Ali Motahari, the Deputy Speaker of the 10th Parliament, says: "Communist and leftist parties can also operate in our country, but they must introduce themselves to the people with their own signs and symbols." Why and how has he recalled this statement from his father at this point in Iran's history and the history of the Islamic Republic? Is such a thing even possible in Iran? Do communists even have the capacity to establish a party in contemporary Iran? Has the Deputy Speaker of Parliament not awakened from a long sleep after 38 years? Reminding of History Beyond merely repeating his father's words, which have a specific function (which I will address at the end), it seems that Ali Motahari has been in a political winter sleep for four decades. He should first be reminded of the events of the 1980s: 1. The closure of publications and publishers of communist and leftist groups from 1979 to 1983; 2. The arrest of all central members of communist groups during this period and the torture and televised and written confessions extracted from them (these confessions were later published by propaganda agencies and security institutions like state television and Kayhan newspaper); 3. The expulsion of all communist students from universities and higher education institutions in the years 1980 to 1982 during the Cultural Revolution (except for those who returned to university after several years due to collaboration and repentance); 4. The expulsion of communists from government jobs during purges and their non-employment in ideological selections; 5. The execution of most active and organizing communist forces in prison and their massacre while in safe houses; 6. The massacre of remaining communist forces in prison during the mass executions of 1988; 7. The cleansing of all libraries and bookstores in the country of most communist works (especially the works of Iranian communists) in the 1980s; and 8. The dissolution of all communist parties and the prohibition of their activities in the Islamic Republic's party law with specific conditions (such as commitment to the rule of the jurist or adherence to Islamic principles). All of the above actions were aimed at the complete elimination of communist ideology and organizations from the public sphere during Ali Motahari's childhood when he dreamed of the religious government envisioned by his father. If someone speaks of the freedom of communist parties to operate in the Islamic Republic without considering the policies implemented and later institutionalized in the text of the laws of the Islamic Republic (such as the party law and the press law) and current practices, one can doubt their common sense and social and political understanding. Alongside these suppressions, constitutionalist, national-religious individuals and groups, critics of Khomeini's government or the rule of the jurist, and secularists also faced the same fate because it was never intended for any ideology other than Shia Islam as interpreted by the jurist and his followers to emerge and manifest. Later, even those close to Khomeini faced the same fate. Even the head of the Expediency Discernment Council cannot obtain permission for his books from the Ministry of Culture. When Christians, Jews, and Baha'is, who believe in the one God of Abrahamic religions, cannot freely perform their religious rituals, and Zoroastrians are introduced as a misguided sect in government gatherings, speaking of the freedom of godless parties seems like a tragic joke. Understanding the Father's Words Ali Motahari has not even correctly understood his father's words, which are full of contradictions (in the discussion of freedom and democracy). Morteza Motahari defended the freedom of communist parties during the era of promises and competition with leftist and national groups, but at the same time did not believe in their freedom of expression, thought, and opinion. How can a political group continue its activities without freedom of expression? Freedom of belief in the legal system of the rule of the jurist is briefly defined as having a belief in the innermost heart, without the freedom to choose, express, and promote beliefs, without the freedom to perform rituals and teach and propagate beliefs, without the freedom to act based on beliefs, without the freedom to deny, abandon, and leave beliefs, and without the freedom to organize based on beliefs. In the 'real' system of the Islamic Republic, even the freedom of belief exists only to the extent that individuals are judged for their unexpressed beliefs or deprived of certain rights and privileges. If these beliefs are acted upon, they lead to imprisonment and execution more quickly. In the legal regime of the Islamic Republic, freedom of belief has been reduced to the freedom of 'having' a belief in the recesses of individuals' minds. Individuals either agree with the ideological teachings of the clergy and the ruling caste and have all kinds of freedom to express beliefs, act based on those beliefs, and organize even without the Ministry of Interior's permission, or they have no platform to express their beliefs, act, and organize based on them. The leaders of the Islamic Republic only consider that part of freedom of belief, namely having it in the mind, as the right of citizens, which they cannot control and is fundamentally uncontrollable. The distinction between thought and belief (Morteza Motahari, on the Islamic Revolution, Tehran, Sadra, 161, p. 49) in this discussion does not help totalitarians and opponents of freedom nor does it assist libertarians and advocates of freedom of thought. Motahari, as a theologian at the beginning of the Islamic Republic, wanted to open the space for thinkers for theoretical discussions with this distinction while, as a political Islamist, he did not want to accept freedom of belief and conviction, which most religious people, especially the clergy, oppose. A clear boundary cannot be drawn between thought and belief or conviction in terms of their freedom or lack thereof; belief is formed and developed in the course of thought and reflection. How can one claim