Houthis of Yemen and Iran; Iran's Strategic Choice and Mistake

Iran's military presence in Iraq - the fact that Iran has a significant military presence in Iraq and is fighting alongside Iraqi military forces and the Kurdistan region against the so-called Islamic State (ISIS) is no longer hidden from anyone nor can it be denied. However, there is no precise information regarding the number of Iranian military personnel in Iraq. Some inflate this figure to as high as thirty thousand troops, while others reduce it to about 1,500. It is likely that Iran has a considerable number of military/security personnel at the expert and advisory level in Iraq, and in addition to short-term training of Iraqi forces and Kurdish Peshmerga, has dispatched thousands of Basij, IRGC, and soldiers to the region, which, when combined with Iraqi forces and Peshmerga, totals around 30,000, which is the maximum figure cited in various sources. The reality is that with a few hundred or a few thousand even the most skilled warriors cannot fight against the 'savage' and highly mobile ISIS, which has superiority in terms of weaponry and local support. In such a war, one cannot enter with optimism and reliance on the charismatic power of commanders. Such an action is equivalent to collective suicide. The type of warfare, for example in the Tikrit region, which aims to liberate the area from ISIS occupation, resembles more the trench warfare of World War I or the Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s; a war that progresses from trench to trench and from bunker to bunker. Air support can be beneficial, but the Americans have halted their air cover due to long-term concerns about regional political-military relations. For this reason, only low-intensity and guerrilla warfare methods, which Qassem Soleimani is reputed for, can be effective at this stage. It is evident that ISIS is not idle, and thus only numerical superiority can determine the fate of the battle and its outcome. Casualties in such wars are higher, and one of the reasons that proves Iran does not have many combat forces in the region is that most of those who have been targeted by ISIS snipers so far have been IRGC and Basij commanders, and fewer ordinary soldiers, who are likely inexperienced, have been killed in battles. The threat of ISIS and Iran's strategic choice - it can be said that the threat of ISIS's presence, expansion, and growth in Iraqi territory, their proximity to Iran's borders, and the possibility of their infiltration into Iran in the medium term are vital and territorial threats that justify Iran's intervention in the war against ISIS. Of course, another factor is Iraq's own request for help from Iran. One could even express regret that Iran has not been able to garner the support and trust of coalition forces against ISIS in its foreign policy, so that current operations could be more fruitful and even enhance Iran's credibility in the international community. The Iranian public still has not come to terms with the issue of Iran's support for Iraq, and people (although they hate ISIS) generally see Iraq as the same Iraq of the 1980s, stained with the blood of Iranian youth. For this reason, the Islamic Republic is trying to change this public perception by stirring religious sentiments and through events like the Ashura march and pilgrimage to places that the common people accept as part of their religious sanctities. As discussed in previous articles regarding Turkey's role or in the article on the new Iraqi government and ISIS, the destruction of ISIS requires a pincer attack and comprehensive siege, and consequently the efforts of regional countries along with the support of great powers. Since cooperation among states in the Middle East is not easily achieved, Iran currently supports the Shiites of Iraq, while the Americans try to encourage the Iraqi government to make decisions that are inclusive and do not create distinctions among ethnic groups and tribes. Meanwhile, Turkey supports the Sunnis of Iraq and until recently was supposed to train them. This competition can be observed in the alignment for the liberation of Mosul (with Sunni support) versus the alignment for the liberation of Tikrit (with Shiite support). In a sense, it can be claimed that Iran's choice to fight alongside Iraqi forces against ISIS is a strategic choice because, in the long term, Iran's territorial integrity and national security and the interests of the Iranian people are threatened by ISIS. However, the Iranian government does not even provide such justification for the fighters sent to Iraq and rather motivates and equips them more with the incentive to defend their Shiite brothers and religious sanctities. In a sense, it can be claimed that Iran's choice to fight alongside Iraqi forces against ISIS is a strategic choice because, in the long term, Iran's territorial integrity and national security and the interests of the Iranian people are threatened by ISIS. However, the Iranian government does not even provide such justification for the fighters sent to Iraq and rather motivates and equips them more with the incentive to defend their Shiite brothers and religious sanctities. Strategic mistake - whatever the outcome of this limited war against ISIS, it has inevitably engaged a significant amount of Iran's military and economic forces. Therefore, a second conflict, say in Yemen, is completely illogical, unwise, and stems from a lack of rational military, political, and economic calculations, in other words, a strategic mistake. History shows that when the United States had the capability to mobilize over three million people and had air superiority at the global level, it had sufficient military capability for two full-scale world wars and one small regional war (the two-and-a-half war strategy). Today, with two small wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, which only involve tens of thousands of troops, it does not feel comfortable and is avoiding any military commitments in other parts of the world, trying to limit its military commitments and recalling its forces. When this strategic calculation is applied to the situation in Iran, a darker picture emerges. While Iraqi mines still claim victims in Iranian territory daily and millions of hectares of our land are littered with unexploded mines, is it prudent, and does Iran have sufficient military and economic capability to engage the war-torn Iranian people in two regional wars, one in Iraq against ISIS and the other in Yemen in support of the Houthis, in pursuit of ideological goals? Of course, Iran denies military support for the Houthis of Yemen. While the Houthis have currently approached the gates of the southern city of Aden and have captured the airbase near Aden, they intend to prevent the division of Yemen into two parts (which existed until 1989) by capturing the southern cities and to take Yemen under their control as a unified entity. To what extent the Houthis will be able to bring such an ideal closer to reality is a matter of much