Four Decades of Rebellion and Counter-Rebellion

In less than three months, the organization of security, military, and law enforcement forces has changed suddenly. Security forces have conducted more maneuvers, the IRGC and Basij have formed 'special and local patrols', the police have increased the number of 'foot, motorcycle, and vehicle patrols', and the Tehran prosecutor's office has established 'night patrols of deputy prosecutors'. What is about to happen that military, security, and judicial institutions are making sudden changes in the name of ensuring public security and combating social harms under plans such as 'Epic of Security and Service'? What is the reason for this state of readiness? What is the Islamic Republic afraid of? The answers to these questions can be found by reviewing the political and social events of the years following the revolution. An examination of past decades shows that whenever public and social dissatisfaction has risen regarding an issue or an unforeseen political event has occurred, security and military forces have been organized to confront, suppress, and control the situation at the behest of the ruling authority. From the protests in Mashhad and Islamshahr in the 1990s to the widespread protests following the rise in gasoline prices in 2007, from the events at Tehran University in 1999 to the presidential election turmoil in 2009. Currently, there is also a worrying outlook regarding Iran's economic situation and potential political changes. On one hand, according to the Research Center of the Parliament, the poverty index in urban areas of Iran has been on the rise from 2008 to 2014, and the inflation rate has again reached double digits in December. Economists like Dr. Mohsen Renani have repeatedly warned: 'If millions of unemployed, marginalized, and poor people protest and a rebellion of the barefoot occurs, they will no longer be negotiable or leadable. They will have no clear goal; they just do not want the status quo.' An example of this prediction was the event that took place on Friday, January 7, in Mashhad, Nishapur, Kashmar, Shahrud, and several other cities under the title 'No to Price Hikes'. On the other hand, news about the health status of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the leader of the Islamic Republic, and discussions about his potential successors have raised concerns about possible reactions from political groups and figures and the likelihood of unrest. The fear of rebellion and the plan to expand the structure of the IRGC and Basij have led to changes in the leadership and structure of military and security institutions and an increase in urban maneuvers. Previously, until 2012, the IRGC had implemented the 'Mosaic Defense' plan, meaning that 'in internal battles, if the enemy wants to take action, in every village, city, or any place where a population lives, the members of the Basij in that area can defend themselves.' With this definition, this military arm of the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic had equipped the Quds and Imam Hussein brigades as rapid reaction forces, Imam Ali brigades for dealing with unrest and security issues, Ashura and Zahra brigades for riot control, and the Saberin brigade for special operations. Currently, alongside these actions, the scope of this institution's activities has increased with the aim of expanding the Basij and IRGC, as Mohammad Reza Yazdi, the commander of the IRGC in Tehran province, announced on Sunday, December 10, emphasizing that 'social earthquakes' are occurring in Tehran, stating that 'special patrols' will soon be launched to 'prevent theft and combat thugs.' Almost a month before him, Gholamhossein Ghaibpour, the head of the Basij organization, had also announced the plan of this institution to launch 'neighborhood patrols.' Ahmad Zolghadr, the deputy operations commander of the Basij, stated that these patrols would consist of five members and would operate on foot in a thousand points across urban neighborhoods in the country. He described the purpose of these patrols as 'helping to establish sustainable security in neighborhoods', 'dealing with thugs and thieves', 'preventing harm to public, governmental, and private properties', and 'addressing visible crimes.' Simultaneously, alongside the preventive actions of the IRGC and Basij, Saeed Montazer al-Mahdi, the police spokesperson, also announced that this force has increased its patrols in 'marginalized areas.' Such a program comes at a time when in 2016, the police had implemented a plan to use 7,000 undercover police forces under the name 'Establishing Moral Order and Security.' However, in the latest instance, Abbas Dolatabadi, the Tehran prosecutor, has also entered the field and, in an unprecedented move, announced the establishment of 'night patrols' by his deputies aimed at 'supporting public rights and protecting citizens' rights.' All these extensive changes and developments in recent months occur while the Islamic Republic has, over the past four decades, after numerous encounters with protest movements, sudden uprisings, and gaining experience in this regard, arranged a broad mechanism for suppressing and dealing with any type of political and public dissatisfaction. However, it seems that the current preparations are not sufficient. The 1990s: The Mashhad Uprising and the Formation of Ashura and Zahra Brigades In the early 1990s, uprisings occurred in cities such as Mashhad, Islamshahr, Shiraz, Zahedan, Zanjan, Urmia, Arak, and Mobarakeh, which were unexpected for government officials. Among them was Mashhad, where an attempt by municipal agents in 1992 to demolish illegally built residential houses on the outskirts of the city led to clashes and the deaths of several people. In August 1994, with the parliament's opposition to the provincial status of Qazvin, protests in this city escalated and turned