Heinonen: The Transition Day May Arrive Much Sooner

Olli Heinonen, a former official of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), is a critic of the JCPOA, as he believes that the approach taken to verify commitments by the agency lacks sufficient technical transparency. He also states that Iran has enough motivation to provide the necessary groundwork for the agency's final report sooner than the eight-year timeline to lift military and missile restrictions. Olli Heinonen is a senior researcher at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University. He previously worked for 27 years at the IAEA in Vienna, at one point serving as Deputy Director General of the agency. Mr. Heinonen, do you think the nuclear agreement between Iran and the P5+1 has established a wrong precedent? This agreement has certainly created a precedent, although the preamble of UN Security Council Resolution 2231 is not a new norm. Some parts of this program and approach are unique in their own right and have not been implemented before, and I think it is not very wise to implement some of the methods agreed upon. For example, if we look at the case of North Korea, I would not use some of these solutions at all for that country. Could you elaborate on the details? Which specific parts concern you? There are several issues. When you are set to verify a program in this manner, you need to define a baseline for it, which means you have awareness or a declaration from the other party, like Iran. This is what we have today, and our history has brought us to this situation. Let me give an example. One example is the agency's task report in monitoring and verifying the production process of rotors for centrifuges in Iran, and one of the things Iran must do in this regard is to register all the rotors it has produced for agency oversight. However, this does not mean that the agency can verify the history of these productions and say exactly how many rotors Iran has produced. The agency only examines what information it receives today, and this approach is very different from what was presented in 2003 during Iran's negotiations with the Europeans. At that time, Iran had agreed to provide its program's background to the agency, and the agency had to verify whether this information about the amount of centrifuge production was accurate or not. Another example is the production of yellowcake through mining or imports from abroad. In this agreement, the agency should not verify the history of these actions and only examines the available figures. If there are other sources, we do not know. The same goes for heavy water production. In my opinion, this is a significant flaw in the agreement that does not address the historical background. Another issue is how to deal with the PMD (Possible Military Dimensions) of Iran's program, where we have seen problems in this regard. The agency presented its report on this in December, stating that it found indications of uranium at Parchin, which means that uranium was present in this facility for some reason, and we do not know if it was due to contamination or if related activities were conducted at Parchin itself. When the agency announced that this PMD file was closed, there was no clear statement about the reason for the presence of these uranium particles. The problem here is that Parchin was not declared as a nuclear facility, so uranium should not have been there. I think this is an approach that either does not address all findings with sufficient technical transparency or does not provide the opportunity for the agency to report on them. Which of these two cases it is, I do not know. You were once the Deputy Director General of the agency. Are you concerned about how the agency is carrying out its duties, or do you see another reason? I do not know. It is a mystery because the agency has taken on a task for which there is very little information about its findings. If we look at the agency's report on the JCPOA, it does not provide any specific statistics. For example, how much uranium Iran has or how much it has produced since the implementation of the JCPOA began. When you compare this with the agency's reports during the initial Geneva agreement or safeguards agreements, those reports had many details, and if a problem like the observation of uranium arose, then the director-general had to explain what Iran's response was, whether the agency was satisfied with this explanation, and whether the issue was closed or not. We no longer see this type of reporting. Does this relate to the closure of the PMD file? In my opinion, this occurred due to the achievement of the JCPOA and not necessarily the closure of the PMD. The agency has taken on a general reporting role. Some countries have objected to this approach. I saw that the US, Canada, Australia, and many others have called for more details. They were somewhat dissatisfied with the way the March report was presented, and in the recent meeting in June, Mr. Amano said that this is all that will be provided. However, I think this does not necessarily align with the agency's duties based on safeguards agreements, and the Board of Governors and the international community are entitled to have more information to independently assess whether Iran is adhering to its commitments under safeguards and also under the JCPOA. So you mean that the agency, which is outside the agreement and has been given a supervisory role, is doing something that one of the P5+1 members, namely the US, has a problem with and is calling for more details? That was my interpretation of the US statement in March. And not just the US, but I also mentioned Canada and Australia. Yes, but I mean the US as one of the parties to the nuclear agreement with Iran. I think even the statements from the European Union in this regard indicated that there is a need for a bit more detail in order to conduct their independent assessments. We must understand that these written reports from the agency are the official record of the implementation of the agreement, and even if the director-general informally tells something to the agency members, it is not the same as a written report or statements presented to the Board of Governors and will not be binding. Mr. Heinonen, a year has passed since the agreement was reached and is being implemented. Recently, Yukiya Amano also said that these actions are in the early stages. My question to you is about the outlook and future of this program. Should we expect Iran to turn this facility and program into a broad program with advanced centrifuges in 10 or 15 years? What we define as a broad