From Trump's Confrontation with Iran to the Succession of Ali Khamenei: An Interview with Michael Rubin

What will the Trump administration do with Iran? About two weeks after his return to the White House, whispers about the possibility of a return to the "maximum pressure" strategy against the Islamic Republic have intensified. Trump's maximum pressure approach during his first four years in office led to the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA, the reinstatement of extensive sanctions against Iran, the killing of Qassem Soleimani, the then-commander of the Quds Force, and the designation of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps as a terrorist organization by the United States. Now everyone is looking for answers to the question of what will happen this time? How will the future of the Islamic Republic unfold, and is the Iranian government closer to collapse, or should we expect a new agreement between Tehran and Washington? To find answers to these questions, we turned to Michael Rubin, a historian and senior researcher at the American Enterprise Institute. Mr. Rubin, who previously served as a Pentagon advisor, believes that the Islamic Republic will engage in stalling tactics during the first two years of Donald Trump's presidency because it knows that afterward, even within the U.S. government, individuals will begin to distance themselves from the president to prepare for the 2028 elections. Mr. Rubin, who lived in Iran for seven months in the 1970s, believes that someone like Hossein Noori Hamadani, a 99-year-old cleric, may be proposed as a temporary successor to Ali Khamenei so that after his death, Mojtaba can become the real leader of Iran without being labeled as a hereditary ruler. While he believes that military conflict between Israel and Iran is likely, he warns that after the fall of the Islamic Republic, it may be the military in the IRGC that takes power in Iran. As a first question, what strategy do you think Donald Trump will implement regarding Iran? Will we witness a second chapter of the maximum pressure strategy, or should we expect a new JCPOA between Iran and the U.S.? The reality is that Donald Trump tends to break diplomatic frameworks. He does not always act according to expectations and does not adhere to common norms. On one hand, I think he will try to engage with Iran. His representative in the Middle East, Steve Whitehead, has already received the authority to do so. However, I think it will be more the Iranians who will seek to engage with Donald Trump because they are extremely concerned about the potential return of sanctions. But the difference between Trump and other U.S. presidents who have sought diplomatic agreements is that he has no fear of leaving the negotiating table. Therefore, the Iranian government must be very cautious in dealing with any potential negotiations with the U.S. If Tehran's goal is to use diplomacy as a tool for stalling and wearing down the U.S., Trump will realize this very quickly and will apply maximum pressure. However, as an analyst, not a supporter, I believe Trump will ultimately seek to negotiate with the Islamic Republic because he does not have a proper understanding that ideology is the foundation of Iran's government. But for you to turn a negotiation effort into an executable agreement, you need a team of like-minded individuals to carry the process forward and implement it. At least for now, such individuals are not seen in Donald Trump's current team, and he has employed people who are fundamentally opposed to any dialogue with the Islamic Republic. Will such a situation not lead to the fate of any agreement being like Trump's agreement with North Korea? I completely agree with you. Trump often makes decisions suddenly and expects his team to fill in the details later. But regarding the Islamic Republic, this approach is very dangerous because details are always decisive. My greater concern is that politically, Trump only has about two years to advance his plans. After that, even Republicans within his cabinet will gradually start to distance themselves to prepare for the next elections. On the other hand, I am concerned that the Iranian government may not be very honest about this. They fear Trump and the potential return of harsh sanctions and activating the "snapback" mechanism, and perhaps their only intention is to get through these two years without conflict. This point is significant because we know Iran does not need such a nuclear program to secure energy, and they know that in two years they can continue their activities at a lower level without completely dismantling it to stall for time and then expand it more vigorously after the 2028 elections. The last point that perhaps the Obama administration and former Secretary of State John Kerry got wrong is that the nuclear agreement ten years ago gave many concessions to Iran from the outset, and now there is not much left that the U.S. can offer Iran in a new agreement. What Iran really wants is a guarantee that Israel will not attack it. But contrary to what some conspiracy theorists in Washington and Tehran say, the U.S. does not control Israel, and it is unclear whether such a guarantee is even within Washington's power. But if negotiations are to be pursued between the two sides, what kind of agreement will the parties have in mind? Will it focus solely on limiting Iran's nuclear program, as the U.S. President stated in his interview with Fox News, or will it also include Iran's regional activities and the Islamic Republic's missile program, as many in the U.S. desire? The initial focus from the Iranian government's perspective is on the "snapback" mechanism, and from the perspective of American strategists, it is on the sunset clauses of the JCPOA. Therefore, initially, discussions about Iran's nuclear program and what will happen after the JCPOA expires will be essential. Another issue is the time limitation, as the snapback mechanism is only valid for a certain period; when the sunset clauses come into effect. Now, Americans may think that the Iranian government has been put on the defensive after Israeli operations in Lebanon, which dealt a heavy blow to Hezbollah, and also after the fall of Assad's regime. However, I believe Iran is buying time. They have not completely given up on Syria. While many are talking about Abu Muhammad al-Julani, the leader of Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham, the