Green Movement of 2009 or Revolution of 2010?

The suppression of the "Green Election Movement" brought it to an end. However, the memory of that movement is revived daily by Ayatollah Khamenei and his followers. They find themselves in a paradoxical situation: on one hand, they speak of the end of the "88 sedition," but on the other hand, they constantly revive it by discussing the "evil goals" of the leaders of the sedition, giving new life to the deceased with a messianic touch. Reviving the "Green Election Movement" is not a product of the ignorance of the leadership of the Islamic Republic, but at least a result of two causes. First - the resistance and steadfastness of the leaders and other prisoners of the movement to their ideals and claims (especially the claim of widespread fraud). Second - the demand for lifting the house arrest by opponents and some members of the regime. Lifting the house arrest was one of Hassan Rouhani's electoral promises, which he is pursuing unofficially. On December 30, 2013, Mehdi Taeb, head of the Ammar Cultural Headquarters, claimed that the goal of engineer Mousavi was not to protest the election results, but to overthrow the regime. His main point was: "We have a crime that is akin to apostasy, and that is the act of attempting to overthrow the regime... Sedition means an attempt to overthrow the regime; the right is higher than murder... When it is proven that they were seeking to overthrow, we should not pursue any other crime. Overthrowing is corruption on earth, and it carries the death penalty, and the definitive and religious ruling for these two individuals is execution." Regarding the demand for lifting the house arrest by some forces of the regime, he also claims that: "Foreigners insist that they come out of house arrest, and they are also pressuring from within, so the fact that they come out of house arrest is a demand of foreign intelligence agencies." According to Taeb, another crime of the leaders of the Green Movement was that the approval of paralyzing sanctions was a result of their actions. Western governments regarded the response to the Green Movement as a violation of human rights and imposed extensive sanctions against Iran. Ayatollah Jannati also compared Mousavi and Karroubi to Mussolini in the Islamic Republic's television program "Shenasnameh" on October 16, 2014, stating that as soon as identified, they did not need a trial and should be executed. According to him, the objection that why the leaders of the Green Movement are not freed is invalid; on the contrary, two other leaders of the sedition should also be detained. He said: "The issue was the overthrow of the regime under the guise of fraud... These factors have been granted leniency; if there were to be a trial for them, no just and knowledgeable judge would issue anything other than a death sentence for them... Therefore, they have been granted leniency for whatever reason, including Islamic kindness, otherwise in any other place they would have been executed on the spot." Saeed Jalili believes that the response to the "88 sedition" is a sign of the "power of the regime" and "true democracy." "Executing on the spot" as soon as an individual is identified is a lesson that Ayatollah Jannati learned from Ayatollah Khomeini. In response to the objections of Western human rights organizations regarding the execution of Hoveyda, Khomeini had said that they tried Hoveyda and then executed him. However, criminals who have killed thousands do not need a trial, and as soon as the murderer is identified, he should be executed. Ayatollah Alam al-Huda also responded to the demand for lifting the house arrest on December 27, 2014, saying that Mousavi was trying to lead people to the streets to confront the leadership and limit his powers. During the protests the day after the election, 23 were killed, and the leaders of the sedition should be tried for inciting street violence and being responsible for the killings. In fact: "The prosecutor's ruling regarding the house arrest of the leaders of the sedition was the best performance and the greatest leniency for them." Alam al-Huda had previously stated that if "the leaders of the sedition do not repent, the people will deal with them as enemies of God." All of these issued death sentences for the leaders of the "Green Election Movement," but they could not justify their verdicts. Now Saeed Jalili, then Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, current member of the Expediency Discernment Council, and representative of the leadership in the Supreme National Security Council, on December 2, 2014, in Mashhad, has tried to introduce a new plan and provide a fresh justification for the house arrest of the leaders of the movement. Jalili considered the response to the "88 sedition" as a sign of the "power of the regime" and "true democracy" and stated that after the suppression of that movement, enemies became agitated and paralyzing sanctions against Iran were approved. The "88 sedition" was instigated by enemies in the context of the Islamic Republic's significant victories. Victories such as: the 33-day war, the 22-day war, the enrichment of uranium from 3.5% to 20%, high electoral competition as a democracy index, and economic and scientific successes. He states that the sedition began on June 15, 2009, and the regime suppressed it by February 11, 2010. Jalili, as the then Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, says: "On February 11, 2010, we were able to suppress the sedition," meaning he speaks of his role in suppressing the Green Movement. According to Jalili, the house arrest of the leaders of the sedition had nothing to do with the Green Election Movement because that movement had ended on February 11, 2010 - meaning it had been suppressed - but the leaders of the sedition went into "house arrest" from