Gary Sick: Iran is Determined to Maintain Missiles for Deterrence

In light of the developments that have occurred since Donald Trump's presidency began in U.S.-Iran relations, Radio Farda intends to conduct a series of interviews with analysts and political experts from various factions and mindsets in America regarding this matter. In the following interview, Radio Farda speaks with Gary Sick, a professor at Columbia University in the U.S. and an analyst who has been following issues surrounding Iran for decades. Mr. Sick served as a senior advisor in the White House during the 1979 revolution and the hostage crisis at the U.S. embassy. Gary Sick is one of the American analysts who welcomed the agreement between Iran and the P5+1, but he also believes that the JCPOA does not facilitate or guarantee a solution to problems regarding Iran; however, it has removed a significant obstacle to finding a solution. In recent weeks, there has been more discussion about Iran from American officials in the new government. Both President Trump and his aides have commented on the nuclear agreement, labeling it a bad deal once again. What is your opinion on the future of this agreement? They have called this agreement bad, and President Trump mentioned this during his election campaign, and generally, the Republican faction has been united in opposing this agreement from the beginning. Therefore, it is not surprising, but the question is whether they want to tear it up? Some said during the election campaign that the agreement would be torn up on the first day, but I think it is very important that President Trump has not done this. He still calls it a bad deal, but he understands well that if the U.S. acts in this regard, we will be alone, as the Europeans and others, including Russia and China, have signed this agreement and are committed to it, and Iran is also adhering to all its details. Not liking this agreement—which I believe they do not like—is separate from harming oneself. From all indications, including from the Secretary of Defense and Secretary of State, it appears they do not want to unilaterally withdraw from the agreement. What they are saying is that they want to enforce it very strictly, imposing more sanctions on Iran, which Tehran sees as contradictory to the agreement. As a result, the issue is still unresolved, but we must see how it progresses over time. Recently, we have also heard that this agreement is under review. An agreement that has many layers and details. If the goal is to renegotiate some of its aspects, or as has been discussed, if American officials are asking for, for example, more inspections, access to Iran's military bases, or the removal of what is referred to as the sunset clause of the agreement, then what will the situation be? Can negotiations be reopened? At this point, it is not clear that this will happen. If the new government in Washington wants, it can raise the issue of renegotiation with other allies, but they must convince them that renegotiation should take place on certain issues. You mentioned issues that are likely problematic for the government; what is pleasing to the Trump administration is the expansion of restrictions, especially when some of these restrictions that Iran accepted are set to be lifted after ten or fifteen years. However, while support must be garnered, President Trump is engaged in disputes with some of these groups. He says the European Union is falling apart and has a tough relationship with some others, including China. As a result, garnering support for renegotiation is difficult, but I understand why such a strategy likely exists in the U.S. government. You mentioned allies. Some compare the situation to over a decade ago during the negotiations with the European troika. However, the situation today is different. Britain is exiting the Union. Elections are set to be held in France and Germany, the outcomes of which are uncertain. Therefore, there is a possibility that in the coming months, governments will come to power that may be more inclined to cooperate with the U.S. government in this regard. This is possible. I think everyone should be humble in predicting elections. It is clear that many were surprised by the outcome of the U.S. elections, and the results of elections in the European Union may also lead to changes in composition, with some countries aligning with the proposals of the Trump administration. Frankly, I think Trump's presidency counts on this issue. However, this has not yet happened. But I think it is a mistake to base strategy on predicting elections in other countries, as the outcome is not clear at all. Mr. Sick, Russian officials seem satisfied with the outcome of the U.S. elections. There have also been signs from the new U.S. administration regarding a willingness to improve relations with Moscow. In recent days, there have been speculations about the U.S. government's efforts to create a rift between Tehran and Moscow. Given that the nature of the alliance between Tehran and Moscow is also unclear, what approach do you think the U.S. government will take in this regard? That's right. We do not know how this relationship is. What we do know is that Russia and Iran have coordinated on the Syrian issue, and this relationship has progressed to the point where, despite initial statements, Iran has provided some of its military capabilities to Russia. As a result, there is a relationship, but whether it will endure over time remains to be seen. In my opinion, the Iranians are somewhat uncomfortable with Russia and do not have enough trust in Moscow, but for now, there is a kind of pragmatic marriage in place, and they support a common idea. As far as I know, even when Russia was sanctioned over Crimea and Ukraine, it did not leave the nuclear negotiation table with Iran. They supported the agreement and continue to do so actively, and Washington needs a lot of persuasion to change this approach. However, from the perspective of U.S.-Russia relations, we currently do not know anything. Because we have two relatively unpredictable players on either side. The U.S. and Russia are not accustomed to working together as allies, and we are now in a new space that has not been tested before. The relationship between Russia and Iran is also unfolding in such an unknown space and differs from the past. Therefore, I think the questions are very good, but there are currently no answers to them. In recent days, we have witnessed actions including missile tests by Iran, which met with a U.S. response in the form of adding new names to the sanctions list. What is your assessment of Iran's behavior these days? The Iranians have done this continuously before, even when there was a direct ban and sanctions from the Security Council regarding missile testing. We can say that Iran has taken a provocative action. But I really do not believe this. I think Iran is determined to have missiles for deterrence, and testing them had to happen. They conducted these tests even after reaching the nuclear agreement. At that time, President Obama believed this did not help the situation, and some sanctions were imposed, and a list was prepared for what other sanctions could be imposed. This list is now being used by the Trump administration. The Trump administration has made louder public statements, but in reality, it has continued the same sanctions actions as the Obama administration. This issue is separate from the JCPOA and is not related to it. However, it is undoubtedly a nuisance, and I think Iran will continue its tests; this is inevitable. They see this missile program as the focal point of their national defense, and we see it as provocative and threatening. If someone wants to achieve a functional mechanism in this regard, there should be more communication between Iran and the U.S. so that both sides are aware of each other's actions, like a 'red phone' that was possible during the Obama administration, but as far as I know, there is no such pathway, at least not among the foreign ministers. There can be actions to mitigate the provocative aspect of this issue, but at this point, there is no sign of action in this regard. You mentioned the foreign ministers. Do you think Rex Tillerson can continue the working relationship that John Kerry had with his Iranian counterpart Mohammad Javad Zarif? At this point, I can imagine the possibility of anything. We are in an unknown space where previous rules have been thrown out. The relationship between John Kerry and Javad Zarif was formed over years of negotiation and debate, and they were in constant communication through phone, email, etc. It is clear that this communication has been lost. It is impossible for Mr. Tillerson to quickly resume such a form of relationship. If he wants to establish a relationship, it is possible, and I think John Kerry and other knowledgeable and experienced individuals in this field would be happy to help in this regard. But for now, there is no ongoing nuclear negotiation. What other areas could facilitate this communication? The situation in Afghanistan and any threat to American forces could be one of these areas, as there has been cooperation in this regard before. Another area is a level of cooperation in the fight against ISIS, where both sides, although acting differently, agree on combating this group. They could also find grounds for dialogue regarding Syria, although there are differences of opinion. As a result, there are many areas, and missile testing could also be one of them, where prior notice could be given to each other before proceeding. This was previously done with the Russians as well. There are issues where we do not necessarily have a consensus, but communication could facilitate actions. However, it is not clear to me that Washington and Tehran currently desire such communication, and the issue is not whether these two can communicate; the question is whether they want to or not.