Hashemi Rafsanjani; Pragmatic Islamism Within the Realm of Possibilities

The death of Hashemi Rafsanjani, following four decades of his active and continuous presence in Iranian politics, is a significant event with short- and medium-term consequences. Rafsanjani, as a pragmatic politician, intertwined Islamism with realism, conservatism with some less predictable moves (in the last two decades of his life), state terrorism with negotiations with rivals simultaneously, and restrictions with some safety valves in social and cultural engineering. Even during his decline after defeats in the sixth parliamentary elections and the ninth presidential election, and his disqualification in the eleventh elections, he could not be overlooked. He is one of the founders of the Islamic Republic, and the history of Iran in the past four decades cannot be written without his narrative. He utilized various tools such as memoir writing (documenting the history of the Islamic Republic from the perspective of revolutionary clerics, which has been criticized by traditional clerics and some commanders of the IRGC), activism at critical moments, continuous communication and negotiation with various power factions, defending Khamenei's leadership while seriously criticizing his policies (such as intervention in Syria to support Bashar al-Assad's regime, the regime's weapons of mass destruction program, and allowing militaristic Islamists in political processes), and comprehensive support for the system despite the system's behavior aimed at eliminating him, to remain relevant and effective in the political landscape. What impact will his death have on the internal politics of the Islamic Republic considering these characteristics? Although Hashemi Rafsanjani was very close to the pragmatic faction in the Islamic Republic (both traditionalists and pragmatic reformists), his personality and political actions were never limited to factional behavior while he supported factional politics in the country. In the second half of the 1980s and the first half of the 1990s, he was closer to the right and later to the principlists, playing a significant role in the suppression of the left faction in the third parliamentary elections. However, during this period, many of his colleagues (like Abdollah Nouri or Attaollah Mohajerani) were close to the left faction. From the mid-1990s, with the consolidation of Khamenei's leadership relying on the totalitarian and authoritarian forces of the right faction (like Mesbah Yazdi), he became closer to the reformist faction. The 2009 Green Movement marked the end of Rafsanjani's friendship with the right or principlist faction of the Islamic Republic, but in the last two decades, Rafsanjani maintained his connections with some forces of the Combatant Clergy Association in Tehran and the Society of Teachers in Qom (like Mohammad Emami Kashani and Ebrahim Amini) as well as clerics very close to the leadership (like Natiq Nouri). This unique position allowed Rafsanjani to influence both the process and the outcome during historical turning points like elections. He has somewhat exaggerated his role in the rise of Rouhani (claiming to have raised his vote from 3% to 50%), but without Rafsanjani's support alongside Natiq and Khatami, Rouhani's government and the JCPOA would not have been possible. Although Rafsanjani did not fit into the factions, without a personality like him, political factions in Iran could not have reached any form of coalition and power could not have been transferred among them. Rafsanjani played a significant role in the rise of Khatami's government and the victory of the reformist faction in 1997 by preventing widespread fraud while preparing the mindset of the opposing faction and military forces to accept the results of the 1997 elections. In this regard, the reformist faction and pragmatic forces have lost one of their weights for 'top-level negotiations.' His decline in power coincided with the rise of security and military forces close to Khamenei and the leadership apparatus. When the Iran-Iraq War reached a military stalemate, Rafsanjani was the only figure who persuaded Mr. Khomeini to accept Resolution 598. In an environment where the military wanted to occupy Baghdad and then Jerusalem without sufficient resources and budget, and with a completely bankrupt economy, he facilitated the possibility of a kind of reconciliation. He paid a high price for this action in domestic politics over the past two decades, but he introduced himself to public opinion as someone from whom reconciliation and agreement could be expected even with enemies. Public attention to him since 1989 has largely been due to this political realism. Khamenei, in his 'heroic flexibility' for entering nuclear negotiations, essentially followed in Rafsanjani's footsteps during the war. Rafsanjani did not adhere to ideological dogmas in either domestic or foreign policy, while he never hesitated for a moment in suppressing critics and opponents and violating human rights to maintain the Islamic Republic. The militaristic Islamists and clerical leaders will benefit the most from Rafsanjani's death in domestic politics. At the same time, reformists and moderates have lost one of their key figures in power disputes and transactions. Some traditional clerics have still accompanied Rafsanjani's ideas, but under the influence of the economic and political power of security and military institutions, they could not align with him in the years following the Green Movement. This group will turn their command more towards Khamenei after Hashemi's death. Rafsanjani's weight in the Assembly of Experts, even after the rise of Khamenei's handpicked clerics, has been about one-third. They will be forced to get closer to leaders like Rouhani. However, the main losers of Rafsanjani's death are the forces in Iranian society that had two expectations from him, expectations that were not realized: a policy of détente with the world and especially neighbors, and a fairer political competition among factions within power. Those who believed in change resulting from power interactions at the top have counted on Hashemi Rafsanjani as a player for creating political stability and interaction with the world since 1989 (after the end of the war and Khomeini's death). The military bureaucracy that has gained increased power during Khamenei's era opposes the policy of détente, and the Guardian Council and the leadership apparatus are fundamentally against the factionalization of forces; they want society to be mass-oriented and obedient to the leader. Why did Rafsanjani endure? Amir Kabir was one of Hashemi Rafsanjani's political models, but despite the elimination of many founders of the Islamic Republic by Khomeini and Khamenei, Rafsanjani did not meet the fate of Amir Kabir. He managed to endure through the ups and downs of domestic politics. This endurance had three main reasons: he created an irreplaceable position for himself by 1) maintaining relations with influential political forces with various tendencies, 2) political realism within the framework of the regime's ideology, and 3) efforts for institutionalization (the Expediency Discernment Council). His closeness to Khomeini and later his undeniable role in Khamenei's rise provided him a kind of safe margin despite some criticisms he had of Khomeini and Khamenei. After the deaths of Montazeri, Ardabili, and Rafsanjani, the house arrest of Mousavi and Karroubi, and the housebound status of Mohammad Khatami, no other influential and founding figures of the Islamic Republic remain in the scene besides Ali Khamenei. If Rafsanjani had continued to live, he could have played a significant role in determining the future leader of the regime after Khamenei's death, but with his departure from the scene, security and military apparatuses can more comfortably guide the Assembly of Experts to elect a compliant or handpicked leader for themselves.