From Tehran Airport to Music Concerts: Military Power Display Against the Executive Branch

Immediately after the government's resolution to remove the police force from the process of granting permits for cultural programs, the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces issued a directive to the police commander regarding the handling of what Islamists consider 'public disorders.' Jazayeri states in this directive that 'the mission of the police in dealing with moral and behavioral disorders in certain places, including concert venues, must be carried out with seriousness.' This directive aims to neutralize the impact of the government's action to ensure the holding of authorized concerts. In a session on July 13, 2016, the Cabinet, based on the proposal of the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance and citing Article 138 of the Constitution, limited the police's powers regarding the quality and manner of holding music concerts to traffic and security matters, effectively removing the police from the concert permit issuance process. The head of the supervision and evaluation team of Khatam al-Anbiya Headquarters commented on the Cabinet's recent resolution, stating that 'the government's resolution does not negate the inherent and legal missions of the police and does not significantly affect the precise execution of police missions. While respecting the Cabinet's resolution, the police must continue this important mission as before.' The police spokesman reacted to the government's resolution, stating, 'No change has occurred in the police's mission regarding the holding of concerts... The police's missions in this area will continue as before.' It seems that police intervention in concerts has not ended. Ali Jannati, the Minister of Culture, stated that most concerts have been canceled by the judiciary, not the police, but this does not justify the limitation of police powers by the government for military and police commanders. The involvement of military and police forces with the executive branch in the Islamic Republic has a long history. During the presidencies of Khamenei and Hashemi, the commanders of the Revolutionary Guard did not see themselves in opposition to Khomeini's close associates, but with the rise of Khatami, who was not Khamenei's preferred president, they became more vocal. Immediately after the events at Tehran University, 24 Revolutionary Guard commanders threatened Khatami with military action against the government: 'Today we see the enemy's footprints in these events and hear the drunken laughter. Seize today, for tomorrow will be too late, and regret will be irreparable... Mr. President, if you do not make a revolutionary decision today and do not fulfill your Islamic and national duty, tomorrow will be so late and irreparable that it is unimaginable. In conclusion, with utmost respect and affection for you, we declare that our patience has run out, and we do not consider it permissible to endure more if no action is taken.' On May 8, 2004, on the day the new Tehran airport was supposed to be inaugurated, Revolutionary Guard forces closed the runway with fighter jets and prevented a plane arriving from Dubai from landing. This action by the Revolutionary Guards was a clear stance against Khatami's government to show that the coercive powers not only obstruct the government in political and cultural arenas but also in construction and economic areas to extract their demands. The Revolutionary Guards demonstrated that they were even willing to use any means to impose their will on the government. In the Revolutionary Guards' statement regarding the newly established airport, the need for airport security against terrorist actions was cited as the reason for military intervention during the inauguration, but there was no evidence of such an attack, and responsible agencies did not confirm it. Thus, the issue of security became a pretext for the military to disregard Khatami's government resolution. The same issue has been referenced in dealing with Rouhani's government resolution regarding concerts. During Rouhani's presidency, the Revolutionary Guards and the government clashed again over new oil contracts, with the Guards sending their Basij forces to the Ministry of Oil to oppose these contracts. In that case, the Guards did not achieve their goals, and the government, which had just completed the JCPOA, resisted the Guards' excessive demands. The conflict between the Guards and the government over oil began during Zanganeh's tenure, which ended the Guards' uncontested dominance over the Ministry of Oil. However, the Guards still retain a significant share of contracting in the oil sector. During Ahmadinejad's second term, when the honeymoon between the government and the Guards ended, the Guards arrested some of Ahmadinejad's close associates in the 'deviationist current' project, and Ahmadinejad referred to them as smuggler brothers. Since the Tehran airport incident, heads of the executive branch have been aware that they should not take actions contrary to the wishes of the Guards' commanders. The Rouhani government likely did not consider the resolution regarding the management of venues as provocative to the Guards; otherwise, it would not have taken such action. However, contrary to the government's expectations, the Guards have even tolerated the limitation of the police's operational methods. Another limiting institution of the executive branch is the religious bureaucracy, which, like the Guards, has always sought a higher hand over the government to obtain desired resources (such as preferred budgets) and to ensure that the government remains obedient. Both during Khatami's and Rouhani's administrations, the Qom Teachers' Society has admonished the government and sent letters, and if the government pays little attention to their requests, they mobilize shrouded individuals in the streets. The last letter from the Qom Teachers' Society, as the main political organization of the clergy in the country, was sent to Hassan Rouhani in late June 2016. This letter criticized some of the government's cultural approaches and also the statements and actions of some senior officials of the eleventh government. The Hashemi government did not allow matters to reach this point and took the initiative in granting privileges. Of course, during his administration, expectations from the executive branch were lower. Ahmadinejad's government also funneled billions of oil dollars into the religious bureaucracy during its first term, but in the second term, it saw little support in return for the resources funneled and thus did not cooperate with the clergy. Non-elected institutions against the seemingly elected institution In Iran, the religious bureaucracy and the military nurtured by them are currently united, which is one of the secrets of the Islamic Republic's survival. This unity is both negative (against technocrats and academics who are not of their making) and positive (in the direction of common interests in economic institutions). This unity has led to the laws related to the separation of powers and ordinary laws being sacrificed to the power struggles of powerful institutions. Both military institutions and the religious bureaucracy have attempted to establish their own universities, but they have not been able to fully bring the university institution under their control. Today, many graduates of religious (Jameh al-Sadiq) and military (Imam Hossein University) universities are present in managerial positions in universities and government, but the voices of students and academics who are not obedient to these two institutions are still heard. The religious bureaucracy and the Guards consider specialists, technocrats, and academics (who are not under their supervision) to be influenced by the West and do not trust them. For this reason, in the Islamic Republic era, the wealth, power, and influence of the military and clergy have continually increased, while the wealth and influence of specialists, technocrats, and academics have continually decreased. The gap between universities and seminaries in the 40s and 50s, which has now transformed into a gap between military and religious bureaucracy on one side and academics, specialists, and technocrats on the other, is one of the very serious and concerning gaps for the government. Over the past 38 years, resources of power, wealth, and status have flowed towards the clergy and the Guards supporting them, but these institutions still lack sufficient self-confidence because the group that has mostly studied preliminary religious sciences and has become a salary earner of the state and government (the clergy) and a group with fake diplomas (with titles like general, professor, lawyer, and minister) know better than anyone that they do not have the competence to govern a nation. Another gap in politics is the gap between elected institutions (which have lost their meaning in the past 38 years) and appointed ones, which the government has tried to fill through oversight and inquiries from the Ministry of Intelligence. Although all avenues for the popular nature of elected institutions and the reflection of people's demands through them have been closed, appointed institutions are still concerned about the existence of these institutions.