How Can the U.S. Manage Rising Tensions in the Middle East?

In Farvardin 1403, the Middle East, which witnessed the war between Israel and Gaza, became embroiled in another serious crisis. Following Israel's attack on the Iranian consulate building in Damascus and the killing of a senior commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps in this attack, the Iranian government decided to respond directly to Israel. This response was given by firing dozens of cruise and ballistic missiles as well as sending dozens of drones towards Israel, but the country, with the cooperation of its Western allies, the United States and Britain, as well as assistance from Jordan, managed to repel this attack. After a few days, Israel targeted Iran's air defense system in Isfahan in response to this attack, although officials of the Islamic Republic tried to cover up this attack. Following this back-and-forth between the two countries, observers now believe that the 'shadow war' between Iran and Israel, which has been ongoing for years, has entered a new phase, and the risk of full-scale conflict between the two countries is now under the microscope of analysts. The magazine 'Foreign Affairs' recently published an article by Vali Nasr, a professor of Middle Eastern studies and international relations at Johns Hopkins University, which states that despite the fact that Iran and Israel have currently stepped back from full-scale war, 'as long as both sides perceive each other as a lethal threat that can only be confronted militarily, conflict in the future is inevitable.' For this reason, Nasr advises U.S. policymakers to adopt a 'diplomatic strategy' and that 'the dangerous security conditions in the region necessitate that Washington understands its potential for statecraft.' Vali Nasr has answered questions from Radio Farda about the current situation in the Middle East, the rising tensions between Iran and Israel, and the position of the Arab countries in the midst of this crisis. Nasr has been the head of the International Studies Department at Johns Hopkins University for seven years and served as a senior advisor to the U.S. Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan from 2009 to 2011. He has written numerous books and articles on politics in the Middle East and Iran. Mr. Nasr, I want to start this conversation from your recent article. In the introduction and conclusion of this article, you consider it the responsibility of the U.S. to reach a diplomatic strategy to reduce tensions between Iran and Israel and emphasize diplomacy. Is there such a will in Washington in the current situation? Vali Nasr's short answer to this question is affirmative. You see, it has not always been the case that the U.S. believed in a diplomatic solution or thought such a solution would be possible, but it has come to the conclusion that it is absolutely necessary to think of a diplomatic strategy to prevent war. As a result, whenever it has felt that war is very close and does not desire it, it has turned to diplomacy. For example, seven months before October 7, it decided that it did not want to face a full-scale confrontation with Iran, it decided to create some sort of ceasefire in the escalating tensions and met with Iran in Oman, and they concluded that if Iran does not expand its nuclear program or attack American forces in the region, Washington would allow Iran to sell oil. This was a kind of diplomatic solution with Iran to prevent further tensions. But should the parties reach such a stage to think about a diplomatic solution? Because you are talking about seven months before the October 7 attack. Now, seven months after that stage, we have reached a point where in the public sphere of Iran, politicians or decision-makers are talking about the necessity of building nuclear weapons. You see, conditions have changed, and a new diplomatic strategy needs to be prepared. Oman was not a huge diplomatic breakthrough that created a new order in the relations between the two sides. It was a diplomatic strategy to prevent a very close crisis. A crisis that the United States did not want to solve militarily. Similarly, after October 7, when it was expected that Israel and Hezbollah might engage in a war, the U.S. moved its aircraft carriers to the Mediterranean to prevent widespread rocket attacks from Hezbollah towards Israel. But at the same time, it indirectly conducted talks with Hezbollah through special envoy Amos Hochstein to prevent further escalation. The situation between Iran and Israel is such that if the U.S. does not find a diplomatic strategy, we will return to the situation of a few weeks ago. I emphasize that the approach was that as long as there was no way to talk to Hezbollah, we would be engaged in a war, and the U.S. did not want to be involved in a war. During this recent conflict between Iran and Israel, I saw that the U.S. spoke with Iran through intermediaries to not carry out a major attack and then engaged in talks with Israel to prevent a situation that seemed really dangerous; a situation that would also involve the U.S. So far, the U.S. has tactically used diplomacy to prevent a situation that could lead to war and has been somewhat successful. I say tactically because it has prevented an immediate crisis but has not been able to change the situation in the region. I now think that the situation between Iran and Israel is such that if the U.S. does not find a diplomatic strategy, we will return to the situation of a few weeks ago. You wrote in your article that 'the rules of the shadow war between Iran and Israel have changed, and the situation is such that if one side attacks, the other will respond directly from now on.' In such a situation, with such a change, what options does the United States have? The United States must negotiate indirectly with Iran and directly with Israel around a series of rules; regarding what each side considers as provocations that increase tensions and explore the possibility of delineating a series of red lines. For example, the Iranians have clearly stated that they will not tolerate attacks on their territory or the assassination of their senior commanders. Israel also has specific lines regarding what Iran can or cannot do in Lebanon and Syria. Right now, these messages are being conveyed to each other through rockets and fighter jets. One way to prevent such a situation is to