Hassan Rouhani: Two-Term or One-Term President?

Eight months before the twelfth presidential election of the Islamic Republic of Iran, attacks from conservative opponents of Hassan Rouhani's government continue, and recently, prominent figures from the reformist faction have begun to criticize this government. Mohammad Reza Aref, a representative from Tehran and head of the Hope faction, which is an alliance of government supporters and reformists in the parliament, mentioned last Thursday that 50 to 60 percent of managers in various agencies are not aligned with the government and that these managers are remnants of the previous era. This reformist candidate in the eleventh presidential election also criticized the lack of change, noting that the demand for change was the people's slogan in the February 2016 elections. For instance, in the Ministry of Science, he stated that the Minister of Science does not respond to requests for establishing a union of Islamic associations. Aref added that reforms in universities have been made, but they are insufficient, and students should be free to express their opinions at the university. The Tehran representative in the parliament also opposed the prevention of music concerts and mentioned the possibility of a vote of no confidence. Last Wednesday, Hassan Rasouli, a member of the Council for Policy-Making of Reformists in Iran, told the Arman newspaper that after the parliamentary elections, former President Mohammad Khatami expressed his grievances to Hassan Rouhani, stating that Rouhani's supporters, who had allied with the reformists in the parliamentary elections, had not fulfilled their promises. According to Rasouli, the important point in Khatami's complaint was the inappropriate behavior of some ministers against the direction of this alliance and the Hope faction in parliament. The member of the reformists' policy-making council also added that Rouhani accepted Khatami's criticism and apparently warned these ministers. Since the beginning of Rouhani's presidency, his government has faced attacks from conservative opponents. This includes criticism regarding the nuclear agreement, which opponents believe has been more detrimental to the Islamic Republic in terms of security, defense, political, and economic aspects than beneficial, as well as issues of corruption and exorbitant salaries and bonuses. Supporters of Rouhani's government have responded that the corruption from these salaries and bonuses is a fraction of the embezzlement and misappropriation during Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's eight-year presidency and have added that the results of the nuclear deal are much better than the political and economic record of the tenth government and what opponents claim. The program "Views" asks three guests this week about the current situation of Hassan Rouhani's government eight months before the upcoming presidential election. Mohammad Sadegh Javadi-Hesar, a member of the central council of the National Trust Party in Mashhad, Shahryar Ahi, one of the founders of the Union for Democracy in Stockholm, and Saeed Barzin, a sociologist and political analyst in London, will respond to this main question. Javadi-Hesar, with nearly eight months remaining until the twelfth presidential election of the Islamic Republic of Iran, assesses Rouhani's strengths and weaknesses for winning this election. He states that given the fragmentation and division of votes among conservatives or rivals of Rouhani, and considering the dominant discourse in the reformist camp, which firmly supports Rouhani, if the situation remains unchanged and no serious change occurs, Rouhani will be the main candidate of the reformists. Moderates and centrists will also certainly support Rouhani, so currently, based on all existing parameters, Rouhani's situation is better than his rivals, and his strength for victory is greater. Regarding the recent criticisms from the reformist faction towards Rouhani, he will discuss this further. Ahi states that since the beginning of Rouhani's presidency, he has faced criticism and attacks from the hardline conservative faction, and according to reports, he has recently faced criticism from prominent reformist figures like Khatami and Aref. He questions whether, as has been the case in the past three decades of the Islamic Republic, Rouhani is more likely to become a two-term president or if his rule will be limited to just one term. Ahi offers two different perspectives: first, the choice of a second candidate is not very significant unless the first candidate is leaving. There is a high probability that Ayatollah Khamenei may not be present in the next five years, and just as a cleric took over when the previous leader left, this time it could happen again. From this perspective, Rouhani represents stability; he has won elections before, and as you mentioned, it is a tradition in the Islamic Republic for presidents to usually serve two terms. Therefore, if he is not there, questions will arise about what happened. If someone who won the first round of elections is no longer present, it will create divisions. In this regard, a better candidate may emerge. However, on the other hand, the Islamic Republic, which has claimed it must move with two wings, needs to have both sides represented. When one side is absent, how can the two wings coordinate? This dual governance can create significant problems. The very different discourse that one hears from Rouhani or from the leader and revolutionary institutions can be very problematic. If we consider Rouhani's instability, especially in light of his disagreements with the Revolutionary Guards and revolutionary institutions, it could lead to challenges. Barzin, when asked about prominent figures who could challenge Rouhani in the upcoming elections, states that he does not see any serious rivals for Rouhani. He believes that Rouhani's situation is not bad; he has a strong coalition supporting him, including both reformists and moderates. Compared to 2010, he is at least stronger now. However, he notes that reformists have defined themselves more precisely now, which has created some tension. This tension is manageable and should not cause operational difficulties that would allow a candidate to emerge from among the reformists. Additionally, he points out that Rouhani's stance against conservatives remains aggressive and sharp, allowing him to manage both reformists and moderates. However, he emphasizes that Rouhani must appeal to his political charisma and activate his organizational base in both Tehran and the provinces. The main problem he sees is in managing public opinion, which could create issues. Some of the aspirations from 2010 have been moderated due to daily realities and may negatively impact Rouhani's base. He recalls that the most significant aspect of people's behavior in the last election was reconciliation with the ballot box and negotiation with the government. This is where it must be seen whether Rouhani can once again attract public opinion and engage in a negotiation and exchange with the people. Javadi-Hesar discusses the recent criticisms from Khatami and Aref towards Rouhani's government, suggesting that they are concerned about decreased participation in the elections. He believes that Rouhani and his team have been somewhat lenient and ineffective in certain areas, such as changing managers and confronting the authoritarian current that has been causing turmoil against the government. He cites a recent example where the Minister of Culture stated he would currently yield to a specific individual, but Rouhani later acted to neutralize that. Aref's and Khatami's expectations are that the government must implement changes in the current conditions, especially since the new parliament has formed. Aref explicitly stated that it is time for change, and now is not the time for complacency. The concerns of figures like Khatami and Aref stem from the fear of a return of extremist currents to power and the potential for the country to face war, continued sanctions, and deeper crises. Javadi-Hesar also addresses the potential request for the replacement of Justice Minister Mostafa Pourmohammadi, whose name has been associated with a controversial tape related to Ayatollah Montazeri, suggesting that there may be calls for such a change. However, he emphasizes that the general approach is to increase motivation for public participation. Where the realization of people's demands leads to increased participation, it is essential to implement changes. Where lack of change and attention to declining participation occurs, they will raise concerns. There is a perception among some in society that the government has defined a survival strategy for itself and is unwilling to negotiate or engage with authoritarian and totalitarian currents on citizens' rights in order to maintain its position in power. This creates significant concern, potentially leading to decreased participation and ultimately the defeat of the reformist camp and government supporters. Ahi concludes by stating that in the eleventh presidential election, the handling of sanctions and nuclear negotiations became the main issue, and now, the concerns of international relations are paramount alongside economic, political, and cultural worries.