Hashemi and the Future of Leadership in Iran

Last week, Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, the head of the Expediency Discernment Council, announced his candidacy for the Assembly of Experts elections scheduled for next Esfand. The Assembly of Experts is an institution whose clerical members have the legal right to oversee the performance of the leadership of the Islamic Republic of Iran and even the right to change, replace, and elect a leader. Furthermore, this institution has become more significant now that Ayatollah Khamenei is in his late seventies, and sooner or later, the question of who will succeed him must be clarified. In the last round of elections for the presidency of the Assembly of Experts, Mr. Hashemi Rafsanjani lost, and in the previous round, he refrained from competing for this position in 2009 due to his failure to condemn Mir Hossein Mousavi, Mehdi Karroubi, and Zahra Rahnavard, and his reluctance to distance himself from the Green Movement of 2009, which made him unpopular with the principlist faction. Although he previously held the presidency of this institution for three years, these factors, along with the Guardian Council's rejection of his candidacy for the 2013 presidential election, have raised the question in political circles about whether Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani's qualifications will also be rejected in the upcoming Assembly of Experts elections, or conversely, whether the shift in the balance of power in the two years since Hassan Rouhani's presidency and the strengthening of moderate and reformist factions will lead to his victory in these elections. This week, this question was discussed by three guests on the Views program in Tehran: Ghasem Shole Saadi, a political activist, former MP, and expelled professor from the University of Tehran's Law School; Eisa Saharkhiz, a journalist and political analyst; and Nasser Zarafshan, a lawyer, writer, and political activist. Mr. Shole Saadi, what is the probability of Mr. Hashemi Rafsanjani being approved or rejected in the Assembly of Experts elections? Ghasem Shole Saadi: Given the precedent set in the recent presidential election where the Guardian Council disqualified him, and considering the sensitivity that may exist in the Assembly of Experts, there is still a possibility that his qualifications may be rejected. Because he has become so entrenched in public opinion after Khamenei's statements that it seems these 'insightless elites' he refers to could be exemplified by Mr. Rafsanjani. Considering Mr. Rafsanjani's position and the new quality that has been revived for him after his statements during Friday prayers and the letter he wrote to Mr. Khamenei before the 2009 elections, as well as the arrest of his children and the positions he has taken over the years, he emphatically states that to overcome the crisis, a free election is necessary. In fact, he emphasizes that the country's situation is in a state of crisis (although I say this was before the recent nuclear agreement) and that to exit this crisis, which he believes the country is in, a free election is needed. Of course, the new government that has come to power can be influential, especially since Mr. Rouhani was ultimately a security element, and his Minister of Intelligence, Mr. Alavi, seems to behave more wisely compared to his predecessor, to the extent that it appears the security atmosphere in the country has improved and moderated compared to before the current government. Since the executor of the elections is now the current government and not Ahmadinejad's government, it is predictable that if his candidacy and that of others, such as Mr. Hassan Khomeini, who has apparently also started to come forward, pass the Guardian Council's filter, then I believe their election will be certain, and it can be anticipated from now that the composition of both the Assembly of Experts and the Islamic Consultative Assembly will differ significantly from what it is now. Mr. Saharkhiz, what do you think? Do you think there is a possibility that Mr. Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani's popularity could be such that he might even reach the leadership of the Assembly of Experts, or do you think his chances are limited to just the approval of his qualifications? Eisa Saharkhiz: I believe Mr. Hashemi is playing two roles. One is as an individual wanting to enter and be at the forefront as the head of the Assembly of Experts in Tehran. In the last election, when the Assembly of Experts had that condition, he was the first, and his margin over the next candidates was very large. I doubt they would disqualify Hashemi on the pretext of the presidential election and his age. Because this would, on one hand, significantly impact public opinion regarding the personal leadership issue and the personal matter with Mr. Hashemi, and they would not want him to be in any specific position, let alone in the Assembly of Experts. If they want to raise the age issue, then they would have to disqualify many others, like Mr. Jannati, Mr. Mesbah Yazdi, Mr. Mohammad Yazdi, and many others who are much older, and their conditions differ. The next point is the international context. Everyone knows that after the nuclear issue, human rights will be the main topic in Iran's foreign negotiations, and I think Mr. Khamenei will act in a way that will not weaken his position at this juncture, knowing he has few cards to play. However, it is natural that what Mr. Hashemi is doing now is twofold: one, he wants to participate himself, and two, he wants to encourage others close to him and to the past leadership of the revolution, including Seyyed Hassan Khomeini, to come forward and have a stronger position, and he is making significant efforts to change the composition of the Assembly of Experts so that he can return to the presidency there and influence the decisions and transformations that will undoubtedly occur in the next eight to nine years, and we should witness significant changes in the Assembly of Experts, where he can also utilize his influence in the presidency. Mr. Zarafshan, what are the background and implications of Mr. Hashemi Rafsanjani's candidacy for the Assembly of Experts? Nasser Zarafshan: First of all, the future outlook of the country is not limited to the struggle between these two factions of the power structure. We cannot summarize the entire future of this country and its developments by saying that this faction will have the upper hand or that faction. Because, in addition to the power structure and the struggles between the two factions, there is also the role of the people and their role in shaping this future. The people who have paid the price for the governance of these two factions and their struggle for power over the past thirty-plus years are tired of this tedious quarrel, which is limited to either this line or that line. Therefore, I do not view everything from the perspective of the struggle between these two factions for power. Over the past