Four Distinguishing Features of the December 2017 Uprising: Struggle Against the Established Nightmare

The December 2017 uprising, with significant breadth (around 100 cities) and clear anti-government, anti-clerical slogans, and support for the monarchy, astonished many observers of Iranian affairs. This uprising shares commonalities with other movements and protests in the past 150 years in Iran, such as differences in initial and final slogans and demands, the government's insistence on pushing them towards violence, and attributing them to foreigners. The protest movement began by addressing livelihood issues but ultimately led to the denial of the regime, just as the Green Movement began with 'Where is my vote?' but ended with the denial of the Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist. The 1979 protest movement also initially asked the Shah to reign, not govern, but ended in overthrow. This movement, like past ones, was attributed to foreigners: 'The main designer of this project is an American named Michael Andrea, a former counter-terrorism official of the CIA, and an operational room consisting of three sides—America, Zionists, and Al Saud—was formed for these unrests, primarily planned by Michael and one of the intelligence officers affiliated with Mossad, with funding from Al Saud.' (Mohammad Jafar Montazeri, Attorney General of the country, Etemad, January 3, 2018) However, the December 2017 uprising has its own distinct features. I will point out four distinguishing characteristics of this movement. The first fully non-religious uprising in Iran. Reformists in the post-Green Movement era, instead of rebuilding their organizations and expanding their connections in the country, sought refuge in the 'system.' They have sunk into a bubble of political elitism, and these days, their supporters, who are astonished by these protests, constantly say, 'We do not know who these people who have come to the streets are.' If the shapeless masses vote for Khatami, the people are heroes, but if they chant 'anti-clerical' slogans, they are rootless and without identity. Over the past 110 years, from the Constitutional Revolution to the Green Movement, at least part of the slogans have been religious or have had a religious flavor. The December 2017 movement is the first to be devoid of religious slogans. The 'Allahu Akbar' and 'Ya Hussein' chants that were heard during the Green Movement are completely absent in this movement. It seems that four decades of ideological education every day in schools and mosques across the country have reached a complete dead end for at least some segments of society, as the youth in these areas do not invoke the 1400-year-old imported religion in the most emotional moments of their lives. When a Basij member in Abik Qazvin chants Allahu Akbar at a gathering of protesters, the protesters first boo him and then repeatedly call him 'dishonorable.' It is also clear to the religious that this movement seeks to remove religion from the political and power sphere. Not a single cleric was present in this movement. In the Green Movement, a few clerics were present because this movement did not initially target the regime itself, and one of the government factions was active in it. Of course, the Green Movement also eventually led to the denial of the regime itself. Against the Shiite clergy. In other uprisings, even up to the Green Movement, protesters tried to engage with Shiite authorities or write letters to accompany them. During the Green Movement, hundreds of requests for meetings and letters addressed to clerics were written. The December 2017 uprising showed that not only have the protesters lost hope in the Shiite clergy, but they have also risen against their privileges. What was heard in all protests were slogans against 'clergymen.' This movement demonstrated that at least in some parts of Iran, the clergy no longer has social authority but is despised. Observers of Iranian developments knew this beforehand, but due to the impossibility of polling, they could not rely on it for their observations. The protest movement brought this issue from inside homes to the public space. The uprising of the barefoot in very small cities. An examination of the locations of protests shows that very small cities have had much more activity in this movement compared to large cities and provincial centers. Those who participated in nighttime demonstrations were mainly young people aged 15 to 25, living below the poverty line and having no hope for the future. Of course, government clerics, to avoid accusations of suppressing the poor and barefoot, attribute the protesters to the affluent class (Ali Saidi, Khamenei's representative in the IRGC, Tasnim, January 3, 2018), but this does not align with the realities on the ground. According to the Deputy Security Minister, over 90% of those arrested in the recent unrest were young and adolescent, with an average age of under 25, and generally had no prior arrest records. They see the only way to change their situation as the dissolution of the Islamic Republic. The regime's continuation for them means the continuation of misery and poverty resulting from discrimination and humiliation. The December 2017 protests have shown that small cities in Iran have a high capacity for social movements. The Constitutional Revolution, the nationalization of the oil