Gary Sick: Negotiations Were More Successful Than Initially Expected

Gary Sick, an American analyst, believes that Iran's nuclear threat affected all aspects of U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East, and although removing this threat through the JCPOA does not guarantee solutions to regional problems, it has removed a significant obstacle. He also believes that the negotiations leading to the nuclear agreement between Iran and global powers were much more successful than initially thought, creating a framework for dialogue between Iran and the U.S. after years of severed relations, both in areas of mutual interest and in areas of disagreement. In an interview with Radio Farda, Sick discusses the JCPOA, its achievements, and the outlook thereafter. Gary Sick is a professor at Columbia University and a political analyst focused on Iran, having written several books on the subject. He is a retired U.S. Navy captain who served on the National Security Council during the Carter administration and later as a senior White House assistant on Gulf affairs. You have been closely observing Iran for decades. Do you now divide it into two periods: before and after the JCPOA? I think the JCPOA was a historic achievement, but it was very limited. This agreement aimed to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. From this perspective, I think it has been very successful. Iran has delivered over 90% of its enriched uranium, stored a large portion of its centrifuges, removed nuclear materials from Fordow, extracted the core of the Arak heavy water reactor and poured concrete into it, making it unusable as before. Additionally, Iran has agreed to extensive oversight by the IAEA, which no other country has accepted, and restrictions on its nuclear program are set to be in place for the next 10 to 15 years. It has also stated that it will never seek to produce nuclear weapons. These are all guarantees that a country could give to the international community. From this perspective, these negotiations were much more successful than everyone initially thought. The negotiations did not lead Iran to change its government or foreign policy, nor did it alter its behavior regarding human rights or support for Hezbollah. The negotiations were not about these issues and were focused on one topic, and they succeeded. Many, including myself, welcomed the idea that this could pave the way for systematic dialogue about other issues, both where Iran and the U.S. have common interests and areas of fundamental disagreement. Do you mean in a separate opportunity and not as part of nuclear talks? This was never supposed to be part of the nuclear agreement. After the agreement, which was also in Iran's interest, foreign companies are now looking to invest in Iran, and they are cautiously starting this process, facing challenges that are a serious concern from Iran's perspective. However, other issues need to be examined separately, and that has not happened yet. I think it was an opportunity that should have been utilized, and at this point, especially Iran shows no inclination to develop this relationship, for example with the U.S., and has stepped back from it. They only negotiated about the nuclear issue and have no interest in more than that. The agreement has been in effect for about six months, and we do not know how it will proceed from here. However, in this short time, for instance, Iran was invited to the negotiating table regarding Syria, accepted it, and has shown that it wants to work actively in this area. This is one example. That's right. During the negotiations, those involved, including John Kerry, established a strong working relationship with their Iranian counterpart. As a result, Kerry and Zarif went beyond nuclear negotiations in their meetings. I view it positively that the two countries were able to discuss issues after more than thirty years. It is true that Iran was invited to the Syria negotiations, but I think this should have happened much earlier. Iran has a role in this issue and should be at the table, whether we agree with its policies or not. However, so far, aside from the relationships of senior U.S. and European officials with Iran, which are now conducted more easily and naturally, we have not seen any further progress in terms of changing Iran's policy on one side and changing the West's approach to the Middle East on the other. You mentioned the two foreign ministers of Iran and the U.S. Do you think what these two have done so far has a personal basis, or has there been a fundamental change in the systems of the two countries that facilitated these discussions, and if it has a personal basis, what will happen with the departure of either of them? Well, it has not been institutionalized. Kerry and Zarif and other officials like Energy Secretary Ernest Moniz and his Iranian counterpart Ali Akbar Salehi have spent long hours in a room discussing intensely, and I think a kind of trust has developed between them to the extent that if the phone rings and the other is on the line, they will answer it and not ignore it. This is a change, but it has not been institutionalized, and it does not mean that the next U.S. Secretary of State will necessarily act this way towards Zarif. They may have the same behavior, and of course, all of this depends on who the next Secretary will be and what the future President's agenda regarding Iran will be. For more than three decades, diplomats from both sides were not allowed to speak to each other. Now that ice has been broken. But we must wait and see. The reality is that when Obama and Rouhani had a phone conversation in 2013, it was considered a very surprising event. Today it is not, as we have become accustomed to seeing senior Iranian and U.S. officials together, talking, walking, or holding joint press conferences. But this does not mean that a foundation has been established for this matter between the two countries, such that they would regularly discuss security in the Gulf or the issue of fighting ISIS. We are approaching the end of this administration. My question to you is whether the nuclear agreement has led to a change in the U.S. approach towards its allies or not? Some say that the U.S. these days does not know how to deal with Saudi Arabia. Many say that the Saudis opposed the agreement and have taken actions in this regard. But the reality is that the Saudis have stated at two points through senior officials that this agreement has prevented Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons and they support its implementation. However, some have doubts about this, and I understand that. The main problem between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia is not the nuclear agreement. This agreement may have caused these difficulties and differences in the relations between the two countries to surface, but the two countries have issues regarding how to manage