reach a common understanding on both sides. There is also a precedent. For example, from the 2006 war until this October 7, there was a kind of understanding between Israel and Hezbollah about what line they would not cross. This does not mean that issues between the two sides were resolved, but it created an atmosphere that prevented full-scale war. But Mr. Nasr, we are talking at a time when the U.S. is heavily involved in negotiations to at least temporarily stop the war in Gaza. For weeks and perhaps months, these intense negotiations in Qatar and Egypt have been ongoing and have not yielded results. How do you think it can advance this difficult task between Iran and Israel? In my opinion, the challenge in Gaza is different from what is happening in the rules of the game between Iran and Israel; because when a war is ongoing, it requires a different kind of negotiations to prevent what is happening between these two countries from turning into a full-scale war. Iran and Israel have interests that they do not want to enter into a real hot war at this stage. I think Iran and Israel have interests that they do not want to enter into a real hot war at this stage. Moreover, the U.S. has come very close to a ceasefire in Gaza and, of course, managed to establish a temporary ceasefire in the early stages of the war. I believe that if the U.S. was really determined to establish a ceasefire in Gaza, it could have done so. Of course, there is another very important difference. The U.S. does not have to deploy its military force in Gaza and accept a very high risk, but a war between Iran and Israel would directly involve the United States. Perhaps for this reason, it has taken seven months for Joe Biden to act more seriously and warn Israel not to enter Rafah. But regarding Iran, the U.S. cannot wait seven months to get involved. You are talking about the Middle East. This situation does not happen in a vacuum. My question is, do you think this situation between Iran and Israel has changed the status and dynamics of this region or not? We can say that nothing has changed, and at the same time, a significant change has occurred. This region, especially the Gulf countries, although they are keen to focus on economic development, trade, and relations with the U.S. and China, have realized that economic issues do not overshadow everything and that this region remains vulnerable due to unresolved geopolitical problems. For example, after October 7, what the Houthis did with their interference in maritime trade in the Red Sea. Meanwhile, the mood in the streets of these Arab countries, also in Egypt or Jordan, has changed. The talk of the populations of these countries has shifted from economic prosperity to Gaza. Governments, in any case, have to keep their people on board. They may still cling to the situation before October 7, but the people in these countries are going a different way, and this may become indefensible in the long term. Now the situation in Iran has also given more urgency to the issue; because how can one think about economic development and major projects when missiles are flying overhead and airports may be closed? This is not a situation that large American, European, or Chinese companies would be interested in investing in. This region is not immune to what the conflict between Iran and Israel could entail, and these countries would also be losers in the event of a full-scale war. I think a change has occurred in this approach where Arab countries are joining the U.S. and Israel to form a coalition against Iran, because this would be a project to defend Israel rather than a project to defend themselves. However, in recent weeks and months, this issue has actually been very much on Washington's mind to achieve normalization of relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel. I mention this to return to the initial point about the need to prepare a diplomatic strategy. Yes, there has been a focus, but I think it is far from reality. Given what is happening in Gaza or the atmosphere in Israel itself, the Israeli government is not only thinking about ending the war but cannot accept the existence of a Palestinian state... Now let’s think that Saudi Arabia is normalizing relations with Israel; it is like thinking that Saudi Arabia has no population and that there are no Arab people who have seen the killing of about 40,000 Palestinians, including 15,000 children, in these months. But Mr. Nasr, we are not talking about a democratic government that cares about the people's vote... Yes, but even dictatorships have to gauge public opinion. You see, it is good that Biden, Saudi Arabia, and Israel have this idea on the table to think about solutions while addressing the biggest issue among them, which is a Palestinian state. That is why the focus is there. But I do not think this is possible. This region is not immune to what the conflict between Iran and Israel could entail, and these countries would also be losers in the event of a full-scale war. Although before October 7, recognition by Saudi Arabia of Israel was very tempting, today this action does not solve Israel's security problems and deterrence. Moreover, I do not think Israel is in a position to give the minimum that Saudi Arabia wants; that is, to end the war in Gaza, not to enter Rafah, and also to take meaningful actions to recognize a Palestinian state. For this reason, I do not see this as a solution. The United States can achieve this normalization goal, but this cannot be the starting point. The starting point for this should be ending the war in Gaza, recognizing a Palestinian state, and addressing the situation between Hezbollah, Iran, and Israel to at least reach a stable situation among them; then you can say that now that you have created stability regarding these security issues, you can provide enough space for Israel and Saudi Arabia to move towards normalization. In Israel's view, normalization with Saudi Arabia creates a coalition against Iran, and I do not think this is something that Saudi Arabia wants; to become the frontline in confrontation with Iran. Yes, they have concerns about Iran, but Saudi Arabia's current theory is that the best way to manage this situation is to establish relations with Iran, and I think this is something that has changed in this region. That Riyadh has adopted a coexistence with Tehran while maximizing competition.