From Medicalian's 'Dream Selling' in Elections to the Iran-U.S. Confrontation Crisis

The announcement of the return of 'maximum pressure' against Iran following Donald Trump's 'executive memorandum' has created a new situation in the confrontation between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the U.S. Of course, the Islamic Republic's refusal to negotiate upon Trump's return to the White House was somewhat clear from the beginning. However, the possibility of future negotiations cannot be completely ruled out. This potential event passes through the corridor of confrontation between the two sides, the duration of which is uncertain. Identity conflicts, structural constraints, and significant differences in the positions of the Trump administration and the Islamic Republic continue to prevent Iran-U.S. relations from exiting the crisis state. In this context, the government of Medicalian is the main loser of the revival of the maximum pressure campaign. Its failure is not only in the collapse of the dream of an agreement with the U.S. and the drawing of an optimistic outlook for lifting sanctions but also in the more significant factor of revealing the 'dream selling' that occurred during the elections and further exposing its security-dependent nature. Medicalian's statements praising Khamenei's rejection of negotiations and his remarks during the government rally on the anniversary of February 11, reaffirming the finality of the Supreme Leader's commands, not only lacked coherence with Medicalian during the presidential election campaign but seemed to echo Saeed Jalili's rhetoric. In his speech, Medicalian addressed Trump, saying, 'If you were willing to negotiate, why did you do these wrong things!' The Supreme Leader rejected negotiations with the U.S., stating, 'No problem can be solved through negotiations.' The reasons he and his supporters present for the rationality of Khamenei's opposition to negotiations, apart from contradicting their previous positions, indicate an optimistic perception and cognitive error regarding Trump; as if it was expected that Trump would start negotiations by giving concessions. Meanwhile, Trump had labeled the JCPOA as a negative and problematic agreement for the U.S. and had unilaterally exited it. The Islamic Republic's efforts to persuade Joe Biden to return to the JCPOA without offering meaningful concessions and changes in foreign policy had also hit a dead end. The moderate and conservative reformists and Medicalian, aware of this situation, resorted to 'dream selling' and made unsupported promises to lift sanctions, attributing the sanctions to the role of Saeed Jalili and the principlists. They claimed that with the presence of balanced forces, the deadlock in the regime's foreign policy would open up in favor of the people. However, they are now presenting the same reasons as Saeed Jalili and are attempting to resolve the government's problem in the challenge of public opposition to sanction-imposing policies and refusal to negotiate directly with the U.S. government. Of course, Abbas Araqchi, the foreign minister, had a pessimistic stance on negotiations from the beginning, but Medicalian, Ali Abdolali Zadeh (Medicalian's representative in the development of maritime economy), and Javad Zarif (strategic assistant to the president) were fueling optimism and creating unrealistic expectations. Officials from the Ministry of Intelligence in Medicalian's government also had opposing views on this matter from the outset. When Ali Larijani, Khamenei's foreign relations advisor, criticized Medicalian's government on state television for its 'unjustified eagerness' to negotiate, it became clear that the position of the Guardian Council regarding negotiations with Trump's second administration, which had previously been labeled as the 'killer of martyr Soleimani,' was not positive. A way out of the crisis in foreign relations required a comprehensive solution that was fundamentally incompatible with the incomplete, half-baked, and unrealistic approaches of Medicalian and his supporting circle. They had counted on tactical escape routes, but since Joe Biden's time, it had become clear that the pragmatic considerations of the hard core of power during the JCPOA were not meeting the expectations of the U.S. government. Although there was no difference between Republicans and Democrats in this regard, it was evident that Trump was stricter in implementation and had a lower tolerance threshold. Trump's America had a greater contradiction with the Islamic Republic in global politics and had increased the conflicts between Iran and the U.S. in the region. The confrontation of the Islamic Republic with Trump's second government; from wishful thinking to reality. A sustainable compromise and deal with the U.S. without significant changes in the Islamic Republic's foreign policy and retreating from anti-Westernism, the slogan of destroying Israel, and strengthening Islamic fundamentalism in the form of the 'Resistance Front' is not possible. The Islamic Republic cannot expand its reliance on the East while expecting that tactical agreements can extricate its relations with the West from crisis and constraints. In fact, within the framework of the existing national security strategy, there is no capacity to open the deadlock in foreign policy; moreover, Iran's geopolitical position and security context are such that there is more potential for growth for a non-hostile Iran; an Iran that seeks balanced and tension-free relations with all global powers. The political and social situation of Medicalian's government has made this event and this situation further destabilize the social position of Medicalian's government and highlight its lack of moral credibility. It has once again become clear that submission and retreat in the face of the Guardian Council and conservatism is not a solution and cannot change the hard core of power's view on political and cultural changes. In this situation, it is expected that Medicalian will face further voter erosion and an intensification of the trust crisis. However, his and his government's main problem is the intensification of the economic crisis, especially in the event of the activation of the snapback mechanism and the complete death of the JCPOA. The significant jump in the dollar price within a week is a serious warning that will also impact inflation rates, and the performance of the fourteenth government, contrary to its claims, will be worse than that of Ebrahim Raisi's government in the economic sphere; the same situation that occurred after the U.S. exit from the JCPOA during Hassan Rouhani's second term. Although currently, the market's reaction is not as widespread as in 2018, the lack of a hopeful outlook and the executive branch's empty hands can pave the way for a price surge next year, especially as the government's budget deficit is likely to increase. In the meantime, if the Trump administration can reduce Iran's oil sales under the shadow of 'maximum pressure 2', the negative economic shocks will accelerate. In this context, the Chinese government plays an important role and may well be the main determinant of the outcome of the return of 'maximum pressure'. Another important factor is the European troika, which, by activating the snapback mechanism due to the re-imposition of UN Security Council sanctions, can have far greater negative impacts on Iran's fragile and shaky economy. In this context, the impact of Trump's campaign depends on the Chinese government's decision to continue, reduce, or cut oil purchases from Iran. The Islamic Republic and Medicalian's government hope that the escalation of tensions between the Chinese and U.S. governments will prevent China from making changes in its trade relations with Iran. Even if China meets the Islamic Republic's expectation of having a special advantage due to the purchase of cheap oil, if the snapback mechanism is activated, it will face difficulties in implementing UN resolutions. However, the issue is not just China. China buys oil from the Islamic Republic that is transferred to this country by non-sanctioned tankers. The Trump administration is working to contain and neutralize networks known as the 'shadow fleet' or 'ghost fleet' that transfer Iranian oil to China under the guise of other countries and evade sanctions. Even if China is willing to buy Iranian oil, if the clandestine transfer channels are closed or limited, the Islamic Republic's revenue will decrease. In this situation, one can expect that capital flight from the country will accelerate and that China and Russia will refrain from investing in Iran. Therefore, Medicalian's government, in addition to political discredit, will face even more economic problems and will inevitably resort to producing unbacked money. The economic misery index will also worsen, and promises of reducing inflation and revitalizing the business environment will not be realized. Additionally, the potential death of the JCPOA and the return of UN sanctions, based on the type of reasoning that Medicalian and Zarif had during the election campaigns, will introduce the Islamic Republic as a threat to global peace under Chapter VII of the UN Charter; an issue for which they held Saeed Jalili responsible while exonerating Khamenei, claiming that such an event would not occur if they were present in the diplomatic structure of the regime.