Has Rouhani Changed?

Hassan Rouhani's relationship with his political supporters and voters has turned into a mix of 'fear and hope.' His electoral slogans and promises were beyond expectations and even revolutionary, but after the formation of the twelfth government, his political approach, stances, and cabinet composition have been discouraging for some public opinion, who say he has changed his course. The peak of these criticisms emerged during the introduction of the Minister of Science, which, after much delay, ultimately resulted in the appointment of 'Manouchehr Gholami,' the head of Bu-Ali Sina University in Hamadan. The Ministry of Science is one of the institutions that has always been sensitive to the Supreme Leader's opinions. Presidents generally consider Ayatollah Khamenei's views when appointing ministers. However, in his first government, Rouhani, faced with a completely non-aligned parliament, introduced candidates that aligned with the academic community's demands, leaning towards reformist and pro-student activity views, and stood firm on his choices. The representatives of the ninth parliament, who were predominantly principlists, did not grant confidence to his first proposed candidate, Jafar Mili Manfarid, and after a year, they impeached Reza Faraji Dana. After Faraji Dana, two caretakers of the Ministry of Science, Jafar Tofighi and Mohammad Ali Najafi, also did not receive favorable treatment from the parliament, and Mahmoud Nili Ahmadabadi and Fakhruddin Danesh Ashtiani also failed. Eventually, Mohammad Farhadi managed to gain the parliament's confidence. Throughout these stages, Rouhani repeatedly defended them in parliament, standing firmly against opponents and not backing down from his positions. However, in the twelfth government, the tide has turned. Although the tenth parliament is more aligned with the government, he has preferred to coordinate his choices with the Supreme Leader. The result of this action, as Gholamreza Heydari, a representative from Tehran, has stated, was Ayatollah Khamenei's opposition to 20 of the candidates for this position. The insistence of the members of the Hope faction in parliament for the selection of Reza Faraji Dana has also led nowhere, and ultimately, the lot fell to Manouchehr Gholami, who has strong opponents among student activists. Why has Rouhani backed down? Why has the president of the eleventh and twelfth governments changed his political stance in such a way and conceded so much from his demands? This issue can be evaluated from several angles. However, after the formation of the government, it seems that the president has concluded that to advance his government's programs, he prefers to cooperate and work with the entire ruling body, from the top of the power pyramid to the institutions close to him, the judiciary, the IRGC, and others. Hassan Rouhani is called a pragmatic politician. During the elections, he needed the people's votes and the support of reformists. He had to show his differences from his rivals, so he made statements and promises that were new not only for moderates but also for reformists. He is a politician who has held the highest and most secure positions of power for nearly 40 years and presumably does not intend to end up with a fate similar to that of previous presidents by standing against the top of the power pyramid. This is how, after describing the IRGC as a 'gun-holding government' and following the arrest of his brother, Hossein Fereydoun, on unspecified financial charges by the IRGC intelligence organization, he accepts a request for a meeting with five senior IRGC and Basij commanders and listens to their warnings. After these two events, the president has publicly endorsed the performance of this military institution, to the extent that he called the IRGC 'the people's beloved.' Some reformists, such as Ali Soufi, a member of the Central Council of the Union of Iranian Nations Party, also believe that 'the existence of severe pressures on the president and his submission to these pressures' is the reason for distancing from reformists and the demands of his 24 million voters. Based on this, one can understand why the president submits to the opinions of the top of the power pyramid regarding the Ministry of Women and Minorities or the Ministry of Science. Hassan Rouhani does not want to create a new conflict over the Ministry of Science, which would create a new front against his government and complicate the conditions of the JCPOA and foreign policy, which are his priorities. The president promised during the inauguration ceremony of his presidency in August to prioritize production, employment, and poverty eradication in his programs. This is a topic he pursued in his first government through the JCPOA. Prioritizing this direction has overshadowed various social and cultural issues. Rouhani also prefers that if he can make a change, it be in economic matters and the implementation of the nuclear agreement. Besides the aforementioned points, another possibility raised in political circles is Rouhani's desire for a long-term presence in the Iranian political landscape and a glance at the future leadership of the system. Based on this analysis, perhaps he wants to present a more balanced image of himself during this period to attract the attention of influential institutions and individuals in this area. Pursuing such a dual policy and conservatism after the elections, although it may be interpreted by some as political rationality, may, on the other hand, lead to the loss of public support. In the current structure of the Islamic Republic, combining these two issues is a difficult task, especially since the power institutions are mostly in the hands of the Supreme Leader, and limited authority and powers have been granted to the president. Perhaps by backing down in some matters like the Ministry of Science, some of the pressures from the faction close to the leader and the IRGC will ease, but in return, public trust will be lost. As it stands, voices of protests have also been raised regarding his performance in universities, and some political activists, such as Abdollah Nouri, a prominent reformist figure, have warned Rouhani: 'You cannot take your vote from 24 million people and act according to the words of those 16 million.' On the other hand, some moderate reformists and principlists also say that there is no alternative to this kind of behavior of hitting one nail and one wood for the government, as the structure of the Islamic Republic does not allow the president to act beyond this. Whatever the case, Hassan Rouhani faces a complex situation ahead. Managing the atmosphere of 'fear and hope' between him and his supporters goes beyond political pragmatism.