Hassan Rouhani and the Conflict Between Dual Power Positions in Iran

Hassan Rouhani, the President of Iran, reiterated on Monday at the tomb of Ayatollah Khomeini that, in his view, being revolutionary is different from extremism. Mr. Rouhani has repeatedly expressed this opinion while facing significant outcry from the conservative faction aiming to restore what was termed the rule of the Imam of the Time, uncompromisingness, and revolutionary zeal during Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's presidency. This is particularly relevant as Iran approaches two pivotal elections for the Islamic Consultative Assembly and the Assembly of Experts. On the occasion of 'Government Week,' Hassan Rouhani stated, 'If someone thinks they are revolutionary, being revolutionary does not mean extremism is acceptable.' Since his election, Rouhani has consistently reiterated this point. Meanwhile, commanders of the Revolutionary Guard, Friday prayer leaders, and other conservative figures have always reacted sharply to Mr. Rouhani's positions. Even the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic has attempted to emphasize some of his past positions to reinforce his revolutionary image. Isa Saharkhiz, a political analyst residing in Tehran, considers the existence of dual governance in Iran as the main factor: 'After the presidential elections, we found ourselves in a new situation; the dual governance that existed during the reformist period was set aside, and a unified governance prevailed, but after the recent elections, it returned to the same position and dominance of dual governance. This dual governance has two types of thinking. If we look at its background in Iran, we see that it dates back to the Constitutional Revolution, namely the duality of constitutionalism and legitimacy. This thinking still exists today. I consider this a reality of Iranian society rather than a political game and division of labor among the power holders in the system. Given that Ahmadinejad's era is over and its disasters have been significant, the previous ruling faction, which has substantial political and economic interests but cannot come forward under Ahmadinejad's name, now seeks to revert the situation of the past eight years. If possible, they want to sideline President Rouhani, even cutting him off midway, or if that fails, to eliminate the possibility of his second four-year term from now.' The strengthening of the dual governance that became unified during Ahmadinejad's presidency is also highlighted by Taghi Rahmani, a political analyst residing in Paris: 'After the nuclear agreement, Rouhani's confidence has increased. Evidence suggests that Mr. Khamenei is not particularly satisfied with this agreement but has gone along with it. Khamenei's strategy is to say that he is still not a diplomat; he is a revolutionary. When he engaged in nuclear negotiations, he spoke of flexibility, not a strategic change. However, Rouhani's strategy in the National Security and Economic Development book, which is the most important book and almost a manifesto compiled under his supervision, fundamentally differs from Khamenei's leadership. This strategy is bureaucratic, the so-called second stage of a revolution that seeks to establish its system and create global relations. These two strategies are not aligned.' The overt and covert conflicts among power sectors in Iran are not only real but also manifest in the dual statements of Mr. Rouhani on one side and conservatives and even Ayatollah Khamenei on the other, indicating the continuation of the project of conflict between tradition and modernism. This is part of Isa Saharkhiz's analysis of the current situation: 'I see social changes as a process. Even progress and regression occur at certain points. Iranian society is moving towards modernity and seeks to shape a modern government and nation-state. In this thinking, the individual can no longer play a role. The revolution was fundamentally about removing power from an individual and a class in society. The Iranian people are moving towards this in a long-term historical process. At one stage, they fail and are pushed back, and at another stage, they advance. This is a forward-moving process. Rouhani's project has been clicked again, and in the context of dual governance, both sides are trying to increase their power and political-social influence and strengthen their hold on appointed institutions, even forcing those institutions or leaders to act within the framework of the law and what is stipulated in the constitution for them.' However, such a level of ideological difference among leaders of other revolutions has had significantly determining results. How about in Iran? Taghi Rahmani states: 'In major world revolutions, the authoritarian faction usually destroys the libertarian faction. Robespierre eliminates Danton, Stalin eliminates others. The same is true in China. Interestingly, the Iranian revolution has, for two or three reasons, somewhat passed the era of state-centricity... On one hand, the world of communication and a degree of civil society growth in Iran have diminished the characteristic of the repressive faction to annihilate all tendencies. However, the great event occurs when it aligns with the demands of the 21st century. That is, strong media and an independent civil society. I believe both ruling factions are sufficiently aware, and even society is sufficiently aware, not to head towards a final confrontation as it did in the 60s and was defeated. The balance of power in Iran is somewhat in favor of bureaucrats and military power. Democracy advocates in such societies are not a determining force. If they move towards a final confrontation, society will face a much worse situation. This must also be noted. This is a new type of experience due to the demands and global conditions we are facing.' It seems that as the very important elections for the upcoming Assembly and the Assembly of Experts approach, the confrontation between supporters of traditional revolutionary zeal and reformists within the current political system of Iran will become even more heated.