debate, but it seems unlikely that this capability will be provided by the strength of a few discontented young Houthis or that it will be sustainable in the long term. Internal opponents of the Houthis cannot be underestimated either. First of all, it should be noted that the Yemeni government and its president, Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi, are still present in the southern regions. Although Mansur Hadi is constantly changing locations and fleeing from one place to another, having last been forced to leave Aden as well, his supporting forces still hope that neighboring Arab countries will support him and maintain him as the legitimate president of Yemen. In fact, foreign governments also support Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi as the legitimate Yemeni government, and Saudi Arabia's recent reaction regarding taking action if a peaceful solution is not reached was in response to Mansur Hadi's foreign minister's request for help. Of course, the former president, Ali Abdullah Saleh, still has both domestic and foreign bases. The Houthis control a large part of Yemen's territory. While the United Nations does not recognize them as an official government, they have somehow garnered Iranian support and at least established a regular daily air communication line with Iran, which in such circumstances is considered strategic support. However, the situation is much more complex than the confrontation of a legitimate government with the Houthi rebels. The Houthis control a large part of Yemen's territory. While the United Nations does not recognize them as an official government, they have somehow garnered Iranian support and at least established a regular daily air communication line with Iran, which in such circumstances is considered strategic support. Iran denies military relations and support for the Houthis but has provided assistance to victims and injured from ISIS bombings in Yemen, transferring more than fifty of them for treatment to hospitals in Tehran. However, when the air communication agreement was signed, the Houthis had not yet been attacked by ISIS and had no wounded or injured; therefore, this agreement cannot be considered a preemptive measure. On the other hand, American and British forces were present in Yemen until recently as part of the anti-terrorism program. The main activity of these forces has been to combat al-Qaeda and ISIS. Now these forces have left Yemen, but the White House has announced that it still retains the capability to militarily confront insecurity in Yemen. Given that the main structure of American and British forces for counter-terrorism has mainly relied on the use of drones, it seems unlikely that Washington intends to intervene militarily. Yemen has only two neighboring Arab countries: Oman and Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia has traditionally pursued significant security interests in Yemen due to its proximity and has played an important role in Yemen's political events in the past. Currently, Saudi Arabia has not yet played its role in Yemen. With the recent internal changes in Saudi Arabia, it is likely that this country is still weighing its options in Yemen or is waiting for internal conditions in Yemen to stabilize. At the same time, Saudi Arabia is the only country that has threatened to take action if peace is not established. Omanis do not seem to play an active role in Yemen's events. When we look at all these factors, Iran's intervention in Yemen appears more meaningless and futile. Such intervention directly embroils Iran with Saudi Arabia and provokes Saudi supporters against Iran. We saw that in the case of negotiations with Iran, the U.S. Secretary of State spoke repeatedly with them and other Arab countries to convince them of Iran's lack of political will to produce a nuclear bomb. Regarding Iran's potential intervention in Yemen, such support will certainly not be forthcoming, and moreover, due to the complex currents such as al-Qaeda and international terrorism, both the U.S. and the U.K. (regardless of the inclinations of domestic parties) will view Iran's entry as a step towards the strategic expansion of the 'Shia Crescent' and will counter it. Iran's support for the Houthis of Yemen also exacerbates the hostility of the so-called Islamic State (ISIS), and they will continue to confront Iran and its proxies wherever they can. Naturally, all these factors will not be ineffective in Iran's military interactions alongside Iraq. Anti-Shiite sentiments among Sunnis and the narrative of Arab versus non-Arab have never been forgotten in the region, and these factors may act against Iran among the Arab states of the Persian Gulf and even within Iraq. Iran's support for the Houthis of Yemen also exacerbates the hostility of the so-called Islamic State (ISIS), and they will continue to confront Iran and its proxies wherever they can. Naturally, all these factors will not be ineffective in Iran's military interactions alongside Iraq. Anti-Shiite sentiments among Sunnis and the narrative of Arab versus non-Arab have never been forgotten in the region, and these factors may act against Iran among the Arab states of the Persian Gulf and even within Iraq. This writing does not mean support for Iran's military intervention in Iraq, although the author believes that Iran could have made better political use of such an action and benefited as a friend of the international system. However, the fear of closeness to the West prevented the understanding of the moment and the appropriate method, and now even support for Iraq, whether inside Iraq and Kurdistan or within the framework of the international system, faces skepticism regarding Iran's long-term goals. The geopolitical significance of Yemen - Yemen's position at the entrance to Bab el-Mandeb and the Red Sea is a strategic and vital position. The access of al-Qaeda or elements of the Islamic State to this area would pose an endless threat to international security. For great global powers, Iran's entry and influence in this region is unacceptable and undesirable. Other geographical and strategic factors are also against Iran. Without having a common border with Yemen, any maritime traffic between Iran and Yemen must pass through the waters of the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean. Of course, it seems unlikely that Oman would allow Iran to pass through its coastal waters for military purposes. Therefore, Iran's passage must occur through international waters controlled by the U.S. and in compliance with the coastal countries' laws. At the same time, the same rule applies to air communications. If it is a military flight, it is likely that the southern Gulf Arab countries will not allow Iran to use their airspace, and consequently, flights must also take place over international waters. Another complexity in this matter is the ongoing conflict between the Houthis and the supporters of Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi on one side and Ali Abdullah Saleh on the other.