How Did Information on Iran's 'Suit-Wearing Guerrillas' Reach the U.S.?

Ali Larijani, the Speaker of the Iranian Parliament, had asked Iranian diplomats to be 'suit-wearing guerrillas,' a phrase borrowed from Richard Nephew, a former sanctions expert at the U.S. State Department. Nephew referred to his colleagues working to impose sanctions on Iran as 'suit-wearing guerrillas,' and Larijani was referring to those trying to lift and circumvent these sanctions. Ahmad Amirabadi, a representative from Qom and a member of the Parliament's leadership, now states that information on 'all individuals and entities active in circumventing previous sanctions' has reached the U.S., and Washington has included them in a new sanctions list. A member of the Stability Front raised the question of 'where this information' came from and called for security institutions of the Islamic Republic to investigate the matter. In response, Parviz Ismaili, the Deputy for Communications and Information of the President, tweeted: 'Zarif tweeted yesterday citing Sanchi and Tat that the recent sanctions list is blind and the U.S. is isolated. However, Amirabadi, a member of the Parliament's leadership, later tweeted that this list is accurate! It is commendable that he sought to provide false codes to Pompeo and Mnuchin.' Jalal Mirzaei, a representative from Ilam, also called these statements 'divisive' and stated that 'they do not help in countering sanctions.' He called for anyone with 'evidence to provide it to the security or judicial authorities.' But how does the U.S. obtain information about companies and individuals involved in circumventing Iran's sanctions? Hamid Hosseini, the Secretary of the Union of Oil Product Exporters and brother of a former Minister of Culture, stated in an interview that part of the information regarding Iran's oil sales was leaked through 'shipping companies that transported Iranian oil.' According to Hosseini, some foreign individuals who expressed readiness to buy Iranian oil were 'sent by the U.S. and Israel to discover the mechanism of Iran's oil sales.' He also mentioned that sometimes competition among companies buying Iranian oil led to the disclosure of this information, with companies that lost in the process revealing their competitors' information. Meanwhile, part of this information may have been provided to the U.S. by Israel. The Israeli newspaper Haaretz, in its investigations regarding the Israeli private intelligence company Black Cube, concluded that assets, banks, companies, and individuals that could be labeled as 'Iran collaborators' were collected by this company, which is referred to as a 'private Mossad.' The Bank Muscat in the Sultanate of Oman, where Iran's bank account balance was part of the money from Iranian oil sales, was one of the main targets of Black Cube. On the other hand, Hossein Alaei, a former commander of the Revolutionary Guards, had previously stated that the U.S. and Israel have more intelligence access than in the past and have 'established an intelligence organization within Iran.' In recent years, reports have also emerged about the arrest of some Iranian security officials on charges of espionage for Israel. For instance, Reza Alijani, a national-religious activist, stated in an interview with Radio Farda that two officials at the Israel desk in the Ministry of Intelligence and the Revolutionary Guards' Intelligence Organization were arrested and executed on charges of espionage for Israel. Reza Zarrab was also presumably one of the information sources regarding how to circumvent Iran's sanctions, to the extent that Mohammad Javad Zarif stated: 'The U.S. has identified our lifelines, and even if it hadn't identified them sufficiently, they were identified with the arrest of Zarrab and Sadr Hashemi.' Meanwhile, some officials of the Islamic Republic or individuals close to these officials who leave or flee the country for any reason may have provided information to U.S. officials. Furthermore, media affiliated with the Revolutionary Guards and security institutions have previously reported on individuals who, according to them, played a role in circumventing U.S. sanctions but fled and failed to fulfill their commitments despite receiving money. Ahmad Amirabadi's statements may also be an attempt to question the members of Iran's nuclear negotiation team, especially when members of the Stability Front insist on their claims about the espionage of Abdolrasoul Dori Esfahani despite the Ministry of Intelligence's denial. At the request of Ali Larijani, the Speaker of the Iranian Parliament, Richard Nephew's book 'The Art of Sanctions' was translated by the Research Center of the Iranian Parliament, and some Iranian officials have read it and referenced it in their speeches. Perhaps Larijani's aim was to familiarize these officials with the U.S. tactics to confront them. However, it seems that Iranian officials are still in shock from the sanctions and are engaged in disputes over who is to blame for the leak of information regarding those circumventing the sanctions.