From Strategic Relations to Ambassador Expulsion: A 180-Degree Shift in Iran-Sudan Relations

Saudi Arabia severed diplomatic relations with Iran and expelled Iran's diplomatic staff from Riyadh. Bahrain, Sudan, and Djibouti also followed suit, cutting their ties with Iran. The United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, and Qatar recalled their ambassadors, resulting in a downgrade of relations to the chargé d'affaires level, although these governments did not officially announce a reduction in relations. In diplomatic circles, such behaviors are common, and a country that recalls its ambassador effectively holds the initiative and can return them to the mission country at any time. Some European countries have previously used such methods in their relations with Iran. Additionally, Jordan summoned the Iranian ambassador in Amman in an action interpreted as support for Saudi Arabia. Turkey also reportedly expressed mild objections to the Iranian ambassador regarding the coverage of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's visit to Saudi Arabia, although the Iranian ambassador denied this, and some media referred to it as a recall for explanations. Such behaviors may arise from other countries as well, although it seems that diplomatic quarrels and reconciliations cannot resolve the dispute between Iran and Saudi Arabia. As of the writing of this article, the Gulf Cooperation Council has convened, but no official statement has been issued yet. Meanwhile, the actions of the small country of Djibouti, with a population of less than one million, were mocked by Iranians without anyone paying attention to the motivations and strategic importance of this small land in Bab-el-Mandeb. A look at the map of the Gulf of Aden and the Bab-el-Mandeb clarifies this issue. If concerns about isolation in the Arab world were among the factors behind Sudan's decision to follow Saudi Arabia, Djibouti's concerns about being swallowed by Ethiopia, Eritrea, or even Somalia, or all three, make the necessity of maintaining a larger power in the Arab world unavoidable. Iran's relations with Djibouti have developed since the 1990s, and the website 'Afran,' which describes itself as a research and academic institution, characterizes Iran's cooperation with Djibouti with the following phrase: 'Djibouti is among the countries whose stance on human rights has always been negative and in favor of the Islamic Republic of Iran.' Sudan is strategically located on the western shore of the Red Sea opposite Mecca and has no geographical connection with Iran, but for about the last 15 years, it has been considered Iran's 'strategic' partner in Africa. Sudan was seen as a base within the Red Sea that raised concerns for Arab countries and Israel due to its relations with Iran. Among this group of countries, Sudan's reaction in Africa and neighboring Egypt is the most surprising. Sudan is strategically located on the western shore of the Red Sea opposite Mecca and has no geographical connection with Iran, but for about the last 15 years, it has been considered Iran's 'strategic' partner in Africa. Sudan was seen as a base within the Red Sea that raised concerns for Arab countries and Israel due to its relations with Iran. The beginning of relations with Sudan - the three-day visit of then-President Mohammad Khatami to Sudan (October 5-7, 2004) was met with a reciprocal visit by Sudanese counterpart Omar al-Bashir (April 23-25, 2006), and relations between the two countries continued warmly during Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's presidency. On June 26, 2011, Omar al-Bashir visited Tehran and met with Ayatollah Khamenei. Ahmadinejad was very interested in creating relationships that he considered 'strategic.' Iran's relations with Sudan during Ahmadinejad's era also witnessed a presidential-level visit (March 1-2, 2007), which was later complemented by the visit of Gholamali Haddad-Adel (February 1-3, 2008), the then-Speaker of the Islamic Consultative Assembly, to Khartoum. Typically, Iran's relations with such countries pursue an immediate goal and a long-term goal. At that time, the immediate goal of establishing relations with Sudan was to find a government language and spokesperson that would confirm the peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear activities in exchange for significant economic aid and promises of more generous payments and small long-term investments; to reject the accusations of the US and its allies; to present Iran as a friend and supporter of the Muslim and poor people of the African continent; and to state in international forums that Iran does not support terrorism and that human rights are not violated in Iran. Following these visits and establishing connections at the highest levels, Sudan fully understood this expectation and knew where to read this refrain. The problem was that Iran did not think that buying loyalty could not be eternal and that the other side might move towards a better offer. The elevation of relations between Iran and Sudan - in mid-May 2012, Ali Saeedlou, Ahmadinejad's then-deputy, entered Khartoum with a large delegation of 48 people and was welcomed by 'Nafi Ali Nafi,' al-Bashir's deputy. Ahmadinejad's message was delivered through his deputy, Saeedlou, to Nafi Ali Nafi to be submitted to Omar al-Bashir. In Iran, this news was reflected as a visit by delegations from the public and private sectors that were trying to establish relations in the interests of both countries. Over more than a decade of formal relations between Iran and Sudan, this country benefited from Iran's financial and military support, and Iran also used Sudan as a gateway to Africa. Building mosques and cultural centers in Sunni countries and arms transactions were two major aspects of this relationship. In fact, following the important visit of the Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister, the events of the Arab Spring shook Sudan, but some Iranian state media referred to the Arab Spring in the official tone of the Sudanese government, labeling the dissenters as agents of 'Zionism' and considering the Arab Spring movement as a plot by those who 'are lurking in wait for Sudan and occasionally seek to create chaos and unrest.' During the Arab Spring uprisings, news from Sudan in Iran was reflected while maintaining the tone and inclination of the Sudanese source, and for example, there was no reference to even 'Islamic Awakening' (a term that Iran created as an equivalent of the Arab Spring). Some Iranian state news agencies published statements from Nafi Ali Nafi, promising that 'the people will soon witness the results of reforms' that were claimed to be in progress at that time. At the same time, Nafi Ali Nafi referred to the efforts of foreign countries and organizations that, in his view, intended to disrupt Sudan's 'economic austerity program' and create chaos in the security and political atmosphere of that country. Less than three years