Has the JCPOA Reached Its End?

Finally, Donald Trump, the President of the United States, officially announced the decision to withdraw from the JCPOA. In the President's message, reference is made to the reinstatement of sanctions at their most severe level. Despite the fact that the International Atomic Energy Agency has not reported any violations by Iran, it remains unclear how the U.S. can implement threats of sanctions when five countries—China, Russia, Germany, France, and the United Kingdom—are officially committed to the agreement. Reasons for the Trump administration's withdrawal from the JCPOA include several factors, some of which relate directly to the JCPOA and others that are peripheral. Among the reasons related to the provisions of the JCPOA is the sunset clause, which allows Iran to continue its nuclear activities after 2025. Trump has consistently deemed this clause unacceptable. Iran's activities in the region, described as 'destabilizing actions,' is another reason Trump has cited. Under this title, a range of issues are raised, including Iran's military presence in Syria and Iraq, support for proxy groups like Hezbollah and Hamas, intervention in regional crises such as support for the Houthis in Yemen, and backing for Bashar al-Assad's regime in Syria, alongside its ballistic missile development program. Iran's ballistic missiles are capable of carrying nuclear warheads, and although Iran claims it has no nuclear program and that its missiles are defensive, Israel and the U.S. insist that Iran's intentions are aggressive and that the missiles are stockpiled for the day they produce a nuclear bomb. Until recently, the U.S. attempted to justify its decision to annul the agreement based on the Islamic Republic's performance in areas outside the framework of the JCPOA commitments. However, after Israel presented archived documents from just a few kilometers from Tehran in a promotional and televised display, the U.S. adopted a new argument, referencing findings from these documents. Based on this, the U.S. claims that Iran cannot be trusted because it resorted to lies and deception to sign the agreement with the P5+1, concealing its true goals and intentions. Although these stolen documents did not reveal anything particularly new that the international community or international arms and nuclear energy control agencies were unaware of, the circumstances leading to the presentation and exploitation of these documents were unprecedented. Iran's silence regarding the espionage operation that led to the transfer of these documents from inside Iran to Israel demonstrated Iran's vulnerability and susceptibility to such operations. Iran had previously experienced a similar vulnerability with the Stuxnet viruses that crippled its centrifuge systems. Another reason for Trump's withdrawal from the JCPOA was fulfilling an electoral promise in which he pledged to withdraw from the agreement to American voters. Reactions in favor and against Almost immediately after the official announcement by the U.S. President regarding the withdrawal from the JCPOA, numerous reactions were shown globally, falling into two opposing camps. Supporters primarily included Trump’s supporters and political opponents of the Islamic Republic, as well as countries that have had chronic tensions and disputes with Iran. Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates are at the top of the list of supporters. Opponents view the JCPOA more as an international disarmament agreement and believe that by violating the JCPOA, an international treaty endorsed by the Security Council has been violated, consequently increasing the risk of Iran acquiring nuclear weapons and, therefore, potentially escalating the possibility of war in the Middle East. The five signatories of the JCPOA—China, Russia, Germany, France, and the United Kingdom—are critics of its annulment, but their motivations may not be easily understood or may differ and even conflict with one another. National security strategy is not about charity and kindness; behind every alliance and coalition lies a clear and hidden map of national interest. Europe signed multiple contracts with Iran after the JCPOA was signed, most of which are profitable for Europe. At the same time, the three major European powers that effectively control the foreign policy of the European community fully agree with the U.S. on the need to curb Iran's missile program and regional actions. Russia empathizes with Iran regarding its military and operational strategy in Syria and supports Iran in many instances at the United Nations. Russia sees a future arms and military market in Iran. Additionally, it should not be forgotten that if U.S. sanctions are imposed and if Iran cannot sell oil at its current levels, it will be Russia that gains access to some of these markets. Therefore, Russia can benefit from both the implementation of the JCPOA and the U.S. sanctions and even extract concessions from the U.S. under certain conditions. China, while engaged in an economic war with the U.S., collaborates with the U.S. on denuclearizing North Korea. In principle, one should not expect anything other than statements from China in the short term. China's perspective is always forward-looking, and it does not act reactively in strategic matters. It would be a grave mistake for Iran to rely on the friendship of China and Russia or on European interests. Regional variables such as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Israel, or regional disputes like the wars in Yemen and Syria, will only bring responsibility to Iran in the long run, not credibility. Iran's regional role has two different and contradictory aspects. The positive aspect of this capability in combating terrorism and extremist religious groups in the region could have earned Iran credibility in the international community. However, Iran has acted selectively and voluntarily in this regard and has not been able to gain any advantage from its performance. What allows this role to be used as leverage against Iran is largely related to the behavioral and ideological patterns governing the Islamic Republic. Two influential Middle Eastern countries, Israel and Saudi Arabia, which have the best relations with the U.S. and the West, seek to limit Iran's regional role and each has a degree of influence over U.S. political decision-making. Over the past 40 years, repeated mistakes