How Achievable is the Nuclear Agreement?

Once again, representatives from Iran and the 1+5 countries gathered in Geneva to continue negotiations regarding Iran's nuclear file. Discussions between Ali Akbar Salehi, the head of Iran's Atomic Energy Organization, and his American counterpart Ernest Moniz, as well as another meeting between Mohammad Javad Zarif and John Kerry, the foreign ministers of Iran and the U.S., are on the agenda, which will conclude on Monday. According to observers, the main demands of Iran include the reduction of oil sanctions, the lifting of SWIFT sanctions or interbank transactions, and access to frozen assets abroad, in exchange for the 1+5's insistence on significantly reducing the number of centrifuges to ensure that even if Iran decides to enrich uranium for nuclear weapons, it would take at least a year. Iran rejects the West's accusation that it is secretly pursuing nuclear weapons. On the other hand, a timeline has been announced to reduce disagreements, with two deadlines for reaching a comprehensive agreement: one by the end of March, coinciding with the upcoming Nowruz, and the other in four and a half months during the next summer. In this week's program, three experts on Iran's international relations are examining the prospects of the results of this round of negotiations between Iran and the U.S., Britain, France, Germany, China, and Russia in Geneva. Davood Hermidas Bavand, a senior professor of international relations in Tehran; Mohsen Milani, a professor of international relations and director of the Center for Strategic and Diplomatic Studies at the University of South Florida in Tampa, USA; and Alireza Namvar Haghighi, a history lecturer at the University of Toronto. In an interview with Mosaddegh Katouzian, they discuss the fate of the nuclear negotiations. Bavand: Analysts are considering the results of the new round of nuclear negotiations between Iran and the 1+5 in Geneva. What interesting points are there regarding the nuclear file in Iran? Davood Hermidas Bavand: Within Iran, the national interests and the intentions of President Rouhani's government are to continue constructive dialogues that lead to acceptable outcomes. In any case, under the current circumstances, both Iran's interests and those of the Obama administration, particularly, and perhaps others, are relatively aligned towards a comprehensive agreement. Now, in every society, there are groups that may think based on factional interests and may have differing views. However, given the current conditions and necessities, Iran's national interests require that these constructive negotiations continue, and the expectation and hope are that, as I mentioned, they will lead to an acceptable agreement. Milani: What do you think? What questions or responses do observers in the U.S. raise ahead of this round of negotiations? Mohsen Milani: Observers in the U.S. encompass a wide segment of society, and I really cannot speak about what they want. However, it seems that the desired agreement for the Obama administration is to keep the number of centrifuges below 4,000, so that if Iran ever decides to build a bomb, it would take a year, allowing Western countries to either launch a military attack on Iran or find a way to prevent it. Gradually, sanctions would then be lifted step by step, and a very serious monitoring system would be established for Iran's nuclear program. This is, of course, the Obama administration's desire. Opponents of Mr. Obama believe that Iran should not have even a single centrifuge and are pressuring to somehow derail these negotiations so that if Iran wants to enter negotiations later, it will do so from a much weaker position. I hope this group fails and that these negotiations reach a satisfactory conclusion. Namvar Haghighi: What other points of discussion are there in this round of negotiations in Geneva that you can add to what Mr. Milani and Bavand said? Alireza Namvar Haghighi: The main issue is that there is a disagreement regarding how the Americans will act concerning sanctions. Within Iran's power bloc, there is a consensus to resolve the nuclear issue. However, unfortunately, despite the Geneva agreement being intended to be a quid pro quo, the concessions made to Iran regarding shipping, automotive, and aviation industries, or the sale of petrochemical products and gold have not led to necessary cooperation from the companies Iran was dealing with, as they stated that since your sanctions have not been suspended or resolved, they have not cooperated. This has led the Iranian political system to feel that the Americans are not seriously building trust. Serious discussions are currently taking place within Iran's power bloc regarding what actions to take and what problems have arisen from this. Therefore, to summarize, the manner of sanctions, particularly the SWIFT issue and the sale of Iranian oil, is key. If the Americans give the green light regarding the SWIFT banking issue and oil sales, it would build trust for the Iranian government. At the same time, it shows that the American project is not one of regime change. Because these discussions have taken shape within the power structure. It remains to be seen what concessions the Americans will make regarding sanctions. Otherwise, in my opinion, regarding the number of centrifuges, as Dr. Milani mentioned, Iran was not satisfied with going below six last time. They are willing to concede, but sanctions are key. Bavand: How can the issues that Mr. Haghighi and Mr. Milani mentioned be resolved to reach an agreement? Davood Hermidas Bavand: Regarding the requests made from Iran about centrifuges, they have come closer to some understandings regarding the amount. Concerning uranium enrichment, everyone is aware that Iran has accepted even up to 5 percent and so forth. Therefore, the main issue returns to lifting sanctions. There should be a fair alignment and coordination in what Iran has accepted, and in return, the sanctions should also be lifted accordingly. However, as mentioned, some sanctions have complexities that likely take longer and are not solely in the hands of the Obama administration, especially some congressional sanctions that require Congress to make decisions, and therefore, the Obama administration itself will likely face challenges. These are realities that are predictable. However, if they reach some form of agreement, it could have a positive reflection in other arenas and may even influence congressional decision-making. Moreover, as previously mentioned, other 1+5 member countries, especially the European Union, do not have the same problems