From Bashar Assad's 'Sand Castle' to Iran's 'Chinese Bowl' in the 'Resistance Front'

Bashar Assad's flight from Syria to Moscow, the collapse of the Syrian Ba'ath regime, and the transfer of power to armed rebels shocked the Middle East and the world. Few believed that the Syrian government would surrender to a coalition of armed opponents within 11 days, and its authority, which had seemingly been maintained at the cost of hundreds of thousands of deaths, the displacement of millions, and widespread destruction in Syria over 13 years of civil war, would suddenly collapse like a sand castle. The situation in Syria remains unclear, and the transitional government has not yet established control. Currently, power is in the hands of Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham and its leader Abu Muhammad al-Julani, who has appointed Muhammad al-Bashir, a close ally, to lead the transitional government until the beginning of March next year. The structure of the old governing institutions has also been preserved for now. However, this event, which signifies a major shift in the situation in Syria, has extensive implications for the Islamic Republic of Iran and what this government refers to as the 'Resistance Front,' which now resembles a cracked Chinese bowl. The article will outline and examine the broad lines of these impacts: Khamenei's reaction to Assad's fall; the 'great fighter' whose name he did not mention. The impacts on Iran must be examined around the wide gap between the government and the people, and for this reason, these impacts have a contradictory nature. The majority of the Iranian people, like the Syrian people, expressed happiness at the fall of Bashar Assad, while the government and its factions mourned. This reality relates to differing views in foreign policy. Opponents and critics have warned since the beginning of the Syrian civil war that the Islamic Republic's success in this intervention would be fragile and unsustainable and would be detrimental to Iran's national interests. In this context, the impact of the revolutionary developments in Syria has transformed the psychological balance of power in favor of the opposition and increased hopes for change in the Islamic Republic. Now, this extensive intervention to preserve the Ba'ath regime and the land corridor to Hezbollah in Lebanon has not only failed to achieve the desired results but has also worsened and complicated the situation for the Islamic Republic. The Islamic Republic could have adopted a supportive stance towards Bashar Assad and mediated between the opposition and Assad's government, opening the way for political changes in Syria. However, now the Iranian government, whether it wants to or not, is tied to the Ba'ath regime and the Assad family, and the lasting consequence of its Syrian policy is the shame of participating in the massacre and suffering of the Syrian people. Now, Iran has not only lost credibility in Syria but also faces negative sentiments towards it in the Syrian public opinion and the new political order. The Iranian embassy was the only foreign embassy in Damascus that was attacked. Mr. Julani, in his speech at the Umayyad Mosque, criticized Bashar Assad and implicated Iran, stating that he had made Syria a bait for his own goals. From the perspective of the Islamic Republic, Syria held an important position in the 'strategic depth' and the preservation and expansion of the 'Resistance Front.' Hafez Assad's agreement and support in the formation of 'Hezbollah Lebanon' played a significant role. Previously, the Ba'ath regime in Syria had supported religious revolutionary forces and, during the eight-year war with Iraq, at least until one year before the end of the war, sided with Iran. According to Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani's memoirs, free oil was also received for three years, at a rate of one million barrels per year. Throughout the years following the 1979 revolution, Syria delayed payments for oil purchases to Iran and benefited from discounts. The relationship between the Islamic Republic and the Ba'ath regime in Syria was strategic. Both main factions of the regime shared consensus on the following axes regarding Syria: maintaining strategic relations and political and security ties with Syria; the importance of Syria in the regional and global role of the regime; viewing Syria as the frontline of resistance against Israel and opposing Arab-Israeli peace: the fall of Assad; difficult days for Khamenei and the hard core of power. Now, the 'strategic depth' of the regime has diminished, and a significant part of it has been lost. The connection with Hezbollah in Lebanon and its armament has faced serious difficulties and constraints. At times when rapid transfer of weapons from within Iran was not possible, the Syrian army would compensate for this shortage to receive from the Iranian government in the future. However, reaching an agreement with the new Syrian