Historic Meeting Between Trump and Putin; Tehran and Tel Aviv Compete in the 'Great Game'

The historical context of the upcoming meeting, referred to as 'Helsinki-3', between Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin on July 16, can be compared to the negotiations held in September 1990 between George H.W. Bush and the then-leader of the Soviet Union, which allowed the U.S. to act freely in Iraq. This meeting took place shortly after Saddam's forces occupied Kuwait, leading to a U.S. military intervention. In another significant retreat in Helsinki, Boris Yeltsin, the then-President of Russia, allowed the U.S. to expand its influence in Eastern Europe during discussions with Bill Clinton in 1997, resulting in several former Warsaw Pact countries aligning with the West. 'Helsinki-3', which is set to occur without the presence of Trump's and Putin's aides, only with interpreters, could lead to significant structural changes in the geopolitical landscape of the Middle East. Trump arrives at the meeting following a less successful trip to Europe and the NATO summit compared to his previous G7 summit in Canada. His popularity has waned among traditional allies due to ongoing economic warfare against the EU, tariffs on steel, and criticism of Germany's dealings with Russia. In contrast, Putin has successfully leveraged the critical state of transatlantic relations, the U.S. withdrawal from the nuclear deal with Iran, and the competition between Israel and Iran in Syria to overcome the political isolation resulting from the 2014 annexation of Crimea. Unlike previous meetings where power dynamics favored the U.S., the upcoming meeting is expected to occur in a more balanced environment, with Russia potentially holding the upper hand. Russia's goals include ending Western sanctions, recognition of Crimea's annexation, halting NATO military exercises in the Baltic Sea, and solidifying its military presence in Syria and the Mediterranean. While some of these demands may be promised to Putin during Trump's bilateral talks, immediate concessions are unlikely without reciprocal expectations. The lifting of U.S. sanctions against Moscow is not feasible until the results of the Robert Mueller investigation are released. However, after necessary coordination, reducing or even halting NATO naval exercises in the Baltic Sea is possible, as Trump did not dismiss this option just days before his historic meeting with Putin. The largest NATO military exercise occurred the previous month, involving 18,000 troops near Polish waters. Another potential concession from Trump could be the transfer of Syria to Russia, contingent on meeting his expectations from the Helsinki deal. This transfer appears to be facilitated by allowing Assad's forces to reclaim the city of Daraa from U.S.-backed forces. However, this handover will not be unconditional; key conditions include ensuring Israel's security and addressing Jordan's security concerns. Israel strongly demands that Russia end the military presence of the Islamic Republic and Hezbollah in Syria, or else the U.S.-Russia deal in Helsinki may not yield results. Netanyahu's recent visit to Moscow aimed to clarify Tel Aviv's positions and its readiness for broader military operations if Iranian and Hezbollah forces remain in Syria. Prior to Netanyahu's meeting with Putin, Israeli aircraft attacked Iranian-affiliated forces in Deir ez-Zor, symbolically echoing past events. Concurrently, Ali Akbar Velayati's visit to Moscow reflects Tehran's concerns about being sidelined in Syria and suffering significant losses after the Helsinki talks. The special envoy of Iran's Supreme Leader announced a vague promise of $50 billion in oil investment, attempting to portray his mission as successful. Another U.S. demand from Russia is to refrain from receiving and selling Iranian oil while increasing its own crude oil production in coordination with Saudi Arabia to fill the gap left by reduced Iranian oil exports. Trump aims to stabilize fuel prices in the U.S. before the midterm elections in November and present the withdrawal from the nuclear deal with Iran as a success, with Russia playing a potentially significant role in this context. The 'Great Deal' in 'Helsinki-3' will occur between larger powers, while smaller regional powers will have limited roles, primarily sharing the costs. In this situation, the Islamic Republic appears to be the most vulnerable party and the biggest loser.