Hamdan and the Revolutionary Guards in Service of Autocratic Power

Brigadier General Hossein Hamdani was among the Revolutionary Guards who rose to power and influence in Iran after the revolution. He was the highest-ranking military commander to die in the government's intervention in the Syrian civil war. Although Tehran has linked his death to military clashes with ISIS in the outskirts of Aleppo, there are reports suggesting that he died in an accident. The details of his death remain shrouded in ambiguity. His passing occurred due to the overturning of the vehicle carrying him on the Khansar – Atheria road in southeastern Aleppo, on the way to Hama province, just 48 hours after the start of a widespread offensive by the new Iran-Russia coalition in northern Aleppo against Syrian armed opponents. Ali Shamkhani claims he went to identify the area, yet despite being anonymous, he was immediately recognized by the opponents of Bashar al-Assad. His statements add more confusion than clarity regarding how he was identified so quickly while allegedly on a secret mission. It is natural that he could have been a potential target for ISIS and Syrian armed opponents. Shahidoust, his nephew, claims that Hamdani was the target of an unsuccessful assassination attempt years ago in his apartment in Damascus with his family. His death can be seen as a sign of the government's increasing activities in preserving Bashar al-Assad and suppressing opponents. In fact, he became a victim of the government's intervention in the Syrian civil war. At the same time, his killing showcases the vulnerability of Iranian military forces in Syria. Hamdani coordinated the activities of militia forces with the Syrian army and Hezbollah Lebanon at the request of Qassem Soleimani and also served as a military advisor to assist the Syrian government in the bloody suppression of opponents. He was known in Syria as Abu Wahab, named after his eldest son Wahab. Hamdani himself referred to his activities in Syria as 'the second Hezbollah,' inspired by Hezbollah Lebanon. According to him, these militias are active in 42 groups and 128 battalions across 14 Syrian provinces. Hamdani focused on utilizing Syrian forces, explaining: 'We mobilized Sunni, Shia, and Alawite youth from Syria because this was the leader's strategy to use their own youth for defense; otherwise, Haj Qassem Soleimani said if I take a brigade from Iran to Syria, we will end the war.' He justified the government's intervention in Syria as 'preserving strategic depth,' according to Khamenei, and also as a presence in a country that connects three continents—Asia, Europe, and Africa—to pressure Israel and 'liberate Jerusalem.' He also stated: 'Throughout this conflict, educational experiences were transferred to the Syrian people without any expectations.' Over the past four years, he organized activities in Iran under the banner of defending the Zainab shrine. Establishing 'Support Headquarters for the Syrian People' was one of these activities. These headquarters were formed in all provinces of Iran and recruited forces to support the Syrian government and its positions. Alongside Iranians, forces from Shia groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan were also utilized. He likely played a role in forming the 'Qawat al-Ridha' group as a military group of Syrian Shia. His activities in Syria went far beyond shrine preservation, with some traditional Shia forces also active in this area. Another aspect of his activities in Syria was related to groups known as 'Kashaf.' These groups were formed for cultural activities and were inspired by groups called 'Salihin Circles' in the Iranian Basij. Hamdani placed significant emphasis on cultural activities within the framework of Shia fundamentalism alongside military operations. He described the positive outcome of this effort as the Syrian army exiting secularism, where praying and reading the Quran was no longer prohibited. Golali Babaei, the former head of the Arts and Literature Organization of the Sacred Defense, noted that Hamdani had undertaken many cultural initiatives, including translating and distributing sacred books in countries like Syria and Iraq. He claimed that Khamenei praised his use of Egyptian translators for translating Persian texts into Arabic. Hamdani was among the traditional Islamist forces who joined the Revolutionary Guards after the revolution. His military activities began in Kurdistan, facing unrest in that region. Although he is portrayed in state media as a founder or co-founder of the Hamadan and Kurdistan Guards, some informed individuals reject this claim and consider him one of the initial members of the Hamadan Guards. During the first decade of the revolution and the eight-year war with Iraq, he was among the mid-level commanders