There is very little time left until the presidential elections on May 29, 2017. As always, the question arises again for consideration: what should be done with this election? First, we assume that the following propositions are true and valid: a- "The level of participation in elections legitimizes the political system." b- "The absence of people's participation in elections delegitimizes the political system." c- "To delegitimize the Islamic Republic, elections must be boycotted." Initially, assuming these claims are true and valid, we will discuss the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of the boycott and other forms of opposition—such as increasing invalid votes through blank voting—and then we will talk about the truth of these claims. Who should boycott the elections? Participation in elections or boycotting elections is the right of individuals and groups. Which individuals and groups should boycott or do boycott the elections? The 38-year experience of the Islamic Republic has shown that individuals and groups within the country do not boycott elections. When the Islamic Republic makes elections completely non-competitive through the Guardian Council's oversight, those within the country will at best say: "We will not vote." Therefore, the boycott of elections should be carried out by opponents of the Islamic Republic residing outside the country. Those outside the country can be divided into three categories: a- Groups whose main goal is the overthrow of the Islamic Republic, who have always boycotted the Islamic Republic's elections and have asked everyone not to participate in the elections. b- Some groups and individuals have remained silent regarding the elections and have not taken a position. c- Others have encouraged people to participate in the elections. If boycotting the Islamic Republic's elections is a principled act, and non-compliance with it is unjust from the perspective of moral foundations and political principles, then the elections should be boycotted regardless of the consequences. Those who hold such a belief have made the boycott a moral issue and a taboo, and they harshly criticize those who participate in the elections. The simplest form of this claim is as follows: participating in the elections means legitimizing the dictatorship of the Islamic Republic and cooperating with them. However, if boycotting the elections is a political tactic aimed at results, then elections can only be boycotted when it leads to expected outcomes. In other words, if the goal is to significantly reduce people's participation in the elections—so much so that it delegitimizes the regime—then the boycott is justified only if it leads to this outcome (ethics and consequentialist politics). A look at the participation rates in presidential elections: Analyzing the statistics of eleven presidential elections is a way to clarify the question of whether the boycott is "effective" or "ineffective." The participation rates in the elections are as follows: 1st election 1979: 86.29%, 2nd election 1981: 24.24%, 3rd election 1985: 26.74%, 4th election 1989: 54.78%, 5th election 1993: 54.59%, 6th election 1997: 66.50%, 7th election 2001: 79.92%, 8th election 2005: 67.77%, 9th election 2009: 62.66%, 10th election 2013: 72.7%, 11th election 2017: 72.7%. As can be seen, at least 50.66% and at most 85% of eligible voters have participated in presidential elections. The high participation rate of over 50% indicates that the boycotters have had little impact on people's participation. A fixed percentage of people do not participate in elections even in the freest countries. This fixed percentage cannot be attributed to the opponents of a regime. For example, look at the U.S. presidential elections during the same period of the Islamic Republic—namely 2016 and 1980. The minimum participation was 49.1% in 1996 and the maximum was 61.6% in 2008. In the 2016 elections, the participation rate was 57.9%. Thus, the participation rate in Iranian presidential elections during this period has been higher than that of the U.S. Boycotters can only demonstrate their effectiveness if they can reduce the minimum participation of the Islamic Republic—i.e., 50%—by at least 20% through the boycott, thereby reducing total participation to, say, 30%. However, under current conditions, this goal is unattainable. Because apart from those who consider participation in elections their duty, there are also individuals who traditionally participate in elections. Independently of these, reformists, prominent and credible figures who have been imprisoned, and leaders of the Green Movement also call on people to participate in the elections. Now, the leaders of the Green Movement, all the Greens and imprisoned reformists have made Seyyed Mohammad Khatami their external symbol. Individuals and groups residing outside the country, despite all the media they have used and continue to use, and all their demands presented with hundreds of witnesses and evidence (BBC, VOA, Radio Farda, Radio Zamaneh, Radio Deutsche Welle, dozens of websites, YouTube, millions of personal social media channels like Telegram, Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram, etc.), lack the authority of personalities and individuals inside the country. In other words, none have the social base of personalities like Engineer Mir Hossein Mousavi, Mehdi Karroubi, Seyyed Mohammad Khatami, the household of Ayatollah Montazeri, and so on. When these figures call on people to participate in elections, the boycott of elections by all opponents residing outside will have no effect. Unintentional or deliberate assistance to the suppressors: In this election period, Ayatollah Khamenei, court clerics, and military personnel (the IRGC, etc.) have mobilized to bring down Hassan Rouhani under titles such as Western-oriented, non-revolutionary, conciliatory, and believing in the U.S. as a "big brother," and to bring the most extremist forces to power under the name of "anti-American revolutionaries". They, in addition to using clerics, Friday prayer leaders, the IRGC, Basij, state media, and other government media, have a traditional social base that considers participation in elections a religious duty. In other words, they have a "minimum guaranteed vote". Tactics such as boycotting elections or casting blank votes and voting for prisoners, even if they are effective, practically only benefit the most extremist suppressors of the Islamic Republic. Because the "minimum votes of the extremist faction of the government" are guaranteed. However, reducing votes and increasing invalid votes decreases the votes of the rival extremist faction of the regime. Ayatollah Khamenei, court clerics, and the military will transform Iran's image back to the era of Ahmadinejad, thus forming a global consensus against Iran and providing a pretext for military action against Iran. If individuals and groups are consciously pursuing the goal of creating such an image of Iran in the world, they must act in such a way that figures like "Ayatollah Mass Murderer"—Ebrahim Raisi—or Saeed Jalili become president. However, if they do not have such an intention and do not want Iran and Iranians to become even more trapped than they already are, they should at least not propose plans whose practical outcome benefits the most extremist parts of the Islamic Republic and harms Iranians. Although the current atmosphere in the country is non-electoral, after the Nowruz holidays, the all-out assault of the IRGC, Basij, Friday prayer leaders, clerics, and all media against Hassan Rouhani will create an electoral and bipolar atmosphere. They will repeat the slogans of the far-right worldwide. They will talk about the independence of the country and the destructive role of Western governments led by the U.S. in the country's situation. They will speak of poverty, misery, unemployment, and recession. They will launch a movement for the underprivileged. But they have done nothing but "national plunder". They have made corruption structural and widespread, and they present it in such a way that if all political and economic power falls into the hands of revolutionaries (i.e., the IRGC and Basij), all issues and problems will be solved. The relationship between voting and legitimizing the regime: The proposition that claims: "Voting means legitimizing the system" is false. Neither low participation rates in U.S. elections—especially congressional elections, which have been a maximum of 40% in 1982 and a minimum of 36% in 2014—delegitimizes the democratic political system of this country, nor does high participation in the elections of a dictatorial regime legitimize that regime. For example, the military dictatorship of Myanmar declared that more than 98% of the people participated in the constitutional referendum in 2008 and more than 92% voted positively for it. However, no one in the world considered that constitution legitimate and democratic. The democracy movement in Myanmar, led by Aung San Suu Kyi, continues to seek a way to reform this constitution that guarantees military dominance. Legitimacy—as Max Weber explained—is divided into three types: traditional, charismatic, and rational/democratic. Traditional and charismatic legitimacy has no connection to the votes of the people. Rational and democratic legitimacy depends on the votes of the people. That is, people create a political system with their satisfied votes. Thus, even if Engineer Mir Hossein Mousavi or Seyyed Mohammad Khatami becomes president with 90% participation from the people, the regime still lacks democratic legitimacy. Because the legal regime (the constitution) and the real regime (the reality of the Islamic Republic) are not democratic and committed to human rights. Ayatollah Khamenei claims that the threat of war is pure lies. Should democracy-seeking opponents think like him and believe that the rise of moderates or extremists in the Islamic Republic has no impact on the occurrence of war? Elections are an "opportunity". An opportunity for "peace seekers" and "war seekers". Peace seekers should not allow the monopoly of the military to create a pretext for military attack on Iran. When the danger is very great, no matter how low the probability is, one must be very cautious.
How Effective is the Opposition's Boycott of the Elections?
As Iran approaches its presidential elections, the effectiveness of the opposition's boycott is questioned. The article argues that boycotting elections may not significantly impact participation rates, which have historically remained high, and warns that such tactics could inadvertently aid the regime. The author emphasizes the need for strategic consideration in opposition actions to avoid strengthening extremist factions within the government.
👥 Key Players
📰 What Happened
The article discusses the effectiveness of the opposition's call to boycott the 2017 Iranian presidential elections. It analyzes past election participation rates and argues that boycotts have not significantly reduced voter turnout.
- Participation rates in Iranian elections have historically remained above 50%.
- Opposition groups outside Iran advocate for boycotts, but their impact is limited.
💡 Why It Matters
📚 Background
Iran's elections are often criticized for lacking competitiveness due to the Guardian Council's control over candidate eligibility.
Translated from the original and edited for English readers. View original source →
Translation confidence: 85%