How the JCPOA Could Have Been a Better Agreement?

What objectives did the Iran nuclear agreement with the P5+1 pursue, and to what extent have these objectives been met? More importantly, from the critics' perspective, how could this nuclear agreement have been better? Daryl Kimball has answered some of these questions in an interview with Radio Farda. Daryl Kimball is the executive director of the Arms Control Association in Washington, a non-governmental organization focused on educating and advocating for actions related to the control of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. In 2004, National Journal named Mr. Kimball as one of the ten individuals whose opinions shape the political discourse regarding the future of nuclear weapons. When I speak with some critics of the agreement, they say that this agreement has not succeeded in preventing Iran from accessing a bomb and that Iran is still seeking to do so in the future. What is your opinion on this? I think we need to assess the JCPOA, which was reached last year, comprehensively. We must remember that before these negotiations began between Iran and the P5+1, the Iranians were rapidly developing their capability to produce fissile material that could be used in weapons. At that time and now, there was and is a pressing need for a verifiable reduction in the ability to produce highly enriched uranium and plutonium, and the JCPOA precisely does this. No diplomatic agreement can verifiably prevent a country's ambitions. However, diplomatic agreements in disarmament can create conditions that can limit or prevent some of these ambitions. Therefore, I think it is important to emphasize that the JCPOA has closed off all of Iran's pathways to nuclear weapons for over a decade. Critics may argue that this agreement has not closed these pathways forever, but such an agreement is not achievable. If the JCPOA had not been reached, Iran would currently have 20,000 active centrifuges and would be producing enough material necessary for a weapon that if it wanted to, it could do so within two or three weeks. We would then be in a very bad situation. Critics may say that this agreement was not enough, and as a disarmament advocate, I may not be completely satisfied, but there is no negotiation where you can obtain everything you want, and this negotiation was no exception. However, this agreement achieved what we needed, which was to block Iran's pathways to nuclear weapons for at least a decade. You mentioned that you are not 100% satisfied with this agreement. If we could turn back time, what should the negotiators have done to make this agreement more to your liking? I am not saying that the negotiators could have done better to achieve a better agreement; what I mean is that no agreement can meet all of what one side wants. Such agreements are the result of compromise and give-and-take. What matters is whether an agreement has met the objective it sought, which I believe it has. However, how this could have been a better agreement, in my opinion, would be if the limitations on Iran's nuclear program had been longer. But if the limitations were to be extended, they could not have been enforced as strictly. This was part of that give-and-take. Perhaps the agreement aimed to eliminate all of Iran's enrichment capabilities, but the Iranians still had the science and technology, and merely extending the time for Iran to do this again and produce the necessary materials for weapons would not yield anything. From a disarmament perspective, there are peripheral issues that could have been better, but what is important is that the agreement fulfills the core interests of the international community in preventing Iran's efforts to acquire nuclear weapons. Another criticism that is often heard in Washington is that critics are dissatisfied with the way the Agency reports on Iran and believe that these reports do not provide enough detail for them to have an accurate picture of Iran's nuclear program. You are an expert in this field. Are these reports sufficient for you? What matters is that the Agency states whether Iran is complying with its multiple commitments under the JCPOA. In both reports that have been published so far, the Agency states that Iran is fully compliant with these commitments, and this is the most important issue. The Agency has always been somewhat reticent in providing details about the nuclear programs of its members. The reports it has published could have included information about where its inspectors have gone and what they have found, or provided more details about the stockpiles. This could have been interesting and useful for researchers, allowing them to independently analyze this information, but the Agency has this approach and implements it. Another reason for this approach is that the Agency must conduct these investigations for another 25 years and prepare reports for members approximately every three months. This is costly and requires a lot of manpower to prepare more detailed reports. As a result, this entity must weigh the cost-benefit of such detailed reports. However, the criticisms made by people like Olli Heinonen, a former Agency official, do not change the fact that the Agency has conducted many inspections and has stated in its reports that Iran is compliant with all its commitments under the JCPOA. Mr. Kimball, how do you envision the future of Iran's nuclear program? What Iran has achieved with this agreement is that within the limited scope of the JCPOA, it still has the capability to continue its program for producing nuclear energy, can produce medical isotopes, and has maintained the core structure of its nuclear framework. Where Iran takes this program in the next 10 or 15 years after the main limitations are lifted depends on what the world and Iran do by then. One important thing we need to do is to gain sufficient regional support for extending some limitations in the JCPOA so that no country in the Middle East enriches uranium beyond the level that Iran is allowed to, which is enriching uranium-238 at a level of 3.6%. Regional restrictions should be applied to the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel, as this could lead to the production of plutonium used in weapons. This is an approach that could convince Iran to extend these limitations. The second action is to justify that there is no technical or economic justification for further developing uranium enrichment in Iran. Currently, Iran has limited enrichment capability, which is not even sufficient for producing fuel for a power reactor, and as long as a country like Russia, which is cooperating with Iran in building reactors, is willing to supply fuel for the reactor, there is no need for Iran to develop its uranium enrichment capability in the years following the JCPOA. These are issues that need to be addressed to understand whether Iran will pose a proliferation threat or not. Even if we set aside the threat issue, Iran has emphasized that it wants to have a dynamic and independent nuclear program in the future. Iran accepted the JCPOA limitations in exchange for lifting sanctions, so what motivation will there be for this? One justification is that other countries in the region accept similar limitations, which is beneficial for Iran. However, this is a region where we also have Pakistan or Israel, which possess nuclear weapons. Yes, we also have countries like Saudi Arabia that could potentially seek nuclear weapons, and it is in Iran's interest for its neighbors to accept this limitation. Another reason that is in Iran's favor is that it can continue to receive fuel for its electricity generation plants, which is a much cheaper way to supply fuel for these plants compared to developing its domestic capabilities. Increasing enrichment levels in the next 10 or 15 years could again lead to international condemnation and the imposition of new sanctions. There are pragmatists in Iran who understand the costs and benefits of actions in this area, and if the benefits of adhering to the JCPOA become clear to the people and leadership of Iran in the next decade, the likelihood that Iran will accept this limitation in the future increases. In recent weeks, there has been much talk about regional countries' efforts to develop their nuclear programs and even the desire to produce weapons. You mentioned Saudi Arabia. What impact do you think the JCPOA has had on this trend? I think what is clear and what other experts have recently stated is that with the JCPOA and the removal of the possibility of Iran obtaining weapons in the coming decade, the motivation for countries like Saudi Arabia to develop and acquire uranium enrichment technology or nuclear weapons has significantly decreased. The competition between Iran and Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries in the region still exists, but these countries should not be worried about a nuclear-armed Iran for a long time, so I think the JCPOA has significantly reduced the threat of weapons proliferation in this region.