of the Guards. He worked briefly in Hamadan and the western part of the country, with most of his activities in the Guards taking place in Tehran. His responsibilities during the war included: Commander of the 32nd Al-Ansar Al-Hussein Division in Hamadan Province, Commander of the 16th Quds Division in Gilan Province, and Deputy Operations Commander of Quds Headquarters. However, after the war and the changes in the Guards' command due to the purging of some critical forces, especially supporters of Ayatollah Montazeri and the leftist faction, he climbed the ranks. Initially, he became the commander of the Najaf Ashraf Headquarters. He then took command of the 4th Ba'ath Division. Shortly after, he became the Chief of Staff of the Ground Forces of the Revolutionary Guards and the commander of the Mohammad Rasulullah Corps in Tehran. He served two terms as the deputy commander of the Basij Resistance Force. During the 2009 protest movement, he was the commander of the Tehran Guards and operated in the Tharallah Headquarters. Hamdani played a significant role in the violent suppression of the Green Movement. His last positions in the Guards were as a senior advisor to the Commander-in-Chief of the Revolutionary Guards and the deputy of the Basij Organization. According to Ismail Kowsari, a member of parliament and a former general of the Guards, he did not have a continuous responsibility in Syria and returned to Iran after his mission ended, but due to his extensive knowledge of Syrian regions, he went back to Syria for a few days for intellectual assistance. He stated in an interview that he intended to return to Iran but was advised by the leadership to return to inform the Syrian people that their country was sick and needed treatment. Based on some reports, which cannot be verified due to the available sources, Hamdani was under pressure due to 'failure' in the Revolutionary Guards' operations in Syria. Although some claim he was recently dismissed from his position as 'coordinator of the Guards' forces in Syria,' there is no credible evidence in this regard. He was active as 'responsible for consolidating logistics for Syria.' Hamdani was among those Guards who adapted to changes in power and acted in alignment with the leadership's positions. He believed that a politically neutral Guards and Basij had no value. Therefore, he was politically active. During the reformist era, he was among the signatories of a threatening letter to Khatami. During Ahmadinejad's presidency and after the eleven-day boycott incident, he also expressed harsh statements against the ninth government president. He opposed Meshaei's views, stating: 'We strongly oppose the Charter of Cyrus and consider it contrary to the path of the Imam and the Leader.' He compared Mahmoud Ahmadinejad to 'Abulhassan Banisadr' and said: 'Ahmadinejad's circle of friends is the most dangerous current after the 2009 sedition.' Hamdani went so far in opposing the Green Movement and its leaders that he called for the execution of Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi. Regarding how to control the 2009 protests, he referred to using malicious forces and emphasized the leadership's insistence on not accepting casualties in street clashes, stating: 'We conducted intelligence operations that resonated in Tehran. We identified 5,000 individuals who participated in the riots but were not part of political parties and movements; rather, they were from thugs and ruffians, and we monitored them at their homes. On the day they called for protests, these individuals were controlled and not allowed to leave their homes. Later, I organized these individuals into battalions. Later, these three battalions showed that if we want to train Mujahideen, we must bring such individuals who deal with blades and knives into action.' Hamdani took a stance on almost all major political issues, expressing views in defense of the targeted subsidy bill, the implementation of Article 44 of the Constitution, and signing a letter defending the actions of Assadollah Lajevardi, the main figure of state violence in the first half of the 1980s. Hamdani also opposed the foreign policy of the Rouhani government aimed at de-escalation, criticizing Mohammad Javad Zarif for walking with John Kerry in the streets of Geneva, stating: 'We cannot walk with Americans and expect the intercession of martyrs.' He considered negotiations with the West as a means of restoring America's image and viewed negotiations with the Great Satan as a defeat. Until the last moment of his life, he supported authoritarianism in domestic politics and belligerence in foreign policy and belonged to a faction of the Guards that believed in standing against the people's demands and reducing the Guards to the backbone of the machinery of religious tyranny.