Iranian society, like other societies, is changing, but what distinguishes it is the direction of this change; despite the relentless and comprehensive efforts of the government to Islamize and shape it according to the lifestyle of Shia clergy, Iranian society is moving in a direction that officials describe as moral decay, at risk of influence, on a downward slope, and under cultural attack. In which direction is Iranian society moving? Why is the government worried about its trends? Has the religious government succeeded in controlling and suppressing joy, beauty, intimate relationships, freedom of expression, and compliance through religious legislation and its legal and illegal enforcement? Valuing and paying attention to beauty, unlike in the 1950s and 1960s when dishevelment and neglect of appearance were valued and revolutionary youth obtained their clothes from second-hand markets, today not only powerless people but also the ruling class values beauty and being well-groomed (according to individuals' definitions of these terms). This can be seen from the sales of cosmetic products, the number of cosmetic surgeries, the sales of trendy and branded clothing, the use of modern models by beauticians, and other efforts to positively influence through appearance. The head of state uses Botox to look good (Mahmoud Ahmadinejad), and the goalkeeper of the Persepolis team wore SpongeBob pants and published a photo of it on social media. Of course, like other social trends, the hard core of the government (religious and military bureaucracy) has been at war with this trend as well. When Ali Khamenei complains about the multi-billion dollar sales of cosmetic products and some private hospitals pay nurses for makeup, it is clear that this trend has become widespread. However, morality patrols still force women to remove their makeup, military institutions arrest individuals involved in modeling, the places administration continues to cut the heads or legs of mannequins in stores, or women who wear a little makeup are warned in offices, ethics committees suspend athletes for wearing their desired clothing for a period, and beauticians are under government repression. But these are merely harassment operations against a social trend of public interest. Joy. Gatherings of young people aged 16 to 18 in front of the Kourosh shopping center in Tehran (up to about 2000 people) and the Proma complex in Mashhad for end-of-year joy and the arrest of 35 university graduates at a party and the flogging of 50 lashes to them the next day are the latest signs of another trend in Iranian society, which is responding to the need for joy and happiness. There is hardly a day that videos of the dancing and joy of teenagers and young people in public spaces such as universities, military barracks, streets, parks, and schools (up to throwing their veils in the air and shouting the phrase 'always be happy') are not published. The privacy of people is no longer claimed by the government and propaganda apparatus because behaviors inconsistent with the lifestyle of the clergy in these spaces are uncontrollable. The soft war soldiers of the regime are constantly trying to erase these. Additionally, attacks on private parties continue merely as symbolic operations meaning that the government does not tolerate these, but in reality, every night tens of thousands of parties are held in homes and gardens across the country, some of which are protected by bribing law enforcement forces. Those who can be identified and punished are severely punished. For example, after a video was released from the second night of the ethnic festival at the University of Sistan and Baluchestan, in which several students were dancing and celebrating, the disciplinary committee of this university issued a 12-semester suspension for 7 of the students: a two-semester suspension for 5 of these students and a one-semester suspension for two other students. (Asr-e Ta'adol, June 17, 2016) In the first parliament of the Islamic Republic, members clapped when they were satisfied with a topic. This was stopped under pressure from Islamists. After 9 terms, in the 10th parliament, some members clapped after a speech by a member, which was met with the reaction of the session's president and some members. (Tasnim, June 15, 2016) The growing effort to be happy and overflow from private spaces to public space, against the harsh government response to this phenomenon with flogging, indicates the strengthening of this trend over the past two decades. Iranian youth desire graduation parties and prom ceremonies (dance ceremonies at school with bringing a girlfriend or boyfriend at the end of high school), and if the government does not allow it, they will eventually find a way to do it themselves. The soullessness of school graduation ceremonies has also led students to take action and hold parties for themselves. The leader of the Islamic Republic calls such ceremonies and programs, and in general anything not approved and controlled by the government, moral decay (June 15 and 31, 2016). Moral decay here is replacing the term vulgarity, which in the 1950s and 1960s was used by Islamists and Marxists to refer