How Khamenei Created the Dichotomy Between Pro-Russian and Pro-Western Factions

On September 19, 2016, Ayatollah Khamenei stated in a meeting with the commanders of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, "I have no concerns about the future and believe that, with divine success, the country's tomorrow will be much better than today." Two days later, on September 21, during the Eid al-Ghadir, he reiterated this claim and expressed his reasons for optimism about the future, saying: "The young people who are currently working hard in this country to revive Islam and establish religion are, thank God, increasing day by day. These are the ones who, by divine grace and support, will bring every enemy, including America and the Zionists, to their knees. The reason I repeatedly say that I am optimistic about the future is due to observing these realities. We have many good realities that can move us forward; they can be the driving force of the public movement of society; good, faithful, and prepared young people who shed tears to be allowed to go and defend; it is not about two or ten or a hundred people; there are many. This is the motivation that will save the country; this must be strengthened." Consider Khamenei's claims: a) There are thousands or hundreds of thousands of young people ready for martyrdom in Iran. b) They are capable of bringing America and Israel to their knees. c) Therefore, there is not only no concern about the future, but the country's tomorrow will be much better than today. Let’s assume the first two claims are true. However, how can the third claim be inferred from those two premises? Suppose a combination of unintended and intended events leads to a war between Iran and Israel, which inevitably—according to laws passed by the U.S. Congress—will also involve the U.S. government. Suppose Iran is capable of inflicting serious damage on Israel. In that case, the Israeli government will not hesitate to use nuclear weapons. Let’s assume they do not use nuclear weapons. Israel and the U.S. can turn Iran into another Syria. Let’s assume that in this war, hundreds of thousands of young Iranians are martyred and the U.S. and Israel cannot prevail, but an Iran that has become another Syria will certainly not be "much better than today’s Iran." How does Khamenei feel at ease? The reality is that Ayatollah Khamenei is extremely worried. If he were not worried, all that talk about "infiltration" and "infiltrators" would not make sense. One cannot reduce all those claims to a justification tool for internal repression. We remember that in a private meeting with members of the Society of Teachers of Qom Seminary, when they criticized Ahmadinejad and his remarks about Iran, Islam, Shiism, and hijab, Khamenei said these are not real issues. He reminded them that when the members of the governments of Hashemi Rafsanjani and Mohammad Khatami went abroad for negotiations, he was worried that there would be no compromise or betrayal. But during Ahmadinejad's era, whenever the officials of this government went abroad, he felt completely at ease about this. The period of Hassan Rouhani completely changed Khamenei's situation in this regard. Hassan Rouhani spoke with Obama over the phone. John Kerry and Zarif had hundreds of direct and phone negotiations with each other. The nuclear agreement was reached by ignoring most of Khamenei's red lines. The structure of the sanctions passed by the U.S. Congress is such that Iran remains trapped in fundamental sanctions. Ayatollah Khamenei has inadvertently transformed the dichotomy of revolutionaries and anti-revolutionaries into a divide between pro-Russian and pro-Western factions. The regional and global policy he has pursued and continues to pursue will entrap Iran deeper into this dichotomy in the less than eight months remaining until the presidential elections. Nevertheless, Hassan Rouhani spoke of using the JCPOA model for direct dialogue with the U.S. on other areas of disagreement. These remarks faced direct reactions from Khamenei, the commanders of the IRGC, court clerics, and so on. There is a lot of doubt about Hassan Rouhani. Some informed sources say that Vladimir Putin told General Qassem Soleimani that Rouhani is a British spy. For this reason, the use of Russian fighter jets from Iranian military airports was coordinated directly with General Soleimani and approved by Khamenei, and Rouhani's government later became aware of this. Khamenei's "pro-Russian" policy stands in opposition to the policy of improving relations with Western governments led by Hassan Rouhani's administration. Khamenei and the principlists initially tried to create a heavy atmosphere of infiltrators, an "English list," detaining individuals as infiltrators, opposing the visits of Western officials as infiltrators, opposing the visits of