freedom of thought while denying the freedom of its outcome? It is just like allowing car manufacturing companies to produce but prohibiting the use of cars for some. Of course, Morteza Motahari and other theologians like him, because they want people to ride in the cars they produce, grant the license for car manufacturing but force people to buy only their cars. The distinction between freedom of belief and thought does not help libertarians in religious societies because the lack of freedom of belief ultimately leads to a lack of freedom of thought, as has happened in all authoritarian societies and power regimes. This distinction does not help totalitarians either because, firstly, it shuts down the market for the production and competition of beliefs, and totalitarian ideologues become fossilized in their past status, and secondly, it ultimately blocks freedom of thought, and theologians cannot continue their pose of being advocates of freedom. Most beliefs have consequences in the world of action. Many beliefs require action. For example, if someone believes that the existing banks in the world charge and pay usury and also believes that usury is not permissible, they are naturally expected to refrain from dealing with these banks. Now how can individuals have beliefs but be asked not to act according to their beliefs? If beliefs are free in Iran and hundreds of thousands of people are Baha'is in Iran, how can they be asked not to act according to their faith? Or if millions of people in Iran do not believe in hijab (which is a reality), how can they be forced to wear a scarf or chador with the stick and whip (a topic that Ali Motahari has insisted on)? Denying freedom of belief is, at the same time, denying the freedom to organize because without a belief or a set of beliefs, organization and structuring are impossible. People who cannot gather and do something based on their beliefs will not feel the freedom of belief even if their beliefs are not scrutinized. A government that denies freedom of beliefs is actually afraid of the formation of organizations that challenge its absolutism. Every authoritarian and absolute government knows well that alternative organizations and opposition are much more dangerous than alternative beliefs. But it blocks the water at the source so that it does not get caught up in the results at the branches. The Islamic Republic is an illusion. Ali Motahari, by ignoring the above challenges, only speaks of the freedom of communist parties in an imaginary Islamic Republic. When there is no possibility of a television interview or printing the photos of three previous heads of the Islamic Republic, two speakers of the parliament, and hundreds of ministers and representatives who were the founders of the Islamic Republic, the freedom of communist parties is a nonsensical propaganda statement to legitimize the existing Islamic Republic in Ali Motahari's mind. If communist parties are free in the Islamic Republic, why should national and religious parties, even those fully believing in the rule of the jurist, not be free? Motahari has forgotten that the Participation Party and the Organization of the Mojahedin of the Islamic Revolution, all members of which are staunch believers in the Islamic Republic, were dissolved just a few years ago. When the son of the regime's ideologue and even his taxi driver are beaten and stoned for a speech in Shiraz, what meaning can this opinion have other than living in a world of fantasy? When in the real Islamic Republic, sentences of death are issued for Hashem Aghajeri and Ashkouri (both believing Muslims) for criticizing the clergy or not considering hijab compulsory, can communists be free to organize in this regime? Apparently, the loyalists to the regime sometimes turn to a world of fantasy and trance to forget the ugliness of existing realities. Function Despite the meaninglessness and impracticality of this statement, why does Ali Motahari repeat something that relates to the era of Khomeini's promises and his companions 38 years after the suppression of every voice and criticism? The only acceptable explanation is the function of family members of political figures in accessing sources of power, wealth, and status. Ali Motahari is one of the family members of officials who have had an incomplete political life; like the children and relatives of people like Bahonar, Rajai, Beheshti, Motahari, and hundreds of clergy and non-clergy killed during the revolution, political conflicts, and war (those who are still considered loyal to the leader); the function of these individuals is to repeat the words and present the ideological legacy of the deceased individual - even if the lifespan of those words has ended. This function (being ornamental in gatherings) leads to earning a livelihood and titles and political positions. Of course, occasionally they may utter words from their past relatives that do not align with the current situation. It is unlikely that Ali Motahari, who is more totalitarian in some of his cultural policies than Khamenei, wants to display a facade of being a freedom advocate.
From the Freedom to Conceal and Not Express Opinions to the Freedom of Destroyed Communists
Ali Motahari, Deputy Speaker of the Iranian Parliament, claims that communist parties can operate in Iran, but this statement is met with skepticism given the historical suppression of communism in the country. The article critiques Motahari's understanding of freedom of belief and expression in the context of the Islamic Republic's repressive policies, questioning the feasibility of such freedoms under the current regime.
👥 Key Players
⚡ Actions
📰 What Happened
Ali Motahari discusses the potential for communist parties to operate in Iran despite historical repression.
- Ali Motahari announce communist and leftist parties
💡 Why It Matters
📚 Background
Ali Motahari's comments reveal a disconnect between historical repression and current political discourse.
📝 Key Evidence
🏷️ Entities Mentioned
Translated from the original and edited for English readers. View original source →
Translation confidence: 85%