industry, the 1979 revolution, and the Green Movement were all urban movements (in large cities), and small, remote cities had little share in them. This is the first time that people from remote areas challenge the concentrated power in Tehran and provincial centers. For this reason, suppressing it has also been more difficult for the government. The government did not expect an uprising to start from these areas, and thus its repressive force was mostly concentrated in large urban areas. Movements in Tehran, Mashhad, Tabriz, Shiraz, and Kerman were quickly brought under control because the government sent tens of thousands of its forces to the streets, but in Dorud, Izeh, and Qahderijan, the suppression did not proceed quickly. In some areas of Tehran, the number of stationed government forces was even greater than the number of people who usually move in the streets or are expected to come out for demonstrations. Due to the stronger presence of this uprising in small cities and less access to news after the filtering of Telegram and Instagram, it was thought that the protests had somewhat subsided after a week. However, on the eighth day, the protests continued because the government, despite showcasing its own rallies, could not fill the country with its forces. The distancing of established institutions from protests. The December 2017 uprising showed that not only have the protesters lost hope in the Shiite clergy, but they have also risen against their privileges. What was heard in all protests were slogans against 'clergymen.' This movement demonstrated that at least in some parts of Iran, the clergy no longer has social authority but is despised. During this period of protest movements, no part of the established institutions accompanied it. The established institutions are so connected to the umbilical cord of the government that they cannot imagine an alternative to the current situation. In the 1979 revolution, significant portions of the state bureaucracy cooperated with the clergy and the market. In the Green Movement, sections of academics, artists, athletes, and some administrative staff cooperated with this movement because it did not initially target the government. In the 2017 protest movement, all institutions that had even the slightest connection to the government and its resources and rents distanced themselves from it. What was more evident than ever in these protests was the positioning of reformists on the side of the government and their efforts to suppress this uprising as quickly as possible (see the statement of the Combatant Clergy Association, which was not much different from the statements of the IRGC). More than sections of the people passing by the reformists in these protests, the reformists had passed by these sections. In recent months, their utmost efforts have been to meet with members of the Guardian Council and IRGC commanders, not to meet with the people of Qahderijan, Shahin Shahr, Khoy, Lanjan, Toyserkan, and Izeh, most of whom, according to a member of parliament from this city, are unemployed. Who has prevented them from going to these cities? Those who have traveled to Dorud know that Dorud is like a fictional city after nuclear wars. Children walk on dirt and mud without clothes and shoes, and many houses have no doors or windows, in a country where 'Khamenei acts like a god.' It is natural that the youth of Dorud and Izeh have no relation to reformists because reformists have no relation to them. In the post-Green Movement era, reformists, instead of rebuilding their organizations and expanding their connections in the country, sought refuge in the 'system.' They have sunk into a bubble of political elitism, and these days, their supporters, who are astonished by these protests after the 2017 uprising, constantly say in the media, 'We do not know who these people who have come to the streets are.' The shapeless masses, if they vote for Khatami, are heroes, but if they chant 'anti-clerical' slogans, they are rootless and without identity. Reformist guests in Persian-language media say they do not know who the protesters are, while both their city is specified and their demands are clearly stated, and they speak in Persian. The claim of not knowing means 'they are not aligned with us' or they do not have a party or group. Does the government allow anyone other than loyalists to have a party and group? Can people come with a political ID and say we do not want 'clerical government'? This movement is a protest against discrimination and humiliation, incompetence, and widespread self-righteousness, stemming from despair and hopelessness. Poverty, unemployment, and the increase in crimes and psychological disorders affecting tens of millions are a result of the above conditions. The Shiite clergy, the IRGC, and government factions are the embodiment of these three features. Even after suppression, these features will not disappear. Those who protested in December 2017, after being released from prison or beaten, will not become the foot soldiers of conservatives and reformists. They will become a power bloc in the Islamic Republic that can challenge the regime itself in the future or, if the conditions are not suitable for overthrow, will play a role in developments. Those who become political (especially through imprisonment and beating) find it hard to step away from this scene.