Have You Seen This Film Before?

Independent polling centers in Iran (by the Future Institute and the National Institute for Public Opinion Research in 2002) showed that the majority of the Iranian people and a significant portion of political elites (pragmatists) do not harbor animosity towards the United States and Western countries and desire relations with them. Since the 1990s, Iranians have gradually realized the futility or harm of animosity and hatred towards the United States and the West in general. Public opinion and even the views of a considerable portion of political elites have shifted regarding Western civilization and America. A member of the city council states about some of his colleagues: "Some in the city council are defenders of America." (Fars, November 12, 2015) A member of parliament comments on this issue, saying, "Some officials believe that without relying on foreign investors, nothing can be achieved, and they see themselves as dependent on America and want to gain the right to live peacefully alongside them." (Alireza Zakani, Tabnak, January 31, 2016) Polls from independent polling institutions in the 1990s (before they were shut down) reflected this change. However, Khamenei's perception and that of his appointees in military and security institutions is different, and the cost of this perception is borne by each Iranian citizen. The flood of hateful rhetoric towards the United States from Khamenei and his appointees, as well as the issue of "influence," especially after the nuclear agreement, is a reaction to this change in public opinion. Additionally, Khamenei faces difficulties in maintaining his position atop the list of America's staunch enemies and leading the Islamist movement in the region after the nuclear negotiations and participation in the Syrian talks. The duality in behavior has led to increased hatred spread by him and his loyalists. This hatred is currently being realized in a new project. The ideological and political aspects of Khamenei's enmity with the West are both ideological and political. His ideological enmity (to the extent of portraying all citizens of Western countries as savages) is aimed at constructing an imaginary and delusional identity based on hatred. This has become part of his identity and that of his loyalists since the beginning of Khamenei's political activities. The other aspect of his enmity with the United States and the West is related to managing domestic policy and especially managing factions and the repressive apparatus with this enmity. This has had different names in various periods. The new name for tension reduction is "influence" (in Khamenei's expression) and "sedition" (in the expression of the IRGC commanders): "The fourth sedition is the sedition of influence" (IRGC commander, Fars, November 2, 2015). In Khatami's era, it was referred to as "cultural invasion" and "soft overthrow." This time, the name of tension reduction is "influence" because Khamenei is fearful of the Rouhani government's normalization doctrine in foreign policy, just as he was fearful of Khatami's dialogue doctrine with Western governments. When Khamenei speaks of "influence" or "infiltration," he means "commercial, cultural, scientific, and media communications between non-foreign Iranian citizens and Western citizens and institutions that do not pass through the government and are not approved by military and security bodies." He does not view Western "influence" and "infiltration" as the activities of foreign intelligence forces within the security institutions of the Islamic Republic but rather as intellectual influence: "Domination in the form of old and new colonialism is no longer practical. Now they seek to shape thoughts within active, intelligent, and elite elements of a country in a way that meets their goals." (November 11, 2015) Therefore, preventing influence, in his view, means cultural engineering and limiting the flow of information. Two assumptions of this view are that, firstly, "Iranians" have nothing to offer in these communications and are more receivers than providers, and secondly, that everything coming from the West is toxic. For this reason, Hassan Rouhani's efforts to separate the IRGC's intelligence operations from Khamenei's using the term "playing with the word influence" is a futile endeavor because the IRGC's intelligence does exactly what Khamenei wants. The project to counter influence is Khamenei's project. This project is defined like making a film or a show with a specific plot, and then the scriptwriting and case-making for it are entrusted to the security apparatus. These projects follow a specific pattern and target specific groups. How is the movie "The Influence Project" made? To make Khamenei's statements about influence straightforward, the IRGC's intelligence arrests and summons a group on charges of opening the grounds for influence to find an external witness for Khamenei's theory. These arrests and summons (like previous security projects) target four groups to play the role of "bad guys" in this film against the "unknown soldiers of Imam Zaman": 1. Activists of Iranian and non-Iranian social networks, such as dozens of social