thirty-plus years, in the first decade, both groups governed together as a unified whole, and in the last two decades, both factions have alternated in power. One period this faction, another period that faction. Society has seen and experienced both colors. What is the record of the work of these thirty-plus years, which is the result of the work of both factions, today? Mismanagement and incompetence have led to the greatest environmental disaster in the history of this country. Financial corruption has reached unprecedented levels in the country's history. The people are aware of these issues. The reserves of the country's groundwater have been destroyed. This has caused land subsidence in the country. The economic situation is worse than the environmental situation. The rent-seeking economy and the acquisition of windfall wealth resulting from windfall powers have taken the place of work and effort, and today the source of these benefits and exploitations, namely oil, is also diminishing. Over the past two decades, the struggle over implementing a structural adjustment program, one of those programs recommended by the IMF and the World Bank and aligned with neocon and neoliberal economic policies, has existed for ten to fifteen years between these two factions. Mr. Rafsanjani and his supporting faction are adamant about implementing this structural adjustment, which means privatizations, i.e., transferring public wealth to private capitalists at a bargain price, eliminating any oversight and accountability over the activities of domestic and foreign capitalists, and allowing unrestricted imports of foreign consumer goods in exchange for natural and raw wealth, primarily oil, and liberalizing prices, which we have witnessed a staggering rise in recent months, are the results of implementing the structural adjustment policies that Mr. Rafsanjani's faction supports. The currently plundered economy is set to be sacrificed for more neoliberal policies and structural adjustment programs. However, the thirty to forty-year record of implementing these policies in other countries is before us. Apart from increasing the gap between the rich and the poor, increasing pressure and misery on the lower layers of society has not yielded anything other than this, not only in three continents of Asia, Africa, and Latin America but even in Europe and America. Given the severe environmental crisis and the dire economic situation that currently exists, I see the future outlook of the country darker than that which can be achieved by the arrival of this one and the departure of that one and the changes that are made within the system and the truly tedious discussions we have become accustomed to for thirty years. Mr. Shole Saadi, how do you view the implications of this transformation if it occurs? Ghasem Shole Saadi: The general atmosphere of society and the international environment necessitate that conditions be somewhat adjusted, and consequently, the composition of Iran's rulers should change accordingly. However, let us not forget that especially regarding the Assembly of Experts, there is a closed circle that practically does not allow dissenters to enter in that sense. Because the jurists of the Guardian Council are appointed by the leader, and the qualifications of those who must be members of the Assembly and participate in elections must be approved by these jurists. At that time, not even the entire Guardian Council but only the jurists of the Guardian Council, who are appointed by the leader, will oversee the conditions of the leadership. This closed circuit has practically prevented dissenters from entering, and almost all of these individuals are representatives of the leader in various organs. If this is the case, Mr. Shole Saadi, then why is there so much sensitivity in the Assembly of Experts regarding Mr. Hashemi Rafsanjani not being president or not being present at all? Ghasem Shole Saadi: Well, Mr. Rafsanjani is facing a serious challenge with Mr. Khamenei for two or three reasons. One is that Mr. Rafsanjani has openly stated several times that he introduced Mr. Khamenei, who was not known on the day Khomeini died when the Assembly of Experts was formed to determine the successor, and he said things on behalf of Mr. Khomeini, and the conditions were created for the Experts to vote for Mr. Khamenei. So your point is that, as Mr. Zarafshan said, these disputes do not lead to the opening of the political space? Ghasem Shole Saadi: No. I want to explain what their differences are. One is that Mr. Rafsanjani effectively humiliates Mr. Khamenei. Therefore, it has created resentment for Mr. Khamenei, and secondly, due to their differing cultural views. Because he always talks about enemies and cultural invasion and cultural onslaught. However, Mr. Rafsanjani's cultural perspective is different. He believes in cooperation and competition, especially in the international arena. This difference in cultural perspective leads to a difference in political views as well. Just as Mr. Rafsanjani believed that just a few months ago, when the country was in a crisis, it needed free elections to overcome the crisis, while Khamenei completely denied that he accepted the country was in a crisis. The third point is that Mr. Rafsanjani has taken blows and has been somewhat attacked in public opinion, which can be said to be partly justified and partly unjustified; despite all this, he has the greatest chance of succeeding Mr. Khamenei. For these reasons, I believe the differences are serious. However, the Assembly of Experts does not fundamentally have a position that can be the source of a structural transformation in the country. Mr. Saharkhiz, regarding Mr. Shole Saadi's statement that the Assembly of Experts is a closed circle and a vicious cycle, and despite the differences between Mr. Rafsanjani and Mr. Khamenei, Mr. Rafsanjani still has the chance to play a role, and Mr. Zarafshan's comments that, in his view, the strengthening of Mr. Rafsanjani leads to a specific economy that weakens the welfare state, what do you think? Eisa Saharkhiz: In the Islamic Republic, if we want to talk about this closed circle, it can be discussed in all matters in a way. Because one individual plays a role in many decisions and many appointments, and the argument is that someone who is appointed by another tries to consider that individual's interests or their long-term interests, that if they want to act outside this framework in the future, they cannot have a position in this power structure. But the existing realities also show that these closed circles sometimes open up. No one expected Mr. Khatami to become president. Even no one expected Mr. Rouhani to become president. But this happens. Sometimes there are shifts within the power structure, and that is why it is said that the people of Iran are surprising. These surprises actually occur within this closed structure. Mr. Saharkhiz, however, Mr. Zarafshan says that these are tedious, and he does not see much surprise in such changes.