Western citizens as infiltrators, preventing the fulfillment of electoral promises, etc., to force Hassan Rouhani to personally withdraw from re-nomination. However, Rouhani's numerous dialogues have removed his doubts, and he has now stated that he will run again. After this issue became clear, widespread rumors have circulated that the Guardian Council is very likely to disqualify Hassan Rouhani. In addition to the views and actions of his first presidential term, Hossein Fereydoun - Hassan Rouhani's brother - is his biggest weakness. It is not clear why Hassan Rouhani stands behind his brother and keeps him in the government. Should Rouhani sacrifice national interests and the country's interests for his brother? The important thing is to have a strong, efficient, specialized, and young government that can save the country from this miserable situation and prevent Iran from getting caught in a regional war - for example, with Saudi Arabia and its allies. Khamenei will feel at ease when the country is entirely in the hands of revolutionary forces - namely Hezbollahis, the IRGC, Basij, etc. He has arranged for a revolutionary force - for example, Ebrahim Raisi, whose hands are stained with the blood of thousands - to succeed him. Khamenei wants the presidency to also be in the hands of one of the revolutionary forces. However, if there is competition between Hassan Rouhani and one of the revolutionaries he has in mind, Rouhani will win. Khamenei and his followers have polarized the atmosphere significantly for several years. For them, the main dichotomy is the divide between revolutionary and anti-revolutionary forces. The forces defending the country's independence and the infiltrating forces dependent on foreigners. This polarization will completely backfire on them. Because Khamenei, the IRGC, and court clerics have already turned the upcoming elections into a dichotomy between pro-Russian and pro-Western factions. They consider Khamenei a symbol of resistance against the West and accuse and will accuse rivals of treason against the country and the revolution. Major General Qassem Soleimani referred to the meeting with Putin and Ayatollah Khamenei on October 23, 2016, saying: "One of the important figures in the world who claims superpower status, when he met with the Leader of the Revolution, stated that now I understand how Iran has resisted with all these problems until now." General Soleimani says that unity against the enemy - America - is more essential than anything else. In this battle, Iran cannot be divided, and some cannot consider the enemy a friend. If one of the officials considers the enemy a friend, "this act is treason." People should not be engaged in discussions that do not even involve half a percent of the population. If officials do such things and some people also support them, "such an act is treason." The battle is being fought on two important fronts: Ayatollah Khamenei has inadvertently transformed the dichotomy of revolutionaries and anti-revolutionaries into a divide between pro-Russian and pro-Western factions. The regional and global policy he has pursued and continues to pursue will entrap Iran deeper into this dichotomy in the less than eight months remaining until the presidential elections. First - Who will succeed Khamenei? Khamenei designed the Assembly of Experts through the Guardian Council and fraud in such a way that he could appoint his desired individual as his successor. He managed to fraudulently bring Ahmad Jannati into the Assembly of Experts and sit at its head. However, reality will not entirely conform to his wishes and desires. How long Khamenei will live? Who will be the country's president? Which way will global and regional developments go? When will Ahmad Jannati pass away? And... all will influence the selection of the next leader. Second - Who will be the next president? Khamenei checkmated Mahmoud Ahmadinejad with a meeting and subsequent media propaganda. But it is more challenging regarding Hassan Rouhani. If Hassan Rouhani is to be disqualified by the Guardian Council, Khamenei and his forces must be prepared to pay the cost of that. If Hassan Rouhani is not disqualified, no matter how bad the economic situation is (tens of millions are below the absolute and relative poverty line, millions are unemployed, the country is still not out of economic recession and has not reached stable high economic growth, etc.), Rouhani will still defeat the pro-Russian Hezbollah candidate. Ayatollah Khamenei has inadvertently transformed the dichotomy of revolutionaries and anti-revolutionaries into a divide between pro-Russian and pro-Western factions. The regional and global policy he has pursued and continues to pursue will entrap Iran deeper into this dichotomy in the less than eight months remaining until the presidential elections.