program is itself a question. Let’s look at the important milestones ahead. The first milestone will be the 'Transition Day,' at which point the agency must provide its final report on Iran's nuclear program and its nature to the UN Security Council following its monitoring activities. This means that all nuclear materials that the agency has been able to be aware of are used for peaceful purposes, and no signs of military activities in the program have been observed, and the agency concludes that everything is in order. This should occur no later than eight years after the JCPOA is recognized. However, if the agency can cooperate with Iran, this report could be prepared sooner, and I think this will happen sooner. I believe we do not need eight years. When we look at the history of this program, there is a gap between 2005 and January of this year, a period during which Iran significantly reduced its cooperation with the agency and was not obliged to report on some of its activities to the agency. However, Iran can fill these gaps with extensive cooperation with the agency, and it will not take long. If full cooperation occurs and the agency can carry out all necessary activities, I think the agency will need between two to four years to provide a more comprehensive report. There are multiple motivations for Iran to have this conclusion reached as soon as possible because the issuance of this report will lift several sanctions; one related to the production of ballistic missiles and another regarding the arms sales ban to Iran. Iran will make significant efforts to lift these sanctions, and the 'Transition Day' will arrive much sooner than eight years. From that day forward, many things will change. First, Iran's nuclear program will be recognized as a peaceful program. Consequently, it will be much easier to acquire new equipment and produce better centrifuges. Development work can already be done, but at that time, a very different environment will be created for this work. At that time, Iran will also not need to obtain approval before importing dual-use materials and equipment, and will only inform the Security Council in this regard. After the tenth year, the restrictions will also be lifted on the 'Day of Cancellation.' Therefore, after the final conclusion, we will witness a very active enrichment program that is technically suitable, which is not necessarily large since some restrictions will remain. If Iran decides, in the twelfth or thirteenth year, it can obtain enough enriched uranium to produce a nuclear weapon within weeks. Also, agency inspections will decrease, leading to a reduction in inspections and additional access. However, at the same time, Iran must still act based on safeguards and must have also ratified the Additional Protocol by that time. That is itself an issue. Based on the JCPOA, Iran will 'pursue' the ratification of the Additional Protocol in the eighth year, but no deadline has been set for it. Therefore, this depends on how the parliament acts and may take some time. However, based on the JCPOA, this is not a prerequisite for the agency's final assessment. But do you think the ratification of the Additional Protocol and the lifting of US sanctions are not related? They are not. The agency's final assessment will be presented. UN sanctions will be lifted, and how US sanctions will be is still a matter of discussion because Congress is currently reviewing this issue and wants to extend US sanctions, and we do not yet know what the outcome will be since there are various proposals in this regard. But do you think such a decision in Congress will not overshadow the agreement? In a way that, for example, Iran might say that the US has violated its commitment and the sanctions that were supposed to be lifted in the eighth year are now being extended. It depends on which proposal in Congress we are considering. Nothing has been approved yet; there are four or five different approaches, and I do not want to speculate. However, if, for example, this issue depends on the agency's final and overall assessment, I do not see a problem with that. The political problem here will be that this final report will be presented much sooner than expected and what was agreed upon. The last issue I want to discuss with you is the impact of the JCPOA on the phenomenon of nuclear weapons proliferation in the Middle East. A region that has been worked on for years to rid it of weapons without success. Do you think this agreement will encourage regional countries to advance their nuclear ambitions or deter them from this issue? I think we will witness a step-by-step approach in this regard. Because regional countries do not know how this agreement will be implemented in the future, and they will adopt a cautious policy in this regard. What is currently certain is that Iran will be very capable in uranium enrichment, and the latest time will be in 15 years when it will be able to produce the necessary fissile materials for a weapon within a week. There are security concerns in this regard. However, this does not mean that other countries will quickly jump to produce nuclear weapons. I have some disagreements with other experts in this field in Washington. In my opinion, countries are reviving their nuclear programs, including Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the UAE, Jordan, and Turkey, and they have begun updating their information and initial facilities. They are also making investments to obtain fuel, which is not necessarily aimed at uranium enrichment. For example, these countries will acquire these capabilities in the next five years, and then it will be time for sensitive technologies like uranium enrichment, which allows them to do so, and no one can stop them, especially since Iran is doing the same. Therefore, they are currently laying the groundwork for that. For instance, in the case of Saudi Arabia, they have made many agreements regarding nuclear cooperation, not just for purchasing power reactors or using them in water resources, but they have also invested in research. The Saudis have negotiated with South Korea, Russia, and France, as well as the UAE, Egypt, and Jordan, and have finalized some of these agreements. Therefore, there are interesting movements occurring, both regionally and transregionally, in these collaborations. The Saudis are seeking to acquire basic science, and in the next five years, they will be able to have a better picture of Iran's path and assess the political and geopolitical developments in the Middle East, and then decide whether they will need enrichment, which they can obtain five years later.