that exist in the U.S. Congress or the lobbying of Israel. Additionally, their economic interests also necessitate that this issue be resolved satisfactorily. They can also have a marginal influence on decision-making in U.S. circles, particularly Congress. If the European Union adopts a policy that differs somewhat from Congress, it could impact the political atmosphere in the U.S., especially in Congress, despite the strong lobbies that exist. In any case, I believe a comprehensive agreement could have positive effects in moderating the resolution of other issues mentioned. Milani: What do you think about the factors mentioned? That is, the sanctions that Iran does not accept on one side and then the role of Europe and the congressional pressure on the Obama administration? Mohsen Milani: I believe that until today, Iran has made very serious concessions to the 1+5 countries. In fact, it has given much more than it has received. If the U.S. Congress and forces in the region succeed in derailing the negotiations, it will be troublesome for everyone. However, the important issue is that if the U.S. government tries to make a deal with Iran, I don't think other countries like Israel or Saudi Arabia and Congress can prevent it. They can create some trouble, but they cannot stop Mr. Obama. In my opinion, the problem is not in Tehran. I believe Tehran has given a lot of concessions. The problem today is in Washington; there are those in Congress pressuring Mr. Obama to extract more concessions, and there are also some trying to ensure that even if this agreement is reached, they can involve Congress to create future troubles. However, overall, I believe that the major European countries, the three that are part of the 1+5, along with the U.S., and to some extent the Russians and Chinese, have concluded that today is the best opportunity to reach this agreement. As I have mentioned several times before, I remain optimistic that these negotiations will reach a positive outcome. Because, as Mr. Bavand stated, these negotiations are not just about Iran's nuclear issue. If these negotiations reach a positive conclusion, it could assist in resolving many other important political issues related to Iran's foreign policy. I must ask you this question, Mr. Milani, if you allow me, does the concern about nuclear armament seem justified to you in a situation where Iran has had years of covert activities in its nuclear program? Mohsen Milani: In my opinion, the inspection regime they have for Iran should be sufficient to guarantee those who think Iran is building a bomb that this will not happen. The truth is that Iran today has the knowledge to build a bomb. You cannot bomb knowledge. I believe that intelligence agencies in the U.S. and the West have come to the conclusion that if Iran decides to build a bomb, it can do so. However, considering the interventions of the International Atomic Energy Agency in Iran and the fact that throughout the history of the NPT, no country has had as much oversight regarding its nuclear program as Iran, I believe those who talk so much about the fear of Iran obtaining a bomb have other issues with the Islamic Republic. The nuclear issue may be important to them, but they have other concerns as well. I think there are some who still want to change the Iranian regime. And because they think that this idea no longer has a market, they are trying to pressure Iran on the nuclear front to ensure that these negotiations do not succeed so that later the U.S. is forced to either contain Iran or go to war, which they believe ultimately leads to regime change. If you look at the thirty-five years since the revolution, you should ask yourself where all those who previously talked about regime change in the U.S. are now. They have not disappeared. These are the same forces that previously spoke of regime change, failed, and now are trying to sabotage the negotiations to lead them to failure. And I hope they fail. Namvar Haghighi: Is the likelihood of a comprehensive agreement greater simultaneously or a two-stage agreement? My question is because the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran emphasized an agreement in one stage and not in several stages (two stages or more). Alireza Namvar Haghighi: It was always intended to be this way. That is, the deal should be quid pro quo. It should be clear what the Americans will do in exchange for every action Iran takes. A comprehensive agreement means just that. It should be clear how the problem will be resolved. Its stages should not be too interpretable. In any case, this was a problem that arose. As Dr. Milani said, the Iranians complied with all matters, but the Americans' concessions were merely on paper. In practice, Iran received nothing. Therefore, the issue will be that it will be specified step by step what actions Iran takes and what actions the Americans and Western powers will take in return. The manner of resolving the issue in the Security Council, how the issue will be resolved concerning sanctions, and the timing of sanctions should have a guiding table. This does not mean that there will be an agreement that all sanctions will be lifted from tomorrow. I doubt that this is intended. It should be specified in terms of timing what actions they will take in return for what actions. The current problem lies in this; it is more about the U.S. wanting to extend the timeline while Iran wants to shorten it. The U.S. believes that the issue of building trust takes five years, which is what the Agency can determine and confirm regarding the peaceful nuclear program. The Americans consider it to be between ten to twelve years. However, from what I gather, within the Iranian power bloc, an important indicator is that, as Dr. Milani said, the goal of this project is not regime change; their goal is negotiation and peace. The issue of SWIFT and the sanctions on Iranian oil sales is crucial. I would like to add to Mr. Milani's comments that no country that has been a member of the Agency and has been part of the NPT has been able to build a bomb. All those who built bombs either were not members, were not invited, or withdrew from the treaty and built the bomb. Currently, Iran, as Dr. Milani said, historically and according to international norms regarding countries that have built bombs, has practically zero capability in this regard. Transforming knowledge into a bomb takes a long time, like Japan. Japan currently has the knowledge to build a bomb, but it does not do so. Bavand: The likelihood of a nuclear agreement being reached by the end of March or the end of this year's Nowruz is...