Has the Shelf Life of Rouhani's Government Expired?

In the first two years of Rouhani's government, Khamenei and the commanders of the IRGC largely remained silent towards Rouhani for three reasons: 1) The pressure of sanctions was such that they could not publicly defend or tolerate the government, 2) They could not criticize the government and its program without any agreement, and 3) The disasters and corruption of Ahmadinejad's government were constantly being published, and they did not want to associate themselves with these disasters. However, after the formation of the JCPOA, criticisms and attacks began. The commanders of the IRGC and those close to the leadership believed that their voter base had forgotten the disasters and corruption of Ahmadinejad's era; sanctions on oil had been lifted, and now it was time to claim a share of the returned revenues; and by highlighting the economic problems and the failure to fulfill Rouhani's ambitious promises, they could pave the way for the return of militarists to the next government. Some successes of the IRGC in Syria have been effective in this strategy. The declaration of an all-out war against Rouhani's government was because Khamenei and the IRGC wanted Rouhani's government only to display moderation internationally and to lift oil and banking sanctions, and when Rouhani spoke of a second JCPOA, Khamenei explicitly introduced it as a demand of the enemy: 'Now they say that another JCPOA must be created in regional matters and the constitution of the country, JCPOA two and three, etc., so that we can live comfortably.' (1395/1/1) This statement, like a fire order, directed all attacks from the military-security spectrum towards the government and its foreign and economic policies. Even Rouhani's declaration of absolute obedience to Khamenei could not end the attacks on the government because the mission of this government for the leadership and the IRGC has ended. The quiet parliamentary elections, which were welcomed by some reformists in the hope of some movement from the government, were the last function of Rouhani's government for the ruling system. Khamenei and the IRGC expect the government to manage current affairs (a logistics role in the words of Mohammad Khatami) in the remaining year and to delegate major and strategic decisions to the leadership and the IRGC. The expansion of dominance and not the survival strategy of Khamenei and the IRGC is the continuation of tension with the United States, which contradicts Rouhani's government's strategy of normalization. The type of military development and their behavior in the region indicates such a strategy: 'For years, we have built power with the assumption of a widespread war with the US and its allies. We have prepared for military options before we are ready for political and diplomatic options.' (IRGC Commander, A 17 Farvardin 1395) Khamenei and the IRGC commanders view this force not as a defense of the country but as aggression and expansionism. The IRGC command explicitly uses the term 'non-conservative guarding' (a soft term for expansionism): 'Maintaining the capacity for survival in the Islamic Revolution according to regional conditions and helping its advancement is the basis of our non-conservative guarding of the Islamic Revolution.' (Same source) He also cites the achievements of this strategy, which are now seen in Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and Lebanon: 'Today, the geometry of the Islamic Revolution has become larger, and its borders have expanded. The Islamic revolutionary community has become international, and the revolution has become global.' (Same source) Denying the most important achievement of the government, the forces close to the leadership and other IRGC members do not criticize the JCPOA but rather deny and reject it. The IRGC command explicitly settles accounts with seemingly elected institutions that distance themselves from the IRGC's position: 'Political thoughts that are in conflict with the Islamic Revolution and the path of truth will not remain stable; these thoughts, even if they form a government and parliament at some point, will eventually be removed from the political geography of the country and revolution by the will of the people.' After that, they directly target the most important achievement of Rouhani's government and introduce it as humiliating and anti-revolutionary: 'If the nuclear JCPOA is considered a model, it is a sign of short-sightedness and a kind of self-deprecation. Those who today speak of a series of JCPOAs have inadvertently taken the anti-revolutionary path and want to humiliate our great people... The JCPOA has never been considered a document of honor and will not be... Our people reluctantly accepted this JCPOA; what results has this JCPOA had for the people that we should accept other JCPOAs? Our people will never replace revolutionary spirit and thought with passive spirit and thought.' He sees the behavior of military institutions