the oil market, Saudi Arabia's policy on the U.S. using its domestic oil reserves, regarding Syria and Saudi Arabia's previous policies there, and support for Sunni groups that have sometimes been extremist, regarding Egypt, Yemen, and the war in that country and the indirect role the U.S. has in this battle. As a result, there are many problems, and in the U.S., there is curiosity about where Saudi Arabia is headed with King Salman. Therefore, the nuclear agreement is not the main issue between the two countries, and when Obama meets with the King of Saudi Arabia in the near future, this issue will not be a priority. Will there come a time when the U.S. will have to choose between Iran and Saudi Arabia as a credible and trustworthy Muslim country in the region? Today, that will not happen. But if the U.S. has to choose, we have no diplomatic relations with Iran; Switzerland is safeguarding our interests there, and in Tehran, one cannot even obtain a visa to travel to the U.S. But on the other hand, Saudi Arabia, which the U.S. provides significant technical assistance to, whether we like it or not, we indirectly assist this country in the Yemen campaign and have a very long history of arms sales, counter-terrorism, and security issues. It is not comparable at all. The reality is that Iran is not an ally of the U.S., and Saudi Arabia is. Will this change in the future? It may, but I do not foresee this in the short term. A change has occurred regarding Iran and the U.S.; the JCPOA has been a significant step forward, but it is no more than that, and it is not a sign that Iran even desires to have relations, as we hear in the statements of Iran's leader about direct relations or alliance with the U.S. During Barack Obama's presidency, some analysts believed that he was trying to withdraw from the Middle East and focus on East Asia. However, you are among those who think that not only did Obama not turn away from the Middle East, but the U.S. will remain in the Middle East for now. If we pay attention to what Obama said about the Middle East, he never said the U.S. would turn its back on the Middle East and leave it to its fate. Compared to the colonial forces that Britain has had in the Middle East for the past 150 years, we have more forces in this region than ever. We are still engaged in Afghanistan and in the fight against ISIS in northern Iraq and will not leave. What the President has said is whether we need to have forty thousand American forces in the Gulf forever? Perhaps not. Is it possible that, for example, Saudi Arabia and Iran, in their own way, find a way for relations that does not involve U.S. interference? I think this is possible, and it is good for regional countries to act responsibly instead of looking to the U.S. to solve their problems and to solve their issues themselves, and that was what Obama was saying. When he talks about establishing a new balance for U.S. forces in the region, it does not mean leaving and abandoning the region. Perhaps it is his fault that he raised this issue in a way that led to misunderstandings. The U.S. is present in the region in a way that was unimaginable two decades ago. Until 1986, the U.S. had almost no military presence, and sometimes a few ships would come and go. Today we have bases in various parts of the Gulf, are engaged in the remnants of two wars, and are also involved in a third war in Yemen, in which we are indirectly involved. This is not abandonment, and we are deeply engaged in this region. Whether we are overly involved and need to reflect on our actions, I think that should happen and would be beneficial. Is it possible for you to balance between Iran and Saudi Arabia or Iran and Israel without U.S. interference? For me, it is not difficult at all for Iran and Saudi Arabia to do this. When King Abdullah was Crown Prince after the Iran-Iraq War, when Saudi Arabia supported Iraq in a devastating war against Iran, and Rafsanjani was elected President in Iran, he and the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia met in Pakistan and Tehran, negotiated about their relations on an agreement, without the U.S. having any role in it. This was only a generation ago; Abdullah later became king, and Rafsanjani is still alive and in Iran. It is not unimaginable that a little goodwill from both sides could provide the tools to find solutions to problems in a working relationship, a relationship that is away from the propaganda and shouting of these days but does not necessarily lead to friendship and alliance. I think if they want to achieve this mechanism, the U.S. will not help in this regard; it may even complicate things; they need to talk to each other. And regarding Israel? Israel is a completely different subject. I know that there are currently signs of relationship building between Saudi Arabia and its other allied countries in the region with Israel. This has not happened regarding Iran, and there are no signs that this will happen in the near future. And I must say that there is no inclination from Netanyahu regarding Iran either. My last question for you is what do you think is the main threat to the JCPOA in the current situation? I must say that what we see now is that the JCPOA is being implemented as it should be. Iran has adhered to its commitments while being dissatisfied with the pace of sanctions relief. This issue will improve over time. However, the JCPOA has been successful in preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, and I believe it will continue to be successful. Everything that threatens the interests of the U.S., Iran, or Saudi Arabia, in my opinion, is not related to the JCPOA. I believe that any action to counter ISIS, political chaos in Iraq, the ongoing war in Yemen, or the civil war in Syria is not directly related to the agreement, but if we want to take action regarding these crises, it can currently be done regardless of the threat that Iran may acquire nuclear weapons. The nuclear issue has been resolved, but this does not mean that the U.S. and Iran will easily agree on the Syrian issue; rather, it means that any discussions about Syria will occur without the shadow of this nuclear threat from Iran, and this makes a significant difference in the situation. For this reason, the JCPOA was achieved because that threat overshadowed everything related to foreign policy in the Middle East. The JCPOA does not facilitate or guarantee finding solutions, but it has removed a significant barrier to finding solutions. Resolving other crises requires goodwill from all players. Solving the Iranian nuclear issue does not solve the Syrian problem; that problem can only be resolved through the efforts of its players to find a solution, which at this stage I am not very optimistic about. Regarding the fight against ISIS, we must confront the crisis militarily and reduce the threat, but other problems remain and must be addressed in a space without...