic Republic under pressure from religious sectors questioning why Hajj should be closed due to the destructive actions of a few rogue individuals! If the attackers were truly rogue, shouldn't there be legal action against them? It is clear that this question, especially from religious sectors, is one of the two reasons that compelled the Islamic Republic to initiate legal proceedings against these individuals for the first time in the history of this regime; otherwise, until now, there has been no legal action against any of the other attackers on other embassies. In addition to this reason, there is another reason for prosecuting the attackers of the Saudi embassy: to appease Riyadh. The Islamic Republic knows that Saudi Arabia's position in regional equations is different. Riyadh has the power to initiate oil wars, Shiite-Sunni wars, isolate Tehran in the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, close the Hajj route, and damage Iran's relations with neighboring Sunni countries. Tension with Saudi Arabia is not cost-effective for Tehran in the long run, just as it is not for Riyadh. Riyadh is also aware of Iran's weight in regional equations. Thus, the Islamic Republic has established a court for the attackers on the Saudi embassy in a remarkable exception. However, is this court a real one for punishing the perpetrators? And is this court aimed at eradicating ugly and undesirable behavior so that such mistakes do not happen again? To answer, we must pay attention to the indictment against the perpetrators. The indictment against these individuals is structured around two main axes: participation in the intentional destruction of Saudi embassy property and disruption of public order through illegal protests and gatherings. Regardless of what the final verdict of the court may be, there are many questions regarding this court, and here we address five of them. First; if the charge against the attackers of the Saudi embassy is participation in destruction and disruption of public order, are these exact charges not applicable to the attackers of other embassies, for example, the British, Danish, and American embassies? If so, why has there been procrastination in prosecuting them, and is there any will to bring them to justice? Second; the indictment does not mention the 'damage to the reputation' that this action has caused to the country. Meanwhile, we see that in many trials, heavy sentences have been handed down merely for 'disrespecting the regime.' It should not be forgotten that throughout the world, there is not a single country or responsible official who has supported the attack on the Saudi embassy. On the contrary, from the Secretary-General of the United Nations to most countries and international organizations, this action has been condemned. Among them, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, as the most prominent Islamic institution, condemned the attack on the Saudi embassy. Third; according to the confessions of the accused, they were incited to protest against the Saudi embassy through publications related to the Revolutionary Guards. From these confessions, it is understood that the 'commanders' of the attack on the embassy are different from the perpetrators. Hassan Rouhani, as President, has also called for the prosecution of both the commanders and the perpetrators. But why is there no mention of the commanders? Fourth; among the attackers on the Saudi embassy, four are clerics. According to the judicial procedure of the Islamic Republic, those who are clerics are tried in a special court for clergy. However, if we consider this procedure to be correct (which it is not), why is their trial held in secret? Is it not true that these individuals, due to their clerical attire, were among those responsible for inciting others? Therefore, why should public opinion not be informed about the trial of these four clerics? This question is particularly important for religious sectors, as we see that individuals in clerical attire have caused the closure of a religious obligation like Hajj, depriving tens of thousands from fulfilling this obligation due to their wrongful actions. (Refer to the article: The Islamic Republic Trapped in the 'Political Hajj' Trap) Fifth; according to Iranian criminal laws, the punishment for destroying public property and disrupting order is one year of imprisonment and a monetary fine. However, as stated by Mohseni Ejei, the spokesman for the judiciary, a reduction in punishment is to be considered for the perpetrators. He stated that some of the attackers on the Saudi embassy 'acted out of anger towards Saudi Arabia and the Mina disaster, and these reasons will lead to a reduction in punishment.' If this is the case, as the spokesman for the judiciary has said, the light sentence that will be handed down to the accused will face at least two problems: First, in all judicial systems worldwide, the purpose of punishing criminals is to deter individuals from committing crimes again. If a light sentence is to be given to the perpetrators, such a ruling contradicts the philosophy of punishment. In other words, the reason that Mohseni Ejei provided for reducing the sentences of the perpetrators would itself lead to future cases where anyone could easily commit acts of destruction and arson against an embassy simply because they harbor resentment towards a particular country. Second, if the establishment of a court for the attack on the Saudi embassy is an exception to all other attacks on embassies to convince both domestic public opinion and the Saudi government that the perpetrators were rogue, will public opinion and Saudi Arabia be convinced that the perpetrators were rogue if leniency is shown in their sentences? We know that Ayatollah Khamenei, in defense of the attackers on the Saudi embassy, stated that 'just because an issue like the Saudi embassy and the British embassy arises, which is very bad and harmful to the country and Islam, this should not be used as an excuse to attack faithful youth.' With Khamenei's statement, it can already be said that the court for the perpetrators (not the commanders) is a show trial and is akin to not prosecuting the perpetrators of other embassy attacks, whose cases have remained deliberately dormant, indicating that the will of the government was behind each of these attacks; attacks that violate diplomatic immunity and international law, making the Islamic Republic the record holder for attacks on embassies.