violent. In Islamshahr, on April 4, 1995, a minibus drivers' strike against the status quo, coinciding with the implementation of economic adjustment plans under President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani and a 50% increase in inflation, created a surprising situation for government officials. The details of these protests and the extent of casualties were never disclosed, but these events led to a restructuring and change in the organizational structure of the Basij and an increase in urban maneuvers. Specifically, the Ashura and Zahra brigades were formed after the Mashhad events with the aim of protecting neighborhoods and responding to unforeseen incidents. Of course, these two numerous Basij brigades joined the IRGC ground forces in 2007 and played a major role under the command of the IRGC Quds Force in the election events of 2009. The 2000s: The Gasoline Uprising and IRGC Operational Patrols Despite all military and security forces being deployed with the support of the core power structure to contain the protests of 2009, the scale of the situation had spiraled out of control. The events of that year occurred while preparations for confrontation had been anticipated for almost a year earlier, considering the unfavorable economic conditions and protests known as the 'gasoline uprising.' Increased urban maneuvers and changes in the organizational structure of the Basij followed the plan for gasoline rationing on June 27, 2007, when various cities, including Tehran and Islamshahr, witnessed public protests, and several gas stations were set on fire, and banks and government buildings were attacked. Reports indicate that several people were killed in this incident, but the actual casualty figures were not disclosed. A few months after this event, the anti-riot Ashura and Zahra brigades joined the IRGC ground forces, and the IRGC commander assumed command of the Basij resistance forces as well. Following these changes, Hossein Taeb announced that 'operational patrols' under the title 'Sustainable Security' would be launched on December 1, 2008, by order of Ayatollah Khamenei, the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic. He stated that Basij forces would patrol every night in all bases to ensure the social security of the people. The establishment of street patrols coincided with the police's 'social security' plan and the extensive operation of the 'Security and Calm Exercises.' The IRGC and Basij operational patrols were reactivated in April 2009, two months before the presidential election. Ahmad Reza Radan, the then deputy commander of the police, stated, 'In meetings we had with the IRGC, Basij patrols would operate as neighborhood patrols in Tehran and across the country.' The 2010s: The Events of 2009 and the Imam Ali Brigades Although the widespread protests of 2009 were contained with the comprehensive involvement of various military, law enforcement, and security forces, supported by the core power structure, concerns about the rekindling of the smoldering discontent and suppressed demands have never left officials. For this reason, several changes were made in the IRGC and Basij to strengthen deterrence and suppression aspects. Among these, the Basij was transformed into an organization, and by the decree of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Mohammad Reza Naqdi was appointed as its commander. On the other hand, in April 2011, new security units named 'Imam Ali' were formed, relying on the experience of the controversial presidential election, under the title 'Countering Seditions like the 2009 Sedition.' The task of the motorcycle brigades of Imam Ali is to deal with security and urban issues and street confrontations. Simultaneously, with the change in the power structure in 2013 and Hassan Rouhani's entry into the presidency, and following the 10th parliamentary elections and the Assembly of Experts, another chapter in the structure of the IRGC and Basij began. In December 2016, while the deputy security and police minister reported a '69% increase in social protests, including labor, professional, and sectoral protests,' Gholamhossein Ghaibpour was appointed as the commander of the Basij organization by the Supreme Leader. The establishment of special patrols of the IRGC and local patrols of the Basij also emerged following this transition. Mohammad Jafari, the IRGC commander, pointed to this change in the Basij's approach compared to the past, stating, 'The Basij's function has always been to be present as a solution in major social problems and crises in the country. With the adoption of new approaches, the scope of the Basij's activities has expanded and will also include social issues.' Such extensive equipping and preparation, supported by the complete financial and moral backing of the Iranian power structure, indicates that the political and economic outlook of Iran is not very optimistic. Numerous protests by defrauded investors, workers, and retirees in recent months, on one hand, the continuation of the economic crisis, the government's financial instability in securing resources, and the increase in a range of taxes in the next year's budget have raised concerns about the possibility of widespread uprisings. In addition, ongoing political dissatisfaction, the failure to fulfill many electoral promises, the continuation of social restrictions, and the repression of critical political activists, along with discussions about the potential designation of the future leader of the regime, have intensified the worries of the ruling security and military apparatus. Therefore, the formation of diverse patrols by various government arms, considering their experiences from past decades, becomes meaningful. A mechanism that has been formed in the name of combating social harms and with the aim of controlling political and social conditions and dealing with protest movements.