Hajj: A Window Towards Normalizing Relations Between Iran and Saudi Arabia

Both Iran and Qatar are currently severed from diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia. In both cases, it was Saudi Arabia that initiated the cut of diplomatic ties with Tehran and Doha. However, when the Hajj season arrived, Saudi Arabia, in a clever move and by virtue of hosting the Hajj, invited all countries, including Iran and Qatar, to participate. This action was smart because if it had not taken such an initiative, it would have been accused of 'preventing the path to God' (hindering obligatory Hajj). By inviting these two countries, Riyadh sought to demonstrate that its hostility towards the governments of Iran and Qatar does not extend to the pilgrims from these countries, and thus, it has smartly positioned itself as a worthy host for the Hajj. Despite the astonishing dimensions of the conflicts between Iran and Riyadh on one side and Doha and Riyadh on the other, Iran and Qatar's responses to Saudi Arabia's invitation for Hajj were different. The Qatari government, arguing that it has no political representation in Saudi Arabia, honorably refrained from sending its pilgrims to Saudi Arabia, while the Islamic Republic not only accepted Saudi Arabia's invitation but also participated with a large number of pilgrims (86,500) in this year's Hajj. Interestingly, in response to Qatar's refusal to send a small number of its pilgrims, the King of Saudi Arabia approached the Qatari pilgrims with kindness and announced that he would cover their travel expenses in an attempt to break Doha's will to abstain from Hajj. However, on the other hand, Riyadh not only did not prepare any special arrangements for Iranian pilgrims but also made one of its preconditions for accepting Iranian pilgrims that the Islamic Republic refrain from holding the 'Ritual of Disavowal of Polytheists' in the plain of Arafat; a condition that was accepted by the Islamic Republic. Thus, for the first time in the history of the Islamic Republic, the Ritual of Disavowal of Polytheists was held at the office of the leadership's representative (the leadership's mission). In other words, the Islamic Republic accepted Saudi Arabia's condition to refrain from holding the Ritual of Disavowal of Polytheists in an open space and moved it inside the leadership's representative office, which could not have been conducted with more than a few hundred participants. This acceptance of Saudi Arabia's condition is significant when we recall that in the early years prior to the bloody Hajj (1987), this ceremony was held in the city of Mecca in front of the leadership's mission with the participation of tens of thousands of other nationals. After the bloody Hajj, the Islamic Republic had limited it to a small scale in the plain of Arafat, and this year it accepted to hold it in a closed and limited space within the leadership's mission, solely with the participation of Iranian nationals. In addition to the colorless and flavorless Ritual of Disavowal, Ayatollah Khamenei's soft message to this year's Hajj can also be seen as another example of his 'flexibility', which, unlike his sharp and pointed message from last year, no longer refers to the 'shamelessness and audacity of the godless and unprincipled Saudi rulers' and 'the unrestrained and haram-eating Saudi clerics'. It should not be forgotten that he had referred to the 'deliberate nature of the Mina incident' that led to the death of 464 Iranians, including the former Iranian ambassador to Beirut, in a corner of his message last year. What makes the speculation about the murder of Ambassador Ghodnfar Roknabadi more likely than any other scenario is the reports indicating the removal of his organs and brain when his body was returned after two months of being missing. In this context, a video has been released by General Saeed Qasemi, which explicitly emphasizes that when Ghodnfar Roknabadi's body was returned to the country, it was found to be 'without a brain, without liver, without intestines. They delivered an empty body.' It should also not be forgotten that Ayatollah Khamenei agreed to send 86,500 pilgrims to Saudi Arabia this year while in his message last year, he claimed that Saudi Arabia had placed 'pilgrims under unknown controls with the help of the espionage apparatus of the United States and the Zionist regime, making the divine safe house unsafe for all.' In other words, Ayatollah Khamenei agreed to Iran's presence in Hajj this year while last year he considered Saudi Arabia and Israel as accomplices in making the Hajj unsafe. He had gone so far in last year's message as to write: 'The Islamic world... should not let go of the throat of those [Saudi rulers].' Despite the bitter Mina incident that Khamenei described as astonishing and despite his claim that Israel is an accomplice with Saudi Arabia in making Hajj unsafe, and despite the fact that the Revolutionary Guards claimed that Saudi Arabia was behind the scenes of the ISIS attack in Tehran (the attack on the tomb of Ayatollah Khomeini and the Islamic Consultative Assembly) last June, why did the Islamic Republic (unlike Qatar) accept Saudi Arabia's invitation to attend this year's Hajj? Was such a Hajj 'dignified'? It seems the answer lies in the fact that the Islamic Republic had a 'benefit' beyond just opening the blocked path of Hajj in mind by accepting Saudi Arabia's invitation; a benefit that both countries could reduce the political tension in the turbulent Tehran-Riyadh relations through the window of the Hajj worship ceremony. However, if that is the case, why did Adel al-Jubeir, the Saudi foreign minister, describe negotiations with Tehran to establish diplomatic relations as 'ridiculous'? Although in recent weeks the foreign ministers of Iran and Saudi Arabia have greeted each other, and Saudi Arabia has ordered its media to reduce the volume of their propaganda against Iran, resulting in this year's Hajj being held smoothly without any controversy, the differences that have led to political tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia remain so strong that Adel al-Jubeir has declared 'changing Tehran's behavior' as a precondition for normalizing political relations. Interestingly, the Iranian foreign minister also considers exactly the same condition as Tehran's expectation from Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia's expectation is not merely that Iran move the Ritual of Disavowal of Polytheists to a small building; rather, Riyadh expects Tehran to maintain silence regarding the execution of Sheikh Nimr (the Shia cleric in Saudi Arabia) from now on. The reopening of the Saudi embassy in Tehran will not materialize until Riyadh receives sufficient guarantees against another attack and assault. Such a guarantee is contingent upon the Islamic Republic not behaving similarly to the past in cases like the execution of Sheikh Nimr. Conversely, Tehran expects Riyadh to completely forget the issue of removing Assad from the Syrian equations and to reduce military pressure on the Houthis in the Yemen file. While Adel al-Jubeir has described negotiations for normalizing relations as ridiculous, he is well aware that all news regarding 'the arrangement for the exchange of diplomatic delegations between the two countries' has been unilaterally announced by Tehran after the Hajj. If we pay attention, the Saudi government has absolutely refrained from any comments on this matter to avoid appearing eager for normalization with Tehran. In any case, it can be predicted that some diplomatic negotiations between Tehran and Riyadh have begun behind the scenes, but Riyadh's expectation from these negotiations is nothing more than 'de-escalation'; otherwise, normalization under the current conditions, where the factors causing tension between the two countries remain strong, is something that Adel al-Jubeir rightly described as 'ridiculous'. In this context, this year's soft message from Ayatollah Khamenei is seen as a sign of his 'flexibility'. However, it is unlikely that Saudi Arabia will be satisfied with anything less than Iran's retreat on the Sheikh Nimr issue, even if it agrees to back down on the removal of Assad.