Four 'Fallacies' in Denying Voting

A note by Rasool Nafisi - Usually during election times in Iran, in addition to the enlightenment that arises from the debates of power candidates, in the popular front and in places where discussion and opinion are possible, namely more so outside of Iran, fundamental discussions arise primarily concerning the necessity or denial of the act of voting itself. Here, I will address four arguments put forth by opponents of voting in Iran and highlight their argumentative problems. The first argument of the opponents: Voting is an affirmation of Ayatollah Khamenei and legitimizes the regime. The reality is that Mr. Khamenei's tactic is to 'self-validate' elections, meaning that participation, especially mass participation, is portrayed as a national endorsement of the Islamic Republic system. However, the people's vote does not align with what he claims. In fact, the people's vote is at the level of 'government' rather than the system. In each of the past elections that had a relatively competitive nature, people voted for someone they believed would respond to some of their civil demands. To explain this issue, I must resort to an exaggerated analogy: imagine a number of individuals living in a place not of their own choosing, like war prisoners (I do not mean to imply that Iran is such a country). It is customary for the head of the camp to allow one of the prisoners to be elected by themselves for the sake of comfort and to keep the prisoners calm. The vote of individuals will naturally go to someone they feel respect and closeness to. The idea that prisoners affirm their situation and the system of captivity through their actions is incorrect. In any closed society, at least the possibility of voting and participation allows local and living demands to be expressed and somewhat met. This situation may not be tangible for those sitting outside the arena, who express maximum demands for overthrowing the entire system, while the people focus on other reasons. The manner and form of these votes become clearer at the level of city councils. There, people vote for their neighbors, their ethnic groups, and perhaps their co-religionists who better understand their needs (and it is this fear that has led the Guardian Council to prohibit the participation of religious minorities in city council elections). Ultimately, it is a reality that Iran's Shia leaders want to showcase the superiority of their system over most Sunni countries like Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the UAE, and even Egypt. Whatever the reality may be, Iran's system has succeeded in experimenting with a type of controlled non-liberal democracy that the aforementioned countries have not attempted. The second argument: Voting is not inherently democratic; the vote is a democratic outcome. To condition the democratic act of voting on its outcome is a form of crude 'utilitarianism.' Voting is an expression of individual will to meet minimum to maximum demands. Voting is a dialogue between the individual and the power institution that occasionally becomes possible. In totalitarian systems, a form of voting is also present at the level of party units, and it is only in absolute autocratic or tyrannical systems that either voting is not an issue or usually more than ninety percent vote for the tyrant. Saddam Hussein, Mubarak, and their ilk brought in such votes. In countries like Iran, where the governing system is a mixture of tyranny and symbols of democracy, voting and not voting becomes a permanent dilemma, and elections become the site of the highest tensions and displays of deficiencies and corruption. Elections become such a problem that candidates who have passed through a hundred filters and quarantines still face envy from tyrants in the final stages and are targeted for weakening and possibly elimination. In Iran, while the tyrant desires to heat up the election furnace to demonstrate his superiority over religious-regional rivals like Saudi Arabia and Qatar, he cannot tolerate the heating of the furnace 'too much.' This very incident reveals the emptiness of the argument based on 'vote and vote outcome': this grand display of people's power that terrifies the tyrant is the result of the very votes that are said to be 'ineffective.' Every four years, in a grand display in Iran, people direct the harshest criticisms at the government and the system. The dimensions of abuses become apparent, and bitter truths that have been hidden until now are revealed. The tyrant decides to replace the presidential regime with a parliamentary regime to rid himself of this grand display. He decides that debates should not be broadcast live. Yet none of these decisions are implemented. The reason for this is unclear. He decides to gradually criticize and diminish the value and importance of a candidate who may become a thorn in his side tomorrow based on millions of votes. However, the backlash of any of his movements has two negative results: implicit support for any candidate leads to the invalidation of the national seal (specifically in the case of Nateq Nouri). On the other hand, the reaction of the attacked candidate is devastating: every word from a candidate like Rouhani criticizing the IRGC's interference, the corruption of the Mashhad endowments, or the pressures and obstructions is enlightening and destructive. He is not a marginal regime opponent speaking; he is the regime itself. The third argument: Choosing between bad and worse is not a choice; it is a compulsion. Although I refrain from using the term 'everywhere in the world' that Mr. Khamenei uses, and I add that 'nowhere in the world' does such a strange regime exist, and their actions and behaviors are not necessarily applicable to the Iranian regime, I also add this: everywhere in the world, especially in recent years, there has been a choice between bad and worse. If the regime artificially creates this situation in Iran, that is a separate matter. The reality is that people constantly monitor the appointed individual and do not vote for him, and if they do not succeed positively, they provide their opinion negatively to the extent that sometimes the regime even tramples on the detailed principles of the nation-state agreement and directly (probably) changes the ballot box. The people of Iran are in a long negative struggle with the regime, engaged in a hopeless dialogue. The fourth argument: If voting had results, the regime would have changed by now, but the regime has not only not grown but has gradually become less democratic. There is much evidence for and against this argument. There is no doubt that the regime is constantly sealing the governmental system and closing the breathing passages of the people. The latest clear example of this will to tyranny can be found in prohibiting the participation of minorities in city councils. But even in this matter, one can see the tyrant's fear of the people's votes. If the vote were ineffective, then why would a regime that wants to gain legitimacy through votes engage in a shameful act like depriving religious minority citizens of participation in city elections? Therefore, the way to open these passages more is through people's votes. Of course, those who oppose people's voting add a second part to it, which is the boycott and 'overthrow' of the regime. They trap the people between two maximum choices while the people are concerned with their daily issues and immediate problems. Ultimately, the regime moves with unparalleled precision and diligence against the constant pressure to close the outlets for the democratic rights of the people, but 'pragmatically' refrains from some claims like parliamentary elections out of fear of public reaction. Voting is not ineffective. The people's votes are pregnant with good and bad results. Less participation increases the weight of bus votes. Not voting does not lead to the regime's elimination, but voting and continuing to vote increases the democratic expectations of the people. Practicing democracy, even in its symbolic form, strengthens the spirit of participation in one's destiny among the people. Voting - and more importantly, not voting for the tyrant's favored candidate - is a clear and explicit dialogue that will ultimately be effective.