Four Transformative Trends in the First to Tenth Parliaments: The Decline of an Institution

Political institutions, even if they have defined roles and frameworks in the constitutions of countries, undergo transformations in reality and in interaction with other institutions in all political systems, whether democratic or authoritarian. A notable example that has recently attracted attention in Iran is the parliament in the Islamic Republic. In this article, I briefly describe and explain four transformative trends in this institution. Reduction of Political Diversity: The process of limiting elected institutions and the authoritarianism of the clergy began with the first parliament. During this period, almost all political factions involved in the revolution participated in the elections. However, some candidates opposed to the clergy (such as members of the National Front) were deprived of their parliamentary presence despite being elected due to the annulment of certain constituencies or rejection of their credentials. This process continued in subsequent parliaments. From the second parliament onward, the Guardian Council's oversight expanded to the extent that even in the fourth parliament, a significant portion of the Islamic left or Imam's line was disqualified. The narrowing of the government class has continued to the point that in the tenth parliamentary elections, even figures loyal to Khamenei were disqualified. Reduction of Members' Status: From the first period, non-compliant members of parliament were deprived of their minimum rights, which is expressing opinions in public sessions, through physical attacks and labeling. In each of the nine previous periods, there have been members who were attacked or expelled from parliament solely for expressing opinions. In the sixth period, many members faced legal cases, and one member was arrested. Gradually, members lost their immunity in expressing opinions and voting to the extent that in the ninth period, they became completely submissive beings to the leadership apparatus. The Guardian Council has sought to extend its oversight to the representative period as well, but this has not yet materialized. The parliament is entirely submissive and tamed in the face of the leadership office and military and security institutions. Reduction of the Power and Status of the Institution: In the nine parliamentary periods, the status of the parliament among the power institutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran has continuously declined. This decline can be explained in three functional areas of the parliament: 1) Delegation of oversight and investigation to the extent that the parliament has completely relinquished oversight over the institutions under the leader and uses this right less against the government, and even if a report is prepared, it is less likely to be presented and read in the parliament. Of course, the decline in the parliament's expertise (despite raising the education level of members to at least a master's degree) has played a serious role in this relinquishment. The way these master's degrees are obtained has a specific impact on the continued lack of the parliament's expertise. 2) Parliaments one to six engaged in some oversight over members upon their entry by reviewing credentials, but with the consolidation of the Guardian Council's oversight, this issue became completely meaningless and void. 3) Delegation of the right to legislate. The formation of institutions such as the Assembly of Experts, the Cultural Revolution Council, the Expediency Discernment Council, the Supreme Council of Cyberspace, and the National Security Council gradually limited part of the parliament's legislative rights. These institutions, due to their appointed nature, gradually gained a higher hand over the parliament. The one who most undermines the parliament's legislative rights is the leader of the Islamic Republic by issuing governmental decrees. All of this, aside from the vetoing of parliament's resolutions by the Guardian Council, has turned this institution into a consultative assembly of the Guardian Council in legislation. Composition: Replacement of Military Personnel in Clerical Seats. The composition of the National (and later Islamic) Parliament has changed from the first to the ninth period in such a way that the number of clerics in parliament has continuously decreased while the number of Revolutionary Guards has increased. The table below shows the number and percentage of clerics in the nine parliaments: • The number of members in this table does not equal the official number of parliament members (270 and after the seventh period 290). The reason for this may be the death and resignation of individuals and the election of new members in mid-term, which increases the total number of members in a period. Also, the annulment of votes from a constituency has led to the loss of a member from that constituency in parliament. • Source: Introduction booklets of parliament members (up to the fifth parliament) and lists of names and backgrounds of members on some websites. The seats vacated by clerics in each parliament have mostly been filled by forces of coercive powers (military and police forces, judiciary, and security apparatus). For example, in the ninth parliament, a total of (according to official member announcements) 62 individuals were members of coercive forces before joining parliament: 2 army members, 8 members of the judiciary and prosecution, 43 members of the Revolutionary Guard (some Revolutionary Guard members do not resign even after joining parliament), 3 former members of security institutions, 4 members of police forces, and 2 members of security. In the tenth parliament, there are 13 judges present. Of course, it is possible that some members of security institutions have hidden their previous work. In the first round of elections, which resulted in determining three-quarters of the candidates, there were only 16 clerics among the members of the tenth parliament. In the second round, one cleric was elected. There is insufficient information about the backgrounds of the other members of the tenth parliament. This process is also reflected in the first candidate of the Tehran list and the presidency of parliament. For several terms, the first candidate of the Tehran list and the first elected representative of Tehran and the Speaker of Parliament is no longer a cleric. This means that clerics have no problem in ceding this institution to military personnel and other members of the government class (propaganda apparatus and revolutionary institutions), either because they have sufficient control over them in higher institutions or because military personnel are advancing in power institutions. Therefore, those who speak of the parliament and its importance in Iran must realize that this parliament has been limited from all sides and has fundamentally taken on a secondary and minor role in the governance of the country. This limitation has expanded to the point that if the parliament were to be suspended for several years, none of the country's affairs would be stalled. Even in the budget area, in the past decade, there has been hardly a year when the budget was approved on time, and the government allocates the budget as a continuation of the current budget.