at the strategic and tactical levels have prevented the Islamic Republic of Iran from strengthening its relations with the West; rather, in the opposite direction, it has aimed to compete with the West and its allies in the Middle East by expanding its regional influence, ultimately suffering from this competition. Iran's increased influence in the region comes with an implicit threat to the Western Middle Eastern allies, and it is clear that in this dangerous challenge, the winner will be the country backed by a global superpower. Existing alignments The study of the current situation and the verbal war between Iran and the U.S. and Iran and Israel, which has intensified recently and ultimately led to the announcement of the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA, indicates a kind of alignment that smells of war: • The readiness for a military confrontation (even if limited) between Israel and Iran in Syria and areas close to the Israeli border is momentarily increasing. Even if we do not take the verbal threats of the IRGC commanders seriously, Israeli media report on preparations to counter missile attacks from Iran or forces supported or organized by Iran. Israel predicts that the IRGC is certainly planning to confront Israel, and for this reason, preparedness in Israel is essential. Missile attacks by Iranian proxy groups or Hezbollah could occur sporadically and without a declaration of war. Hours after the announcement of the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA, Israel launched missile attacks under the pretext of observing 'suspicious movements' near the northern border of Syria and Israel. This indicates that military confrontations between Iran and Israel in certain areas of Syria could occur at any moment and without prior notice, especially in areas that are neither Iranian nor Israeli territory. However, this confrontation may not be limited to Syria and could extend to Iranian territory or other locations where Iran has a presence or proxy forces. • Saudi Arabia and Iran are currently, following intense verbal wars and even threats of war, entering a phase of confrontation in other arenas. The Lebanese elections and oil prices within OPEC are two major arenas of current conflict between the two countries. The Lebanese elections are the first public parliamentary elections in nine years. Undoubtedly, the political power of Hezbollah and its leader Hassan Nasrallah was strengthened in these elections, but the implications of this increase in power are still not calculable by military parameters. However, even to this extent, the balance of power between groups supported by Saudi Arabia (such as Saad Hariri's Future Movement) and groups supported by Iran has changed, and naturally, reactions to this will somehow bring Iran into the mix. The results of these elections politically fuel the competition between Iran and Saudi Arabia. If it becomes clear that these elections have also increased Hezbollah's power in military terms, one can expect a military reaction from Israel and Saudi Arabia as well. • It should be noted that the overall composition of competitions and the electoral process has been a kind of mockery of Iran's domestic policies: out of 583 candidates, a very high number of 86 were women, and in addition, each of the two official religions in Lebanon, Islam and Christianity, holds half of the 128 parliamentary seats. For the first time in Lebanon's history, candidates defended the rights of homosexuals, and nearly a hundred candidates openly supported the idea that homosexuality should not be criminalized. Such a transformation in a country where Hezbollah explicitly and publicly identifies itself as a beneficiary of Iran is entirely exceptional and unprecedented and, at best, indicates significant underlying differences in Lebanese society. Is the JCPOA dead? The statements of the Iranian President have fueled concerns rather than creating confidence about the country's future. Rouhani claimed that economic decisions and changes in currency prices were made considering the possibility of the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA. This is while the government has only raised the official value of the dollar by single-rate currency and preventing its widespread supply, causing the free market dollar price to become uncontrollable and follow the existing political-social turmoil. Such a trend, regardless of its disastrous economic results, is dangerous and explosive from a social and psychological perspective. From a social aspect, the post-JCPOA atmosphere could fuel discontent and bring forth human waves of economic-social dissatisfaction that were seen in the protests of December 2017. The Islamic Republic of Iran can easily ignore these discontents by resorting to the calculation that 'external threats strengthen internal solidarity' or consider them as stemming from foreign interventions and suppress them severely. Both scenarios are extremely dangerous and precisely create the appropriate atmosphere for the expansion of unrest to the point of direct intervention for regime change. Apparently, there is not much distance between the U.S. withdrawal and the death of the JCPOA. The Iranian President has now stated that an order for unlimited enrichment has been issued but has not yet been implemented. If Europe cannot change the U.S. path in the JCPOA minus the U.S., then limited solutions will remain. European investors will retreat, and the JCPOA will be officially archived. In such a situation, Iran may exit the Non-Proliferation Treaty and officially execute nuclear activities. Given the statements from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the overall composition of foreign policy figures in the U.S. (Trump, Bolton, Pompeo), it seems that the U.S. will primarily try to force Iran to accept negotiations for a revision of the JCPOA content and reach a new agreement through increased pressures and imposing severe sanctions. This path can be seen from the preliminary steps announced just hours after the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA by the U.S. Treasury Department. Alongside this, military friction between Israel and Iran could pave the way for broader U.S. intervention to support Israel. Saudi Arabia and the UAE could also open another front, whether under the pretext of the Yemen war or within the framework of Iran's interventions in Syria.