How Can We Understand the 60 Percent Who Said 'No' to the Elections?

More than 60 percent of Iranian citizens did not participate in the first round of the presidential elections, despite repeated calls from Ayatollah Khamenei, the leader of the Islamic Republic, and government propaganda for widespread citizen participation. The first round of elections was extended to a second round with a participation rate of 40 percent, while the votes of some participants were cast for a candidate supported by the reformist electoral campaign, which was defined in opposition to the thoughts of the leader of the Islamic Republic. This position has led to reactions from observers and political activists opposed to participation in the elections. Some, like Abolfazl Ghadiani, a founding member of the Mojahedin of the Islamic Revolution Organization and a critic of Ayatollah Khamenei, welcomed this social consensus and acceptance of those who voted for the reformist candidate, stating on the Zeyton website that the hands of the election engineers and the regime's propaganda for demonstrating legitimacy were tied by this event. Farhad Meythami, a former political prisoner, emphasized the issue of civil resistance and the mechanism of change by passing through what he termed the apparent difference between voting and not voting, concluding that the ultimate result impacts civil resistance. In the initial discussion, Mehrdad Mirdadamadi, a journalist from Radio Farda, addressed the social consensus arising from citizens' non-participation in the elections, suggesting that it may now be time to ask what approach and behavior the ruling authority and its factions will take towards this phenomenon. The opposition, which until now may have been speaking to an unknown group of dissidents, must now recognize that over 60 percent of Iranian voters are their audience and understand their nature, needs, and demands. In this discussion, Eli Kharsandfar, a political sociology graduate from Turkey, interpreted citizens' non-participation as what she calls an 'election movement,' believing that the identity that manifested itself in the form of non-participation could not have been created overnight and is a product of the 1401 movement. She views the approval of Masoud Pezeshkian, the reformist candidate, by the Guardian Council as a 'warning' received by the government from society. Kharsandfar describes this as a reason for the government's 'lack of legitimacy' in the eyes of citizens and a product of the pressure of what she calls 'social order to political order.' Mohammad Mohibi, a political science lecturer at Islamic Azad University in Tehran, considers the low participation of citizens in the presidential elections to be a continuation of a trend that began in 1396 with protests that emerged that year. This political expert believes that the Islamic Republic seeks political acceptance from the ballot box rather than political legitimacy, stating that this non-participation in the elections does not necessarily lead to consensus among the opposition groups of the Islamic Republic. Kharsandfar considers the issue of legitimacy important for the Islamic Republic and believes that the process of citizens not voting leads to a legitimacy crisis, which in turn brings about a crisis of efficiency for the Islamic Republic. This sociologist argues that the legitimacy crisis and efficiency of the Islamic Republic strengthen the discourse of social order. Mohibi states that the consensus created by the low participation of citizens will only benefit protest movements in Iran when cohesion among the opposition to the Islamic Republic is established and avoids what he calls 'wishful thinking and fantasy.' Kharsandfar also refers to the organization of the opposition in the protests of 1401, believing that the political force resulting from citizens' non-participation in the elections should focus on what this political sociologist describes as producing discourse for organizing civil associations. Mohibi states that the opposition to the Islamic Republic remains stuck in past stereotypes, while the social alignments and discourses have changed. He believes this issue should be pursued by opposition groups and researchers and transformed into a new discourse. He questions why, now that the Islamic Republic does not change its approach, the opponents of the regime insist on the stereotypes of the past 45 years.