reality is that he controls only about 35% of the country and does not have complete control over it, and Iran hopes to be able to play a role in Syria again or at least disrupt the situation. Another major issue in the regional agenda is how much Iran can concede regarding the Houthis and whether the Iraqis will go along with this process. Personally, I am more likely to believe that the Iraqis will cooperate because many Iran-friendly leaders in Iraq, like Qais Khazali, want to move from being just a warlord to becoming legitimate businessmen. But regarding the Houthis, the main question is whether Iran truly has complete control over them or not. Because if Donald Trump wants to negotiate regarding the Houthis and they cause disruptions, he may become angry with Tehran and conclude that the Islamic Republic of Iran is unable to fulfill its commitments. In addition to all this, another important issue is the transitional period in Iran, as Ali Khamenei is 85 years old and may not be in the best health. We come to the discussion of the political future in Iran, but before that, I want to ask you about Israel's strategy towards Iran. Do you think we will be closer to a potential Israeli military attack on Iran under the new Trump administration? What Israel wants, in my opinion, is not for the United States to explicitly support an Israeli attack on Iran, but rather to not take any action to disrupt those efforts. Therefore, what the Israelis want is capability. That is why they have asked the United States to provide them with the necessary tools to carry this out independently. This aligns with Trump's doctrine because he wants regional countries that are dependent on the United States to acquire the ability to take their security into their own hands. And that is exactly what Israel is doing. Iran must be very aware that Trump may favor Israel's approach. The Israelis have shown that they can strike with high precision in a way that renders Iran's air defenses ineffective, and this should be concerning for the Iranians. But the main issue is that many analysts in the West say that the Iranian government will not commit suicide. Even if they develop nuclear weapons, they will not use them against Israel because Israel will certainly respond. However, this is really a flawed argument. Israel's concern is not whether the Iranian government will commit suicide or not; Israel's concern is what will happen if the Iranian regime is sick. If Iran produces nuclear weapons, a group of loyal forces deeply committed to the ideals of the Islamic Republic in the IRGC, which also includes special units, will take responsibility for the actions. At the same time, we know that the Iranian government lacks legitimacy among its people. The "Women, Life, Freedom" movement demonstrated this. Now the problem is that if we have another uprising in Iran that leads to the regime's collapse, in the 24 or 48 hours remaining until the end, what could prevent the IRGC units, which control the nuclear weapons, from attacking Israel? In contrast, will Israel respond to a country that is undergoing regime change? Will it respond to the people protesting in the streets for the "Women, Life, Freedom" movement? The answer to this question is no. As a result, this is the main reason for the concerns about Iran's nuclear program, which has become an existential threat to Israel: that Iran could acquire a nuclear bomb and then the regime collapses, and afterward, no one knows what will happen. Therefore, Israel may feel that it does not have much time to respond. For this reason, I believe that a conflict is imminent. After the attacks on October 7 and the subsequent events, the region has witnessed many developments; Iran has been significantly weakened, and the proxy groups affiliated with the Islamic Republic have also suffered sometimes irreparable blows. The question is whether this is the end of the Islamic Republic's regional dominance or whether they will once again recover and play a role in the region? A very good question. I think we can agree on this issue that they do not intend to surrender because it is an ideological regime. The main goal of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps is to defend the revolution and revolutionary ideals. And of course, in the founding statutes of the IRGC, the goal has also been somewhat to export the revolution, and we have seen that they use not only soft methods but also hard methods and military capabilities to achieve this goal. So we are faced with the problem that they will continue these efforts. Of course, as you pointed out in your question, Iran has lost a significant portion of its capabilities. Hezbollah is not as powerful as it once was, although I am concerned about Hezbollah's ongoing financial network in Africa. Also, Bashar al-Assad's regime has ended, and a replacement has emerged that may be just as bad. So they may not have the same financial capabilities as before. However, if the United States decides to withdraw from Iraq, as was suggested during Biden's presidency and Trump is also inclined to such a move, this could create a basis for the IRGC's return, albeit in a limited way. Keep in mind that the IRGC is not just a cost-incurring military unit; it is also considered a revenue-generating military entity. If they and their proxies in Iraq engage in income-generating activities and become a profitable entity, this could ultimately be the starting point for the revival of their power. Let me give you a simple example. When you are faced with a widespread fire, you do not wait for 80 or 90 percent of it to be extinguished and then go home; you wait until the fire is completely and 100 percent out. As a final question, I want to ask you to tell us a bit about the future. How do you see the prospects for the Islamic Republic and the efforts of the opposition for overthrowing it? If this happens, what approach could the next government take? First of all, I must say that I am a historian, so my job is to predict the past! Many of my critics also say that even in this area, I am only right 50 percent of the time. But if we want to look to the future, we have a transitional period ahead. Mojtaba Khamenei wants to succeed his father, and Khamenei himself wants his son to take his place. The problem is that this will deal a serious blow to the legitimacy of the Islamic Republic because this regime initially presented itself as opposed to hereditary rule.