I Am Opposed, I Am Different, I Am Effective

Before Ahmadinejad registered as a presidential candidate, many believed that Ebrahim Raisi would be the notable phenomenon of the 96 presidential elections. However, his registration, contrary to Khamenei's advice and likely leading to his disqualification and that of his preferred candidate, Baghaei, will shift the news and electoral atmosphere towards him. By doing this, he has stolen the spotlight from Raisi up to this point. Undoubtedly, his actions will impact both the election process and its outcome. Ahmadinejad implicitly wants to convey three messages to public opinion: 'I am opposed.' His first point is to clearly show that he is not aligned with either Rouhani's government or Khamenei in managing the country. Through his three statements and press conferences, Ahmadinejad aimed to clarify the distance between himself and Rouhani's government. His registration serves to announce his distance from Khamenei and his opposition to the management of the country, particularly regarding two issues: nuclear policy (the cornerstone of his global management program) and subsidies (the cornerstone of his social justice program). He knew that all political forces within the government would condemn his registration and consciously chose this condemnation to confront Khamenei. After eight years of presidency, thousands of meetings with Iranians inside and outside the country, and millions of letters collected during provincial trips, Ahmadinejad has realized that the justice-seeking movement in Iran has no representative within the government and that Khamenei does not represent the poor. He believes that despite eight years of unsuccessful efforts relying on $700 billion in oil revenues, he can still gather the poor and unemployed behind him (with the promise of a 250,000-toman subsidy offered through Baghaei). He links his socialist justice-seeking ideology with Shiite messianism and Iranian expansionism (global management) to mobilize social support more effectively. Ahmadinejad aims to direct both domestic and foreign public opinion towards the notion that he should be considered in political equations independent of Khamenei, confronting supporters of distributive social justice (Iranian socialists inside and outside the country) with the reality that among the regime's opponents, of which Ahmadinejad has recently joined, there are no better options than him. The act of registration and subsequent disqualification of Ahmadinejad and Baghaei will send a message to his voter base (part of the impoverished classes, which according to Ghalibaf constitute sixty percent of the population and whose income is below the minimum wage) that he is not aligned with Jamna or Paydari. This outcome will be detrimental to the opposition movement against the government, allowing Rouhani to potentially be elected even in the first round with less trouble. 'I am different.' Ahmadinejad's registration explicitly states that he differs from other politicians within the system and announces that no one among the insiders and those in positions of power (members of the Expediency Council) has the audacity and courage to act against Khamenei's explicit opinions. Rafsanjani always vacated the field with Khamenei's indirect statements, let alone his direct words. Khatami does not even remind of the most basic rights violations (such as travel bans or interviews with the media); Rouhani behaves as if he has not heard Khamenei's criticisms of the government's economic programs at the beginning of 96; even Mousavi and Karroubi have not directly and explicitly opposed Khamenei. Ahmadinejad knows that he can no longer play a role as the head of the government in the politics of the Islamic Republic, and his disqualification due to registration is a lost cause. At this point, two options lay before him to shape his political fate: to play within the system and become one of Khamenei's less significant pawns in appointed institutions (like the Expediency Council), which have little impact on the country's affairs, or to stand against Khamenei and become one of the opposition leaders. He also knows that Khamenei is not a popular figure among the people or officials, and only fear keeps officials obedient to him, fear of losing interests and fear of punishment. He has seen that the more individuals who wish to be independent of Khamenei (like Khatami and Rafsanjani outside of house arrest, and Karroubi and Mousavi in house arrest) fear, the more pressure they face. 'I am effective.' His registration alongside Baghaei emphasizes that his political influence and that of his close associates have not ended, and the attacks he faces after registration (which have been significant within just 12 hours) indicate the existence of a special social base for him and his like-minded individuals. Ahmadinejad has always denied the notion that he rose on the shoulders of the right or principlist faction and today wants to show that this faction cannot defeat Rouhani without him. In a political system where the leader determines even before registration and supervises the vetting of political candidates (who can come and who cannot), Ahmadinejad's candidacy is not only cost-free for him but beneficial in every way: 1) He can use this leverage to confirm the qualification of his second preferred candidate (Baghaei; his first preferred candidate is himself). 2) This game will make Ahmadinejad and his allies less vulnerable to future judicial pressures, and he can present future pressures as political rather than judicial. 3) Ahmadinejad can attract part of the change-seeking opposition to Khamenei, who are tired of the unreached and forgotten promises of the reformists of the 1990s. He has also adopted a position similar to former reformists in cultural policies; in politics, as much as programs and promises can be attractive, steadfastness and resilience can also possess such qualities. 4) Ahmadinejad has left his reaction to the disqualification of Baghaei and himself ambiguous, thereby raising the cost of the regime's decision-making regarding candidates, something that the reformists of the 1990s have not been very successful at. Thus, Ahmadinejad's registration within the system is considered a serious challenge to the extent that some have referred to it as a sedition, some have called him an agent of British espionage, and others have labeled him a calamity for the regime. With such reactions, it seems he has succeeded in conveying the three aforementioned messages to public opinion.