How Do Opponents of the JCPOA Operate in Iran?

Why did the opponents of the nuclear agreement in Iran oppose it, and what approach did they take in response? What impact has the JCPOA had on Iran's domestic politics? Reza Alijani shares his views on this with Radio Farda. Reza Alijani is a political activist and journalist, a member of the National Religious Activists Council. He was the editor of the banned publication Iran Farda and was briefly detained after the 2009 presidential elections. Since 2011, he has been residing in Paris, France. When you look at Iran's domestic politics, do you see a distinction between pre- and post-JCPOA? Yes, to a large extent, Iran's situation can be differentiated before and after the JCPOA. Both the international image of Iran has changed compared to the past eight years, and its economic conditions have improved somewhat, as well as the political landscape within the government. In terms of international image, it is clear that Iran has transitioned from a confrontational rhetoric to a diplomatic one, led by Mr. Zarif. Economically, Iran, which was heading towards war at the end of the sanctions, can now sell oil. Insurance conditions for imports and trade have become easier. Some banking exchanges have been facilitated. Trade and imports have flourished in Iran. It cannot be said that the government has become economically stronger because investment is not taking place. Exiting recession is difficult. However, it can be said that it has become wealthier. It can pay its overdue debts more freely, pay subsidies, and invest a little. In domestic politics, it can be said that an invisible schism has occurred within the conservative faction. In the past, during the nuclear negotiations, the Supreme Leader's office and the government were on a common path. Now, the government sees the issue as a process; Mr. Rouhani thought it was a way to reform relations with the world, while the Supreme Leader's office viewed it as a specific point, wanting only the nuclear negotiations to conclude and the sanctions file to be closed. With what Mr. Rouhani later said about JCPOA 2, the Supreme Leader's office had never agreed from the beginning. While Mr. Rouhani said we cannot speak with the same rhetoric we used before the JCPOA. In any case, the tracks of these two trains have diverged, and we see that part of the conservative faction remained on Rouhani's train and the government, even though they want to hide themselves. Because they are closer to the government's rhetoric in foreign policy and economics than to the confrontational rhetoric of Mr. Khamenei. However, in domestic and cultural issues, they may be closer to the Supreme Leader's office. Additionally, their interests and the power rent they gain from proximity to the Supreme Leader's office require them to keep this difference and schism invisible. Therefore, it seems that we can divide the Iranian government in terms of political and economic conditions into before and after the JCPOA. Mr. Alijani, you mentioned the schism and spoke about its invisibility. Which forces have been strengthened more? Has it only been a technocratic faction and a moderate, pragmatic faction that has gained power, or have other factions also increased their power following the JCPOA? Overall, it can be said that just as Rouhani won the election and defeated Jalili, this discourse has also been strengthened in the social arena. The parliamentary elections also largely demonstrated this. In the economic sphere, when a slight opening occurs, which is still very minimal and incomplete, it benefits the government. The parliamentary elections showed that and the conditions of the last two or three years, a relative activation, of course, with all the difficulties and obstacles that exist, and civil society and Islamic associations in universities, some professional associations like teachers and some labor and women's organizations have overall been able to strengthen more than in the past, which is not only related to the JCPOA. It relates to the new conditions in Iran. This is a time when lower-income groups also supported Rouhani's slogan that 'I want my economy to turn as the centrifuges turn.' From now on, perhaps this challenge will continue. Do you think this has led to the formation of a new political force? I mean, we used to have reformists and conservatives. Is this a new political force where a new set of groups has come together? On the surface, yes. On the surface, a moderate technocratic current has emerged that is more tolerated in these security conditions. Just as Mr. Rouhani remained, Mr. Khatami or Mr. Hashemi were sidelined. However, I do not think the fundamental issue, meaning the main arrangement of political forces in Iran, has changed. Because two discourses are debating in Iran. One discourse wants to interact with the world, seeks peace in the region, and wants the constitution to be partially implemented domestically. The other current thinks the opposite. We see this conflict from the reformist era, it peaks during the Green Movement, and with the suppression of that street formation of the Green Movement, it becomes somewhat subterranean. In the 2013 elections, it rises somewhat. I think part of the forces from the opposing current shifts towards this side, just as it did during the Green Movement led by Mr. Mousavi. In this period, it also shifts towards this side through Rouhani's diplomacy and interactive discourse in the world and region. In any case, on the surface, the moderate current has become stronger; it