later, the term 'austerity economy' also entered the official literature of Iran. Meanwhile, some non-state news sources predicted the fall of Sudan as inevitable, even before Tunisia, Egypt, or Syria. While Omar al-Bashir was a skillful player. He, who was once wanted by the International Criminal Court in The Hague for the Darfur massacre, suddenly received support from the leaders of the Arab League member countries, and his extradition order was effectively nullified. On January 9, 2011, Sudan was divided after a referendum. In fact, the division of Sudan into North and South Sudan occurred with more than 98% of the people's vote, and the separation lines were fundamentally based on the Muslim nature of the North and the non-Muslim nature of the South; however, Iranian media attributed this separation to the factors of England, America, and Israel. Omar al-Bashir's trip to Saudi Arabia - on July 27, 2013, it was rumored that Saudi Arabia did not allow Omar al-Bashir's private plane, which was flying to Iran, to pass through its airspace, and the Saudi flight control center claimed that it had not received a request for such a flight from Khartoum. Omar al-Bashir was supposed to travel to Tehran for the inauguration ceremony of new President Hassan Rouhani. Saudi officials demanded adherence to diplomatic customs and official notification 48 hours before the flight, and Iranian officials called this Saudi action 'regrettable.' However, shortly after Omar al-Bashir's encounter, he traveled to Jeddah and met with then-Saudi Crown Prince Salman bin Abdulaziz in the Jeddah palace, praising the Saudis and their efforts in developing the holy sites in Mecca. In fact, this is the ideological and religious separation point between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Iranian religious leaders have consistently had deep disagreements with Saudi leaders over the management of the holy sites for 37 years of the Islamic Republic's existence. Iran-Sudan relations - after their establishment, relations between Iran and Sudan quickly developed in two cultural and military dimensions. In July 2014, the United Nations accused Iran of transferring weapons to Sudan. The Israeli representative's office had previously corresponded with the Iran sanctions committee at the United Nations, claiming that Iran had illegally shipped weapons in violation of the arms embargo. Israel seized a weapon-laden ship named 'Klos-C,' which was sailing under the Panamanian flag in the Red Sea. Reports indicated that the arms shipment was moving from the Iranian port of Bandar Abbas to the Iraqi port of Umm Qasr and then to a port in eastern Sudan (Port Sudan) but was intercepted by Israel in the Red Sea before reaching Sudan's coastal waters. Sudan joins the Saudi coalition - on March 30, 2015, just four days after Sudan joined the Saudi-led anti-Yemen coalition, Sudan's Foreign Minister, Ali Karti, denied rumors of severing diplomatic relations with Iran but quoted Omar al-Bashir, who had just returned from an Arab League summit, stating that Sudan had corrected some issues regarding Iranian cultural centers in Sudan without severing diplomatic relations. In fact, Sudan resorted to a calculated trick in reviving its relations with the Arab world and, through tactical proximity to Iran, managed to attract more economic aid from wealthy Arab countries. Following this coalition, Sudanese troops and officers were sent by sea to Yemen to fight alongside coalition forces and support the government of Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi against the Houthis. Iranian media quoted General Khalifa al-Shami, spokesman for the Sudanese army, claiming that Sudanese forces under the command of the Saudi military coalition had entered battle against the Houthis. Meanwhile, until September 23, 2014, Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, Iran's Deputy Foreign Minister for Arab and African Affairs, denied rumors regarding the closure of Iranian cultural offices in Sudan, attributing it to 'elements seeking to undermine good relations between Tehran and Khartoum.' However, a week later, Western news agencies reported the closure of several Iranian cultural offices in Sudan and a 72-hour deadline for their staff to leave the country. The Sudanese government did not provide any specific reason for this action. Some news agencies referred to Sudan's concerns as a Sunni country regarding the activities of Iranian cultural offices that promoted Shia Islam. Other speculations published at that time pointed to Sudan's isolation within the Arab world and over $30 billion in investments by Gulf Arab countries in Sudan. In fact, Sudan resorted to a calculated trick in reviving its relations with the Arab world and, through tactical proximity to Iran, managed to attract more economic aid from wealthy Arab countries. The friction point between the period of support for the Houthi Shiites by Iran and Sudan's participation and support for Saudi Arabia led to Sudan's separation from Iran. Sudan was determined to support Saudi Arabia's policy of backing the official Yemeni government against the Houthi rebels, considering this action as serving Sudan's interests. Later, Omar al-Bashir admitted in an interview with the Saudi publication 'Asharq Al-Awsat' to the coolness of relations with Iran, stating that the decision to close Iranian cultural centers was a strategic and important decision, not merely to appease the Saudi government. He emphasized: 'Shiites are present in many countries in the region, including Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, Yemen, etc., but we will not allow them to be present in Sudan at all.' However, despite what was called a strategic decision, al-Bashir denied the existence of strategic relations with Iran, stating that Sudan's relations with Iran were very ordinary and normal. He attributed the use of the term strategic relations to exaggeration and a desire to sour relations with Saudi Arabia. However, Muhammad Nasreddin, a member of Sudan's People's Congress Party, considered Sudan's decision to close Iranian cultural centers sudden and believed that Omar al-Bashir was under pressure from influential Salafi movements that openly spoke of the dangers of Shiism, and for this reason, he sought to strengthen his relations with Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Arab countries to avoid exposing himself and Sudan to the dangers of Salafis. On May 2, 2015, the website 'Shia News' claimed that Omar al-Bashir, the President of Sudan, had reached an agreement with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates to cut their 'strategic relations' with Iran, which included cooperation in military industries, training of security and law enforcement forces, and political and cultural relations, in exchange for receiving $2 billion in financial aid from each of the two countries (a total of $4 billion). However, at the time of the publication of these reports, more than a month...