to art and literature that most people paid attention to. Just as the label of vulgarity was a tool for creating cases and prohibitions, moral decay will play the same role. Breaking the news-communication monopoly. The Islamic Republic has faced resistance since the day it established the monopoly and sought to enforce it. The latest of these resistances has been ongoing in social networks and satellite channels. The broadcast of television advertisements for movies from satellite networks, which has encompassed all films - and the government ultimately, despite threats, yielded to lifting the ban on showing the film 'We Don't Get Used To It' - has led to a serious challenge among the officials of the Islamic Republic in the judiciary, the Ministry of Culture, state television, and producers and directors of cinema. The Islamic Republic has refused to grant licenses to private television networks and even cable networks in universities, but ultimately a license has been granted to the institute under the supervision of Makarem Shirazi, and its Valayat network is operating independently of state television. Just as the censorship barrier for books was broken with the online publication of works, the censorship barrier for audio and visual works has also been broken with rival media. Free and informal sexual relations. Statistics from forensic medicine on the number of referrals for abortions to medical centers over the past 10 years show a rising trend, increasing from 2,929 cases in 2006 to 9,955 cases in 2015. The head of the fertility department of the Ministry of Health stated at a meeting reviewing population policies in the Ministry of Health: 'In a study in 2015, it was found that 80,000 cases of abortions were intentional.' (Arman, June 26, 2016) The actual statistics should be in the hundreds of thousands of abortions per year. Abortions in Iran mainly occur after free sexual relations since married women have various and easy ways to prevent pregnancy. Despite the government's strict regulations against intimate relationships, Iranian girls and boys act very freely in such relationships. About 80% of Iranian girls have boyfriends (Jam-e Jam, October 27, 2013), and it is evident that their relationships cannot be limited to phone conversations. Given the difficulty of young people going out together in Iran (despite the morality patrols), they spend hours together at home, and these meetings may lead to sexual contact. There are about 4 million young divorced women (including annually) and 11 million young people of marriageable age in Iran who have little chance of marriage or do not want to marry and are not nuns to abstain from sexual relations; and the result is that cohabitation of girls and boys without legal marriage has become an undeniable phenomenon in Iran. Disregard for the law. Since the law in Iran is written by the ruling caste, and those that are written and approved are based on the interests of the ruling caste and many of them are not enforced, the majority of the Iranian people are indifferent to the laws. Annually, 9 million cases are opened in Iranian courts where one or both parties have ignored or violated existing laws. The number of bounced checks in Iran in the fourth quarter of 2015 was two million (i.e., about 8 million per year). (Public Relations of the Central Bank, June 26, 2016) It seems that Iranian citizens, who see themselves powerless against tyranny and totalitarianism, see no way other than to escape responsibility and the law. This trend acts against capital and social trust in the long run (since bad law is better than lawlessness), but it is a cost that society pays for the continuation of the religious tyranny government.
Five Social Trends in Confronting the Totalitarian Religious Government
The article discusses five social trends in Iran that challenge the totalitarian religious government, including the growing appreciation for beauty, the desire for joy and celebration, and the disregard for laws. It highlights the government's attempts to suppress these trends through repression and legislation but notes the resilience of the youth in pursuing their desires for happiness and social freedom. This matters as it reflects a significant cultural shift in Iranian society, indicating a growing resistance against authoritarian control.
👥 Key Players
📰 What Happened
The article describes various social trends in Iran that challenge the government's strict religious and cultural norms, such as the appreciation for beauty, desire for joy, and disregard for restrictive laws. Despite government repression, these trends continue to grow, particularly among the youth.
- There is a growing appreciation for beauty and modern fashion in Iran, despite government disapproval.
- Social gatherings and expressions of joy are increasingly common, challenging the government's restrictive policies.
💡 Why It Matters
📚 Background
Iran is governed by a theocratic regime that imposes strict social norms based on Islamic principles, often clashing with the desires of its younger, more liberal population.
Translated from the original and edited for English readers. View original source →
Translation confidence: 85%