media activists (in Qazvin) and an American-Lebanese (Nazar Zaka, introduced in a text published by interrogators in media close to the IRGC as a spy, a term indicating his military status, while the U.S. financial aid organization is neither a military nor an intelligence organization); 2. Business people associated with Western companies, mainly dual nationals, such as the arrest of another Iranian-American (Siamak Namazi, apart from four Iranian-American and American individuals who have previously been detained and not released); closing a KFC store (which had no connection to the American company of the same name) one day after its opening is understandable in this context; 3. Journalists, such as four journalists (to date) and the summoning of about 20 journalists for interrogation (Saham News, November 3, 2015), with accusations of the enemy's influence project in the press (12 members of parliament's warning to the Ministry of Culture, September 21, 2015) and "the infiltrating network of Western governments" (IRGC announcement, November 3, 2015); 4. Political activists, such as members of the central council of dissenting political parties (like Kourosh Zaeim, a member of the central council of the National Front of Iran). To make this show appear popular and appealing to the public, state media, the IRGC, and the Basij, along with the Coordination Council of Islamic Propaganda, have resorted to four methods that have previously followed the same pattern: 1. Directing slogans and advertisements of street demonstrations towards this security project (this time coinciding with November 4); 2. Publishing letters in the name of artists and academics (such as the publication of a letter from 12,000 Basij professors to the heads of the three branches of government, most of whom became faculty members during Ahmadinejad's era through non-competitive scholarships); these letters suddenly increase the number of signatories to several thousand to astonish against the letters of critics that have dozens or hundreds of signatures; 3. Playing the victim role by media that are in the suitcase of security forces (see the publication of the text of Nazar Zaka's interrogation in Kayhan newspaper and Fars news agency). This type of media boycotted the 2015 Press Festival for a form of victimization. 4. Issuing statements from some members of parliament, as if they represent the people. The warning from 12 members of parliament to the Ministry of Culture has this function in addition to case-making, as perceived by the government. The winners and losers The hero of this film is ultimately Khamenei himself, as institutions and political factions within the system become embroiled in these matters (see the clashes between the head of the judiciary and Rouhani and the threats from IRGC officials against doubters about influence). Khamenei ultimately comes to the forefront and ends the disputes as the final arbiter while some opponents and critics are suppressed along the way. In the meantime, the government, which cannot achieve anything, becomes a mere coin. It is Rouhani's turn These practical actions disrupt the process of tension reduction and normalization of Rouhani's government in foreign policy, and Rouhani's reaction to the influence discussion reveals that he knows what dreams they have for him and his government. Based on this concern, he has exposed the role of media close to the IRGC in implementing this project: "From some publications, one can understand who will be arrested tomorrow, where will be shut down, and whose reputation will be tarnished." Khamenei delayed his security programs against the executive branch (which have been implemented identically in previous governments) in the first two years of Rouhani's government due to the need for this government to lift sanctions, but after the nuclear agreement, it is now time for this government to "become dependent on the arrogance." These messages have also been well received by Western companies, and they have become highly hesitant to invest in Iran. These behaviors in the trade sector ultimately led to a government order prohibiting the entry of American goods (which is a kind of joke in the context of globalized business). This is a form of "self-sanctioning." The conflict over... The "Influence Project" show not only reflects the conflict at the level of insiders and spies but also reflects the conflict of interests among parties in Iran, and for this reason, screenwriters can invest in the story's tension. The dispute over relations with America or the type of relationship with that country is not limited to ideological and political dimensions (reducing the political capital of Rouhani's government on the eve of parliamentary elections, securitizing the political atmosphere, and reducing cultural and scientific relations between Iran and the West). This dispute also has an economic aspect. The main discussion among factions (in which Khamenei always sees himself at one end of the factional divide) is which part of society will benefit from oil revenues and businesses in the post-sanction era. Apparently, the interests of the IRGC and the office are not guaranteed in this regard.