has become stronger than before. But fundamentally, I do not think the arrangement of political forces in Iran has moved outside of those two discourses of conservative-conservative and reformist. How do you see the position of the IRGC? In recent months, much has been said about the issue that the JCPOA has helped the IRGC gain power. The IRGC has been powerful politically and economically in Iran, and we have seen manifestations of it over the past one or two decades. What position has the JCPOA placed the IRGC in? It can be said that during Ahmadinejad's presidency, the IRGC attempted to seize the Iranian economy, which was minimal, and if you read Ms. Vossoughi's memoirs from the City Council, you will see that at that time, they were taking steps to take over Tehran. During Ahmadinejad's eight-year presidency, the IRGC tried to capture the Iranian economy and seized a large part of it. They entered parliament. Many governors and many members of company boards were all IRGC members. I think the JCPOA has not overall benefited the IRGC, but it has brought the behind-the-scenes challenges to the forefront. The fact that the IRGC is more vocal than before and even stands against the JCPOA, undermining JCPOA 2 alongside Mr. Khamenei, is due to their feeling of weakness and the threat to their interests. They feel that if we only look at the discourse, the government is moving towards reconciliation, and we must prevent this reconciliation, just as during Mr. Hashemi's era when they felt Hashemi wanted to reconcile with the West and Europe, they created obstacles in Europe, and their sabotage was somewhat more severe and included terrorist actions. Now we see them climbing the walls of the British embassy. Mr. Soleimani's statement emerges surprisingly. Hassan Nasrallah's remarks are highlighted. I do not see these challenges as a sign of the IRGC's advancement. They are a sign of the IRGC's concern that their interests may be endangered, and furthermore, behind-the-scenes challenges are ongoing regarding the division of assets and the released funds of Iran, which (based on very serious hearsay) the IRGC wants a significant share for the war in Syria and support for Hezbollah, and the government, despite all its weaknesses, is resisting to some extent. The fact that the IRGC is making more noise than before is a sign of their concern rather than their strengthening and advancement. Another issue that will become more prominent from now on is that we are gradually approaching the end of the government's term. We have the presidential elections ahead in a year. In the coming year, how will the implementation of the JCPOA affect the presidential elections, and can Hassan Rouhani's government use it as an asset for re-election or not? Opponents of the JCPOA, both inside Iran and in the international arena, are using all their power. Now it is the turn of Rouhani's government to make use of it. That is, the opponents of the JCPOA in the U.S. and other regional countries are making every effort to prevent the JCPOA from progressing, especially to ensure that economic facilitation for Iran does not occur. They are trying to exploit the flaws in the agreement itself to make investment in Iran more difficult. In this regard, it seems that the extremist current inside Iran is also acting in alignment with the sabotage they are carrying out, launching missiles and writing specific slogans on the missiles, and trying to make their intervention in the region, which contradicts the national interests of Iranians, more public with a harsher rhetoric. In any case, they have tried to turn the point of strength of Rouhani's government, which is one of its important promises regarding the nuclear file, into a negative point. However, here they are also being clever because opposition to the JCPOA is not well-received in public opinion. That is, it is a banana peel under the feet of the right current. People do not like the idea of war between Iran and the world and conflict and tension. As a result, two layers collide here. For their grassroots supporters and Basij, they promote that the government's foreign policy has been conciliatory and has reached a deadlock. For the people, they try to say that the economy that Mr. Rouhani promised has not materialized. Now the issues of corruption and such are used as seasoning and sauce. The government must be able to act more strongly in this media and propaganda war, which is also subject to criticism and protest, and also in dealing with corruption, where they have tried to equalize the game with these government salary slips; the government can act more strongly. But more importantly, the government must succeed in investment and job creation. I believe that in the coming year, this conflict will intensify, and if the government does not clarify and explain why economic reforms are not progressing at an appropriate pace, part of which may be the government's inability and mismanagement, but the main part is the sabotage occurring in foreign policy. What has been referred to as JCPOA 2. In any case, the people have now been layered. A large part still thinks they are in a state of hope and fear. They see the barriers to economic growth and development, but some are becoming disillusioned. The speed of economic improvement is not sufficient for them given their urgency and the difficulties of life, and the large salaries that some government officials have received have intensified this issue. I think we should expect to see more tense days in this area in the coming year.