February 14, 2011. If the claim of fraud in the election and the popular protests afterward were not the cause of the house arrest, then what factors caused the house arrest of the Green leaders a year later? Saeed Jalili identifies the "main reason for the house arrest" as "initiating a new sedition in the Islamic regime." He then explains that at that time the "Arab Spring" ("Islamic Awakening" according to Khamenei/Jalili) had begun and escalated in Tunisia and Egypt. The leaders of the sedition intended to initiate a revolution against Seyyed Ali Khamenei by modeling those two models. He states: "What caused the house arrest of the leaders of the sedition was that they explicitly declared in their statements and struggles that they wanted to create a revolution similar to the Tunisian revolution against Ben Ali and the revolution in Egypt against Mubarak; these new seditions caused their house arrest. We should not confuse this issue with 2009; we witnessed in the leaders' false statements how they mocked the achievements and successes of the Islamic regime." Thus, the accusation changes. The cause of the house arrest has no connection to the claim of electoral fraud and the protests lasting eight months (until February 11, 2010) or twenty months (until February 11, 2011). That sedition was over, and the regime did not impose any punishment on the leaders of that electoral movement in this regard. However, Mousavi and Karroubi had changed their perspective. They were no longer concerned with fraud and the annulment of the elections. They had learned from the Tunisians' revolution against Ben Ali and the Egyptians' revolution against Mubarak and wanted to implement it against Seyyed Ali and create a different history. In other words, they had transitioned from reformism to revolutionary activism. A revolution that was not popular; foreign enemies supported it. This support included verbal and practical support, including paralyzing sanctions. Several evaluations: First - perhaps the most important issue for Ayatollah Khamenei and his followers is that since February 14, 2011, every lie, accusation, insult, and charge has been leveled against the leaders of the Green Movement, but they have not allowed them to speak even a word in their defense. Khamenei and his supporters have nothing left to say, but everyone is waiting for Mousavi and Karroubi to speak and hear their claims. Mehdi Karroubi has sent a message that we should pursue our demand for a "public trial." Second - Mousavi and Karroubi were and are seeking "reform of the Islamic Republic" and "implementation of the constitution without compromise," not revolution. This point was explained at that time in elucidating the "causes and reasons for the difference between the outcomes of Tunisia and Iran" in three sections titled "Ben Ali's departure, Seyyed Ali's stay" (refer to the first and second sections). Whether a revolution is good or bad, feasible or unfeasible, they were not seeking a revolution. Third - it is true that revolutionary activism is a necessary condition for revolution, but merely being revolutionary does not mean that a revolution can be established. If there is no "revolutionary situation," a revolution will not occur. At that time, we were not in a "revolutionary situation" for a revolution to take place. The dictator (Ayatollah Khamenei) also had the "ability" and "will" to suppress, and he did. The absence of either of these two - or both (the will to suppress and the ability to suppress) - is a necessary condition for revolution. Fourth - the leaders of the Green Election Movement were against economic sanctions. For the views of engineer Mousavi and others, refer to this article. However, Ahmadinejad, with the full support of Ayatollah Khamenei and all conservatives, referred to all UN Security Council resolutions as "pieces of paper," and they claimed that these sanctions were beneficial for the country's self-sufficiency. Fifth - Ahmad Tavakoli stated that he voted for Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in the 2009 election because Mousavi intended to mobilize the people against the regime and "unfortunately was capable of doing so." Now Saeed Jalili speaks of the Green leaders' intention to instigate a revolution against Khamenei. What does this claim mean? The meaning of this statement is that Mousavi/Karroubi/Rahnaward are under house arrest because they are capable of "social mobilization" of social forces. The regime does not free them because it is concerned about social mobilization of the discontented by them. Sixth - the claim of this article is not that if the leaders of the "Green Election Movement" and other political prisoners are released, they will seek to create "active social networks" and "social mobilization" against the regime. The claim is that the leadership of the Islamic Republic sees such power in these individuals. In other words, they acknowledge that these individuals have become "social" and "national capital." Gaining trust in individuals at this level, especially in Iranian society, which is facing a severe decline in social capital and where creating trust and assurance has become difficult, is very valuable. Seventh - Iran is in a precarious situation where significant dangers threaten its existence as a country. In such dangerous historical junctures, trustworthy national figures are needed whose words should be heard to save the country from the danger of collapse. We need a powerful Iran. Without security and peace, there will be no development. Iran will only become powerful when society and the political structure are democratized, and human rights are respected. The freedom of all political and ideological prisoners, the opening of the rigid political space, and the establishment of friendly relations with Western governments are the keys to this goal.