Human Rights Negotiations with the European Union: Is it JCPOA 2?

The news was brief and unexpected. The Islamic Republic has accepted to engage in human rights dialogue with the European Union. In the author's view, this news is significant for several reasons and is, at the same time, surprising: First, this news did not leak through the media but was announced by Sadegh Larijani, the head of the judiciary of the Islamic Republic, on August 5, which coincides with the first anniversary of the nuclear agreement reached on July 14, 2015, in Vienna. Second, according to this news, it is not that Iran and the EU have decided to start human rights dialogues; rather, the parties had previously begun these negotiations, but the news had not leaked to the media. (The text of the news does not indicate how many months ago the parties began negotiations). What is important is that the parties have quietly and confidentially initiated discussions earlier. This reminds the author of the secret nuclear negotiations that began in late 2012 at the behest of Ayatollah Khamenei, mediated by Oman. Third, according to Mohammad Javad Larijani, head of the Human Rights Headquarters of the judiciary, the initiative for these negotiations came from the European Union, not Iran. Reports indicated that during meetings between Catherine Ashton and Federica Mogherini (former and current representatives of the EU) in Tehran, the priority of human rights issues was communicated to the Iranian side. Fourth, and most importantly, according to Mohammad Javad Larijani, the will to start human rights negotiations with the EU 'emanates from the desire of the system.' In the language of the Islamic Republic, 'the system' equates to the leader of the Islamic Republic. Therefore, this news is of great significance as Ayatollah Khamenei has expressed his principled agreement to human rights dialogues with the EU, but the question remains as to why Ayatollah Khamenei's name is not explicitly mentioned? Fifth, according to this news, the subject of negotiation with the EU is 'critical negotiations.' Sadegh Larijani stated that the Islamic Republic positions itself as a claimant (not an accused) in human rights issues. For example, he mentioned that regarding the ban on hijab in French schools, the Islamic Republic claims a violation of human rights freedoms in the EU. What is important is that the volume of criticisms between the two sides is by no means equal. The Islamic Republic has a significant record of human rights violations and has so far refrained from cooperating with Ahmed Shaheed, while the EU has always welcomed human rights criticisms against itself. Sixth, according to this news, these negotiations are exclusively between Iran and the EU, and unlike the nuclear negotiations where the main interlocutor was the United States, Iran is not willing to engage in discussions with the US in this round of negotiations. Apparently, this decision relates to Ayatollah Khamenei's previous stance that negotiations with the US should be limited to nuclear discussions. Seventh, according to Mohammad Javad Larijani, the responsibility for these negotiations has been transferred from the Human Rights Headquarters of the judiciary (which he heads) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In this regard, there are two important considerations: a) Why is the Human Rights Headquarters of the judiciary and Mohammad Javad Larijani, who is a capable negotiator, not in charge of the negotiations? b) The transfer of responsibility from the Human Rights Headquarters to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs reminds the author of the transfer of the nuclear file from the Supreme National Security Council to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In other words, it seems that the same pattern observed at the beginning of the nuclear negotiations is also seen in the human rights negotiations. The significance of this issue is that if the nuclear negotiations were to be handled by the Supreme National Security Council, the conflict of forces within the council (including the presence of Saeed Jalili) would disrupt the negotiation process. Therefore, it appears that this arrangement has been made so that the human rights negotiations with Europe are concentrated in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs under the management of Zarif. The rigidity of Sadegh Larijani on human rights issues is exemplified by his statement: 'Western human rights principles cannot be imposed, and we cannot accept human rights that they impose on us from their liberal culture, because our religious system can have its own human rights system based on its own principles.' c) If the initiation of human rights negotiations is with the favorable opinion of Ayatollah Khamenei, it should not be doubted that the transfer of responsibility for human rights negotiations to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has also been with his favorable opinion. In other words, Ayatollah Khamenei has agreed to both the initiation of human rights negotiations and the transfer of responsibility for the negotiations to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It seems highly unlikely that if the decision were in the hands of the judiciary, this branch would ever agree to initiate negotiations or transfer responsibility for the negotiations to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. From the author's perspective, all the aforementioned considerations testify that 'JCPOA 2' has been initiated, but this time centered on human rights issues. The claim is not that these negotiations will be comprehensive, inclusive, and necessarily result in outcomes, but the claim is that Ayatollah Khamenei has initiated 'another flexibility.' Just as one cannot deny Ayatollah Khamenei's central role from the beginning to the end of the nuclear negotiations, human rights negotiations are also unimaginable without his favorable opinion. Likewise, the transfer of responsibility for negotiations from the Human Rights Headquarters to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is also inconceivable without his favorable opinion. Now, if he has agreed to human rights negotiations, the following considerations arise: First, at the beginning of 2016, when Hassan Rouhani spoke about JCPOA 2 and 3 and more, Ayatollah Khamenei immediately expressed his explicit and swift opposition to this approach. With this consideration, what new parameter has led him to agree to human rights negotiations (even if critical)? Second, excluding the US from human rights negotiations does not affect the change in approach at the top of the Islamic Republic, which is now willing to engage in critical discussions with the EU. Third, the rigidity of the Islamic Republic in rejecting human rights dialogues has been such that it has so far prevented the acceptance of Ahmed Shaheed (the human rights rapporteur) into Iran for six years. Fourth, the agreement to human rights negotiations comes at a time when the Islamic Republic has one of the darkest records of human rights violations. For example, it should not be forgotten that 32 senior officials of the Islamic Republic, including Sadegh Larijani, the head of the judiciary, are on the EU and US human rights sanctions list. We also know that since the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, mechanisms have gradually been put in place to increase international oversight of governments' adherence to human rights. The Secretary-General's reading and reporting of human rights violations to the General Assembly, the adoption and issuance of punitive resolutions condemning violating countries, sanctions against violating countries, and finally the appointment of special rapporteurs are some of these mechanisms. The severity of the human rights situation in Iran is underscored by the fact that the Islamic Republic has faced all four punitive actions mentioned above (Secretary-General's report, resolution, sanctions, and special rapporteur). It seems that the only punishment the Islamic Republic has not yet faced is the Security Council's human rights intervention. Conclusion: Although there are still many ambiguities surrounding the agreement between Iran and the EU regarding human rights dialogues, what comes to mind at first glance is that this step could be a positive move forward to address one of the most severe records of the Islamic Republic. This is while the Islamic Republic can also express its human rights criticisms. Such a positive step, although attributed to Zarif's initiative and Hassan Rouhani's management, which managed to register the nuclear negotiations in their record, would have been impossible without Ayatollah Khamenei's agreement. What is important is that one can have the positive speculation that JCPOA 2 has been initiated with a focus on human rights issues.