How Serious is Putin's Nuclear Posturing?

Five days before Vladimir Putin announced that Russia would make conditions for potential nuclear weapon use against its enemies easier, one of those nuclear weapons experienced a stunning explosion. Satellite images show that the Sarmat missile, Russia's newest intercontinental ballistic missile, which Putin has repeatedly boasted about, obliterated all trees, buildings, and land around the missile launch test silo at the Plesetsk spaceport in a previously undisclosed explosion on September 21. In his address to the National Security Council on October 4, which was broadcast on television to draw attention beyond the walls of the Kremlin, Putin made no mention of this incident. However, he ensured that the world, particularly NATO and the United States, received the message he wanted them to hear: that he is updating Russia's nuclear doctrine. Putin stated, "The updated version of the document suggests that aggression against Russia by any non-nuclear state, but with the participation and support of a nuclear state, should be considered a joint attack on the Russian Federation." Since March 2022, when he sent tens of thousands of troops to the borders to occupy Ukraine, Putin has repeatedly hinted, signaled, threatened, and warned that Russia is ready to use its nuclear arsenal, the largest in the world, to defend itself. He has yet to do so, but Putin and other Russian officials have continuously issued threats, some covert and some overt, unsettling arms control experts, military analysts, and policymakers. Nikolai Sokov, a former Russian diplomat and arms control negotiator now working with the Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation, states that it is difficult to understand what has changed until Moscow actually publishes specifications indicating that its nuclear doctrine has changed. However, he believes this is certainly a sign. Sokov told Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, "I haven't seen anything that is fundamentally new. Everything Putin said has existed for a long time... He articulated the existing policy much more clearly, but added new details that are adapted to the current situation." Sokov also notes, "This represents a warning to NATO, as NATO continues to consider whether Western weapons should be used for long-range attacks or not," referring to ongoing movements by Ukraine seeking permission to target objectives inside Russian territory. The next day, Dmitry Peskov, the Kremlin spokesman, stated that this is precisely the intention they had. Peskov said, "This should be considered a specific sign; a sign that warns these countries about the consequences of participating in an attack on our country by any means, not necessarily nuclear." "This guideline is a living tool" For several generations, Soviet and now Russian policymakers have relied on strategic deterrence tools in their military and foreign policy toolbox, attempting to compel other countries to do what Moscow wants by signaling or threatening potential use of nuclear weapons. Over the past decade, Putin has significantly increased the budget for the armed forces of the country, including its nuclear arsenal. This includes new models such as hypersonic weapons, nuclear cruise missiles, and the Sarmat intercontinental ballistic missile, which has been deployed despite at least three previous incidents. Russia's arsenal, with strategic weapons like long-range missiles and less powerful tactical weapons like nuclear artillery shells, is now the largest of its kind in the world, with the United States a close second. Western planners, particularly those who are concerned about when Moscow will decide to launch its missiles, are closely monitoring official statements not only from the Kremlin but also from the Ministry of Defense and senior Russian foreign policy officials. The document "Fundamental Principles of State Policy on Nuclear Deterrence" in Russia is the main guideline for determining the timing and conditions for the use of nuclear weapons. In 2020, Russian officials published an updated version of this guideline, which, however, did not contain significant changes from the past. According to this guideline, Moscow may use its nuclear arsenal "in response to the use of nuclear weapons and other types of weapons of mass destruction against itself or its allies, and also in the event of aggression against the Russian Federation using conventional weapons when there is a vital threat to the state." Many experts have focused on what might be considered a vital threat to the state. One published interpretation suggests that a popular uprising against Putin and his government could also be deemed worthy of a nuclear response. In June, during a business meeting in St. Petersburg, a prominent Russian analyst urged Putin to lower the threshold for nuclear weapon use. Putin disagreed but stated he was ready to review this policy. The Russian president said, "This guideline is a living tool; we closely monitor what is happening around us and do not rule out changes to the nuclear guideline." William Burns, the head of the CIA, stated that Russia's threats of potential use of tactical nuclear weapons in Ukraine were serious in the months following the March 2022 invasion of the country. Burns said he warned his Russian counterpart about this. However, it seems that several incidents during this conflict have blurred or even erased some of these red lines, leading to greater ambiguities in the West regarding Moscow's planning. Ukraine's use of drones to attack early warning radars from a distance, which are used to detect missile launches from afar, has terrified Western policymakers, as they worry that this could be perceived as a threat to Russia's strategic defense, as stated in the nuclear guideline. Putin has suggested that Ukrainian territories that the Kremlin claims to have annexed, although no other country recognizes them as Russian territory, fall under the nuclear guideline. On the other hand, Ukraine continues to attack Russian forces, including with Western weapons, in many of these occupied territories, with Kyiv stating its goal is to reclaim all Russian-occupied lands. In August, Ukrainian forces launched a bold cross-border attack into Russian territory in Kursk. This was the largest attack on Russian territory by foreign forces since World War II and may have met the conditions set in Russia's nuclear guideline. NATO and the United States are considering Ukraine's requests for permission to strike targets deep inside Russian territory with Western long-range missiles, something Moscow has repeatedly warned against. The Kremlin's decision to broadcast Putin's address to the National Security Council reflects Russia's determination to send a message one day before Zelensky's visit to the White House, where it was expected that Zelensky would raise the request for permission for long-range strikes, among other issues. However, Putin did not clarify whether Russia's nuclear guideline has been officially updated or if this was merely a suggestion that a conventional attack on Russia by a country supported by a nuclear-armed state would warrant a nuclear response. Pavel Podvig, a senior researcher at the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research in Geneva, states that Putin's statements do not imply that Russia's nuclear guideline has undergone a fundamental change. Podvig told Current Time, "If you look closely at the events and consider the history of the issue, in fact, not much has changed." He added, "For now, everything remains just at the level of words, and we still have not seen any real steps toward escalation. I think we should be cautious, but on the other hand, we should not overreact." Zhiadong Liang, a senior political analyst at the Arms Control Association, also stated, "There are certainly more details, and we should think about this kind of routine nuclear threats that Russia is making." Luke Coffey, a former advisor to the UK Ministry of Defense who is now a senior researcher at the Hudson Institute in Washington, said that with only a few weeks until the U.S. presidential election, Putin's statements are somewhat aimed at Americans. According to Coffey, Putin "is a very shrewd politician and understands how the issue of nuclear weapons plays into domestic discussions in the United States. He is a master of this propaganda and information warfare." Coffey also stated, "What was announced today by Putin was not really a major deviation from Russia's nuclear guideline; he may have emphasized more the support of a nuclear state for a non-nuclear state attacking Russia."