How Will the Islamic Republic Manage the Post-Raisi Era?

The fatal fall of Ebrahim Raisi has created a special situation in the Islamic Republic. His death at the age of 63 does not in itself have a significant impact on the performance of the Islamic Republic unless he was considered a candidate for succession to Khamenei. In this case, the investments made would be wasted, and the regime would not have an easy task in finding a replacement. Raisi's advantage before becoming president was his support from the majority of principlist forces, but his weak performance during his presidency has changed perceptions. In addition to the majority of Iranians' aversion, which was shown in their reluctance to participate in the thirteenth presidential election, he also faced increasing dissatisfaction from principlists and some of their factions. In the twelfth parliamentary elections, only the 'Amanat' list featured his photo alongside Ayatollah Khomeini and Ali Khamenei. The formation of Raisi's government was the result of years of policymaking by the Guardian Jurist institution, led by Khamenei, which, through extensive interventions, suppression of political and social freedoms, and staunch resistance to reforms and revisionism, was able to establish its desired 'Islamic government' by reducing the presidency to the executive vice-presidency of the Guardian Jurist. Raisi's presidency; a failure of illusion or a victory of conspiracy? Raisi ascended the ranks on a smooth ground and did not do anything special himself. He was the only president who did not claim to represent the will of the people and considered himself an executor of Khamenei's policies everywhere. He shifted the burdens and problems away from the leadership and directed them towards the governing institutions, thus fulfilling the Guardian Jurist's desire for governance without accepting responsibility and accountability. Among the presidents, Raisi not only had no tension with the Supreme Leader but also filled the gap between the leadership and the presidency during his three-year presidency. Raisi was also a supporter of the hard core of power in executing the transition to a mafia government and the unified rule of aggressive principlists and shaping a parallel reality. At the same time, he sought to elevate his position in the power hierarchy to become Khamenei's successor in due time. He attempted to place his aligned forces in high levels of the system. However, his efforts to prevent Mohseni Eje'i from becoming head of the judiciary and to oust Sadegh Larijani Amoli from the presidency of the Expediency Council were unsuccessful. Some of his close associates, such as Mehrdad Bazrpash, were active in weakening Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf in the twelfth parliamentary elections. Raisi left a weak performance record. His managers were mostly weak. One of his ministers was found guilty of corruption in the 'Dabesh Tea' case. Some, like Hojjat Abdolmaleki, left the ministry early. Parliament representatives sought to impeach more ministers, which were canceled by interventions from the leadership office. Despite the fact that Raisi's government had the opportunity to sell more oil due to the Ukraine war and behind-the-scenes negotiations in exchange for the Biden administration's practical flexibility regarding sanctions, the country had reached a complete deadlock in terms of economic opening. He sought to justify and deny the skyrocketing inflation and shrinking of people's livelihoods through indirect borrowing from the central bank and statistical manipulation. His government's claims after joining the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and 'BRICS' and signing long-term cooperation agreements with China and Russia did not yield clear results in increasing investment in the country; on the contrary, the net capital flow turned negative due to widespread exits in the year 1402. What does Khamenei want from Raisi? He sought to maneuver on provincial trips and manage in the field with an emphasis on a 'jihadist' approach, which yielded no achievements other than increasing the administrative costs of the executive branch, and in the end, he risked his life over his insistence on provincial and urban trips. The new subsidy system, with the elimination of the four-thousand-toman dollar and economic surgery, was implemented both weakly and imperfectly, and the received subsidies did not have the purchasing power to match the increase in commodity prices, resulting in the average purchasing power of society being less than before the year 1400. In the years 1401 and 1402, the government had a high budget deficit. During this time, the provision of gas, gasoline, and electricity faced difficulties, and the outlook ahead stemmed from the need for imports in these areas. Encroachment on the private sector and public assets under the name of 'productive-making' also increased. The darkest aspect of the government's performance was in the political and cultural fields, where it fully implemented a repressive and contractionary view, and alignment with the judiciary reached its peak. Raisi was also unsuccessful in holding the twelfth parliamentary elections and could not advance the electoral display within the framework of defined objectives. The weak and chaotic management of the crisis surrounding the helicopter crash, indifference to warnings about adverse weather conditions in Varzeqan, poor facilities and planning in rescue efforts and locating the crashed helicopter, contradictory news, and failure in informing and engineering public opinion were a microcosm of the overall performance of Raisi's government and intensified the crisis of the regime's inefficiency. Raisi's death will not impact the regime's performance, and finding a replacement for him in the executive branch will not be a difficult task. However, the regime is currently unprepared for this and must take necessary actions to hold early presidential elections within a short period of fifty days, by July 20. The emergency situation and the occurrence of conditions that were expected to happen in 1408 have placed the regime in a special situation that may intensify competition among principlists and the premature maneuvering of those from the third generation of the Islamic Republic's officials who aspire to the presidency, creating a kind of instability in the political arena. However, it is more likely that the inauguration of the ninth president will occur smoothly. This situation has not existed for the regime for years. It was only faced in the early years after the explosion of the Prime Minister's office and the assassination of Mohammad Ali Rajai and Mohammad Javad Bahonar, which was managed in the revolutionary atmosphere of that day. Now, in a year when a cold nationwide election was held, another election must be conducted again. Mohammad Mokhber, the interim replacement for Ebrahim Raisi, who is he? According to the constitution, until the formation of the fourteenth government, the affairs of the government are in the hands of Mohammad Mokhber Dezfuli, the first vice president. He is in a position similar to that of Mohammad Reza Mahdavi Kani in 1360, who briefly held the presidency of the government. Mokhber, within fifty days, in a council composed of him, Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf, and Gholam Hossein Mohseni Eje'i, must be responsible for planning for the execution of the elections. Both Qalibaf and Mohseni Eje'i may run for the presidency. The Foreign Ministry will be managed by Ali Bagheri Kani in the absence of Hossein Amirabdollahian. Therefore, Ebrahim Raisi's death will not have a specific political and discursive impact within the regime and the political arena. He was an executor of assigned policies and never had a specific role in policymaking, nor did he have a particular advantage from a strategic and discursive perspective. His popularity among the Basij has also declined. The absence of Qassem Soleimani is much harder for the regime than that of Ebrahim Raisi. The only impact of Raisi on the power equations after Khamenei was that he did not find such an opportunity and was removed from the group of claimants. Overall, Raisi brought the presidency to zero, and his absence has no substantive impact on the reality of politics in Iran. The government has no problem in replacing and moving on from Raisi, just as Ali Khamenei said, 'no disruption will occur.' The issue is managing the timing and starting the early phase that was supposed to take shape in the future. This situation has created new and unforeseen considerations that are unlikely to cause much trouble for the regime. Raisi's successor will most likely continue his performance in the executive branch. He may only not be as obedient as him and create some margins, which, however, will not be unmanageable for the Guardian Jurist institution.