government, given the shared negative stance towards Israel, is possible, but even if realized, the scope of this relationship will be limited, and in the most optimistic scenario, it will provide the Islamic Republic with at most a narrow corridor. With the heavy blows that Israel has dealt to the military and defense structure of Syria after the fall of Bashar Assad and with the destruction of almost all heavy military weapons, the possibility of success in Syria for actions against Israel has significantly decreased. The Islamic Republic has also lost all the centers it had built in Syria to increase pressure on Israel. Iran's military and strategic investments in Syria have been completely destroyed, and military forces have been forced to withdraw. The Islamic Republic has never been able to establish a network of Syrian forces similar to Hezbollah in Lebanon. The initial idea of establishing 'Hashd al-Shaabi,' similar to 'Basij Mustazafin,' according to Hussein Sheikh al-Islam, a former Foreign Ministry official, failed, and they were forced to replace it with Hezbollah Lebanon. Subsequently, plans to form 'Qawat al-Rida' and 'Hezbollah Syria' also went nowhere. In fact, the Islamic Republic's actions in Syria lacked an enduring internal element and were merely externally oriented, which, with the inevitable exit during the fall of Bashar Assad's rule, its existence was erased. The heavy financial investment is also considered a major failure for the regime and the leader of the Islamic Republic, which has caught up with Iran. Economically, based on some leaked documents and reports, Iran has paid between 30 to 50 billion dollars over the past 13 years in the form of credit from the Central Bank, sending goods, and oil assistance. Alongside this, it has also sent weapons and equipment and covered the wages and logistics of military forces, which are estimated to range between 20 to 30 billion dollars. Some of these costs have been paid as grants. Regarding loans estimated between 20 to 30 billion dollars, due to the extensive changes in Syria and legal obstacles, recovering them even without interest faces serious challenges. What will happen to Syria after Bashar Assad? It is not incorrect to say that one of the pillars of the 'Resistance Front,' despite the lack of ideological and discursive commonality, was the Ba'ath regime in Syria. Now, the Resistance Front has suffered a fundamental blow due to the weakening of Hezbollah Lebanon, which expands the existential threats against it. In addition to losing an important supporter, the Resistance Front has also suffered psychologically. Hezbollah Lebanon, as a political-military movement that operates beyond Lebanon's national sovereignty, has lost one of the two external pillars it relied upon. The bloody history of conflict between Hezbollah Lebanon and 'Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham' and the 'National Army of Syria (Jish al-Watani)' will not only sour relations but also position Syria alongside Hezbollah's opponents in Lebanon, increasing pressures to weaken and disarm it. Maintaining Hezbollah's military nature has become harder than before after the blows it suffered in the recent war with Israel. Hezbollah's weakness in the fall of Bashar Assad was influential, and now Assad's fall, in turn, weakens Hezbollah Lebanon. The impact of these developments on the Hashd al-Shaabi forces is more political and psychological, weakening their morale and strengthening their opponents in the political arena of Iraq. The Houthis in Yemen have not taken a strong stance against the armed Syrian opponents, and the impact of these developments on them is less. However, the Sunni axis of the Resistance Front, namely Hamas and Islamic Jihad in Palestine, has a good relationship with Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham and the armed Syrian opponents. This indicates a rift within the Resistance Front. Therefore, the status of the Resistance Front has become chaotic materially and spiritually. Of course, its existence continues, but for the time being, it has weakened, and it seems unlikely that it can compensate for the damage it has suffered. At the same time, it should be noted that the hope of the Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist, as the leader of the Resistance Front, lies in the chaos of the post-Assad situation in Syria and in taking advantage of potential disagreements that may arise. The expansion of protests among the new generation of Palestinians regarding what is happening in Palestinian territories and the development of the discursive and political foundations of Shiite-centered Islamic fundamentalism are also among their hopes. The architects and managers of the 'Resistance Front' resist its decline. Therefore, the fate of the 'Resistance Front' after the repercussions of October 7 and the fall of Bashar Assad depends on multiple factors whose variable behavior will determine its future position.