as conflicting with the government's approach to normalizing relations with the West: 'The result of a value-based thought towards interaction with the world without revolutionary calculations, resistance, and steadfastness to achieve the goals and interests of the system and country will be chronic Westernization.' (Same source) Media close to the leadership and the IRGC have clearly announced the end of the government's shelf life since the beginning of the year 1395. All headlines of Kayhan newspaper in the first week of publication in the new year are against the government and the JCPOA, with themes about the fruitlessness of negotiations, the failure to lift sanctions, the losses and not the benefits from the JCPOA, and an emphasis on the resistant economy envisioned by Khamenei, whose main goal is to render sanctions ineffective. Resalat newspaper has followed the same path: 'In the JCPOA, the concrete of Iran's missile industries is no longer considered, as the time is for negotiation, and there is no need for missiles at all. In the third JCPOA, Hezbollah, Hamas, the Palestinian resistance, Ansar Allah of Yemen, and Bashar al-Assad are eliminated because they are extremist, terrorist, and dangerous and threaten the global order. In the fourth JCPOA, Imam and the thoughts of Imam and the thought of the Islamic Revolution will be removed from the political decision-making scene and respectfully deposited in the museum of history. In the fifth JCPOA, the Iranian constitution will be changed, the leadership council will replace the leader, the IRGC will merge into the army, and the Guardian Council into the Expediency Council. In the next JCPOA, Israel will be recognized because we have no dispute with Israel. These JCPOAs are all designed, and even the effort to draft them, like the first JCPOA, has been done by specialized think tanks of the US State Department, and these JCPOAs are just waiting for official sessions, usual bargaining, signatures from both sides, and implementation. Any JCPOA that is implemented will temporarily lift one of the sanctions, and we will celebrate. During the negotiations of the first JCPOA, the opposing side used the created atmosphere to pave the way for its infiltration into the country's decision-making centers and aligned media to prepare the ground for subsequent JCPOAs.' (17 Farvardin 1395) This writing explicitly introduces Rouhani's government as the executor of US policies. Against normalization, the government's program, in addition to normalizing relations with the West, has been to normalize relations in the Middle East, but the IRGC wants a permanent war. The IRGC command responds to Rouhani's statement that 'Tehran does not wish to engage in a relationship with Riyadh that is fraught with tension' (7 Farvardin 1395) by saying: 'Regimes like Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and others are manifestations of modern political backwardness, and the IRGC has designed and planned to create the necessary preparations to respond to their audacity and foolish behavior, which stems from reliance on American power, and is waiting for orders.' (A 1395/1/17) The IRGC's missile launches at this stage, while there is no security threat against Iran, are mainly aimed at disrupting the process of normalizing foreign relations. Khamenei and his military commanders consider the economy envisioned by the government and other believers in normal relations with the West as a parasitic economy or integration into the global market and oppose it. They propose another path and criticize the government for this reason: 'The parasitic economy and the formation of a resistant economy will render a large part of America's plans for infiltration into the country abortive and mortal... We regret that more than two years have passed since the command and emphasis of the Supreme Leader on the implementation of resistant economy policies, and no major and fundamental action has been taken in this regard... It seems that the principles, indicators, and main components of the resistant economy have not yet been established for the economic actors of the country, and all institutions have become accustomed to the wrong traditional economic methods of the past, which do not respond at all in the conditions of economic warfare.' (IRGC Commander, Al 1395/1/17) When the military and their overall command are explicitly opposed to the government's two programs in foreign policy and economics, there is no room left for maneuver for the government. Without the expiration of the government's shelf life, a military commander would not place himself in the position of economic policymaking. Qassem Soleimani has best expressed the government's expectations from Rouhani: 'Mohammad Javad Zarif, the foreign minister, had only one specific and clear mission, which was the nuclear agreement.' (Tabnak 1394/12/27) After this agreement, there is no longer any room for the government to determine the path and policymaking.